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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the dissertation was to examine whether globally agreed
development goals (Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with a specific focus on
poverty reduction) were operationalized in human rights, access to justice and rule of law
programs/projects of Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and of its
executing partners. The analysis of the CIDA’s reports to Parliament and programing
documents indicates that from the first years of the launch of MDGs, they were
operationalized within the CIDA’s programing architecture and remained as a macrolevel goal of the agency. MDGs, with the focus on poverty reduction, were treated as an
ultimate goal, towards which the issues within the democratic governance portfolio were
also geared. Though CIDA acknowledged that human rights were not explicitly
mentioned in MDGs, in its programming documents CIDA continuously linked MDGs
with human rights considerations. CIDA’s programing also envisioned the achievement
of poverty reduction through activities which focused on human rights, rule of law, legal
and judicial system.
Despite the fact MDGs were declared as the overarching aim of CIDA’s efforts,
documents of the analyzed CIDA funded projects did not reference MDGs within their
projects’ architectures. Neither projects’ goals nor outcomes indicated that they were
explicitly contributing to reaching MDGs. While not explicitly referring to MDGs, some
projects stated their intent to contribute to poverty reduction and/or assistance to the poor
and marginalized. Even though these projects were concerned with poverty reduction
and/or interest of the poor and vulnerable groups, the silence towards the MGDs can be

i

interpreted as a gap between the CIDA’s corporate declared development agenda and
goals of the projects implemented in the field.
The conclusions are based on the analysis of Government of Canada policy
papers, CIDA’s official policy and strategy papers on democratic governance, human
rights, poverty reduction and sustainable development, and CIDA’s reports to Parliament.
As a part of the data collection, interviews were conducted with CIDA’s current and
former staff, as well as professionals who worked for organizations which implemented
CIDA financed projects. Documents analyzed in the dissertation projects were obtained
through access to information requests.
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The fallow ground of the poor would yield much food, but it is swept away through
injustice. (Proverbs 13:23, The Bible, ESV)
1

INTRODUCTION
In the procession of ideologies, democracy is presented as a model of prosperous,

fair and equal society with human rights, and justice, while the institutions which support
and promote them are regarded as haute couture items which any aspiring modern
fashionista society has to have and transplant. International development activities
financed by Western donors have been playing a crucial role in both projecting that
image of how prosperous and effectively functioning societies should look and act, and in
supporting the achievement of that ideal. Though, in the meantime in the background of
this catwalk of ideologies there have been ongoing debates on the constitutive elements
of the normative fabric adorning this widely lionized model, how they emerged and are
contested, and how the new components are woven into it.
1.1

PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH1
International development programs and projects are mostly viewed as

operational tools through which donor countries disburse money and material resources
in developing countries. However, they play an even more central role by being channels
through which norms and ideas are promoted in developing countries. By signing on to
these programs and projects the governments of donor and developing countries most
importantly commit to the shared understanding of principles set in them. The financial
and operational considerations come only to support the achievement of the developed,
discussed and agreed upon norms and principles. The Canadian International

1

The subchapters 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 incorporate texts from the approved dissertation proposal.
1

Development Agency’s (CIDA)2 policy on Human Rights, Democratization and Good
Governance (HRDGG) recognized the importance of programs in the transfer of norms
and noted that “program initiatives are important instruments for expressing Canadian
values, and in working to build a more just, secure and prosperous world for all.”3 But in
the analysis of development programs and projects there is a tendency to either
mechanically assess whether they reach declared outcomes or not, or whether money is
efficiently utilized and final beneficiaries benefit from a project.
Yet, the design of the program/project architecture represented by goals,
outcomes, outputs, indicators, milestones, baselines, as well as the description of issues
and risks of individual programs/projects are a foundation over which the operational side
of the program/project implementation is based. Similarly foundational is the analysis of
whether,

through

operationalization,

the

program/project

architecture

reflects

internationally agreed macro-level development goals and the theoretical framework over
which those goals are developed. The research analyzes the interaction between the
international development global normative framework and local norms represented by
the projects implemented in the field.4 Particularly, this research studies whether globally
agreed development goals (Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with a specific
focus on poverty reduction) “cascade”5 via operationalization in human rights, access to

2

In 2013, CIDA merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The
amalgamated department was named the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
(DFATD). The current name of the department is Global Affairs Canada (renamed in November 2015).
3
Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on
Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance, 3.
4
Adjusted based on the conceptual framework suggested (developed) by Dr. Homer-Dixon to the initial
draft of the research proposal, which had been presented as an assignment for the Global Governance
Research Methods course, Balsillie School of International Affairs. I would also like to thank Dr. HowardHassmann for her advice during the first steps in forming the research ideas.
5
Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”
2

justice and rule of law programs/projects of CIDA and of its executing agencies/partners.
The specific research questions are listed in the subheading 1.3 below.
1.2

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
CIDA acknowledged the crucial importance of democratic governance and human

rights in poverty reduction and “long-term sustainable development,” 6 because “[a]
democratic society—built on a foundation of freedom, human rights, the rule of law, an
engaged civil society, and effective and accountable public institutions—is more able to
provide human security and poverty alleviation for its citizens.”7 While Chapter V of the
United Nations Millennium Declaration specifically focuses on democracy, governance,
and the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law, the MDGs do not
contain specific references to governance and human rights. This discrepancy becomes
more salient in human rights, access to justice and rule of programs and projects of donor
countries and United Nations’ (UN) agencies. CIDA touched upon that “gap” in MDGs
which it considered to “be a global roadmap for CIDA’s development assistance”8 by
stating in its Sustainable Development Strategy: 2004–2006 that “the MDGs represent
long-term targets for most areas of sustainable development – with the notable exception
of governance, to which CIDA actively contributes.” 9
As a practitioner, I observed the challenge of justifying whether activities and
objectives of access to justice and human rights projects at the operationalization and
reporting level had a direct causal link with, or contributing to, one or several MDGs or
6

Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, Sustainable Development Strategy: 2007–2009,
30.
7
Ibid., 9.
8
Ibid., 3.
9
Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, Sustainable Development Strategy 2004–2006.
Enabling Change, 26.
3

in rationalizing the development mandate of such projects. For example, how could
capacity building of justice sector officials or awareness-raising on human rights topics
among the public could lead to poverty reduction? Even the beneficiary populations of
projects might question the utility of spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on human
rights, access to justice, and awareness-raising activities as they could not experience
immediate or even short-term improvements in their lives; especially improvements in
their social and economic conditions. Another layer of the challenge in the areas of
human rights, access to justice, and rule of law was to develop indicators for
program/project internal evaluations which measure not only the quality of the
implementation of programs/projects, but also show whether they contribute to global
development priorities and improve the lives of the most vulnerable. In addition, external
evaluators’ measurement of program/project efficiency in reaching development goals
might apply different measurement indicators, raising questions about whether each party
in a development program/project spoke the same language of development goals.
1.3

RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND
ANALYSIS
During the research proposal defense stage, the following research questions were

proposed and data collection and analysis conducted accordingly.
1. At the inception and project design stages, how accurately are international
development goals (MDGs) translated into the outcomes, outputs and indicators of
international development programs and projects and into relevant activities which
contribute to these defined outcomes?

4

2. How do an international development donor and its executing partners
operationalize the same development goals in their human rights and rule of law
program/project documents and reflect “variables” of the capability approach
and/or human rights-based approach (HRBA)?
3. Do M&E (monitoring and evaluation) plans of international development
programs/projects measure the same variables as identified during the
program/project design stage and their impact on the readjustment of
project/program outcomes and macro-level policies/strategies, as well as on
development of new programs/projects outcomes?
To determine whether and/or how CIDA operationalized the issues of poverty,
human rights and MDGs in its corporate program architecture, the research analyzed
CIDA’s official policy and strategy papers on democratic governance, human rights,
poverty reduction and sustainable development (1995–2010) and CIDA’s reports to
Parliament (Departmental Performance Reports (DPRs) and Reports on Plans and
Priorities (RPPs)) from 2000 to 2010. The analysis of CIDA’s policy papers and reports
was placed within the general framework of the overall Government of Canada policy
papers and discussions in the Parliament through a lens of historical trajectory, including
the public attitudes towards Canadian official development assistance.10 During the data
collection, interviews were conducted with CIDA’s current and former staff and
professionals who worked for organizations which implemented CIDA projects, as well
as professionals who were involved with CIDA financed projects in various capacities.
The structure of CIDA’s goals, objectives and policy priorities at the corporate level are

10

For the Ghana Land Administration Program, World Bank documents available online were also
analyzed.
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referred to as the program architecture. The project level operationalization of goals,
objectives and issues addressed are treated as the project architecture.
The research also analyzed the projects financed by CIDA and for which access to
information requests were filed with CIDA and then DFATD. The projects were selected
from a list generated through a query from the CIDA data set at http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebprojDataEn?Readform The following selection criteria
were applied:
•

CIDA’s project status in the database – “closed” and/or “terminated.” While the
majority of the selected projects followed the initially proposed status criteria, to
increase the number of potential projects for the analysis, some selected projects
also had the status “operational";

•

CIDA’s sector of focus – “democratic governance”;

•

DAC sector –“human rights” and/or “legal and judicial development.”11
Initially, the list of projects submitted with the access to information request was

accompanied by the following text,
Project documents of the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (law, justice, human
rights components) 2000-10, as well as of projects listed in the table attached to
the form, their periodic & annual reports by CIDA & executing agencies/partner,
final reports, periodic, mid-term and final evaluation reports by CIDA, external
evaluators and partners (not interested in budg. & financial reports). Also, emails
of staff in program and evaluation units which relate to developing these
programs/projects (focus on how goals, outcome, output, indicators & milestones
were developed, monitored & evaluated). Documents in English only, Russian if
any.

11

CIDA used DAC coding in its Project Browser Dataset. “DAC sector codes are 5 digit codes developed
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). They are defined, standardized and organized into tables according to sectors such as
Education, Health, Government and civil society, etc. There are specific criteria on how DAC sector codes
should be selected.” Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, “Sector Coding Guide for
CIDA Partners. Version 2.”
6

However, after the detailed explanation provided by CIDA’s relevant department that
each requested document and email had to be reviewed and a decision made on meeting
statutory requirements, I decided to amend the initial request to ensure shorter processing
times. Eventually, the list of projects was shortened and the text of the request adjusted.
In addition, the request for CIDA’s staff emails was completely removed because the
required process for review of each relevant email before a decision could have been
made for their release could significantly affect the timing of the release of the documents
which related to projects requested.
I would like to acknowledge the extensive input of CIDA and DFATD staff in the
relevant departments in compiling and releasing the documents. Their valuable work was
an important factor contributing to this dissertation. Their guidance was also important
for me to understand how requests are processed (debunking some of misconceptions I
had about the process) and adjust them accordingly to ensure that I received as many
documents as possible within the reasonable timeframe. In total, the volume of the
documents received for the requested projects was over one thousand pages. However,
there were also pages and requested documents which were withheld, including under the
exemptions provided by the legislation. There were follow-ups with the relevant
departments to ensure the release of as many requested documents as possible.
Although some additional documents were released after the follow-ups, in the
end there was not a significant change in receiving the initially expected documents. The
result was that the dissertation limited itself to the analysis of four projects for which the
highest number of relevant documents were provided. The same difficulty contributed to
the decision not to include any United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project

7

financed by CIDA, as it was initially proposed, because the available documents did not
provide sufficient data for the analysis. Even with such adjustments in determining the
projects to be included in the dissertation, for each of the selected projects my analysis
still faced too many gaps in anticipated information and data to be able to answer all the
proposed research questions for each analyzed project. Therefore, the parts of findings of
the dissertation which relate to the analysis of the projects are based on generalized
assessment of the documents available, rather than each research question separately.
Those four projects which had the highest number of relevant documents
analyzed in the dissertation included categorization by CIDA “legal and judicial
development” and/or “human rights.” The Justice Reform Initiative Support (JURIS)
project supported judicial reform, making the judiciary responsive to the needs of the
poor and improving access to justice for them. The project involved building the
capacities of justice sector actors such as judges and court staff (supply side) and groups
which could improve access to justice for the poor (facilitate access for the demand side).
The Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation in Human Development (SEARCH) project
within democratic governance focused on the promotion of rule of law and human rights
law reforms, as well as improving access to economic and social assistance for target
groups. The Ghana Land Administration Program (LAP) was aimed at economic and
social development and poverty reduction through securing land rights, improvements in
land litigation cases and harmonization of laws. The Secure Tenure and Safe Space for
Lesotho Widows, Orphan and Vulnerable Children project addressed the issues of
housing and property ownership for vulnerable groups to improve their well-being and
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living standards. The expectation of the project was that improved protection of the
property rights of vulnerable groups would contribute to poverty reduction.
During the search for the original Government of Canada documents which
related to issues addressed by the dissertation, I approached the librarian assigned to the
Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA) to assist me in finding those resources
faster and more efficiently. Her assistance was instrumental in building the database of
those documents. Many of the Government of Canada, CIDA, and parliamentary
documents analysed and cited in the dissertation were retrieved from the list she emailed
to me. Atlas ti. qualitative research software was utilized in the analysis. Zotero software
is used for citations and generating the bibliography. The citation style used from Zotero
is “Chicago Manual of Style 16th edition (note)”.
1.4

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
The chapters of the dissertation which lay the groundwork for the case analysis

(CIDA’s program architecture, policy documents and projects financed by CIDA) focus
on the main concepts addressed by the dissertation - democracy, poverty, human rights,
justice and access to justice, law, as well as their interaction within broader discourse
such as social and economic rights, development and human rights, law and
development, rule of law and MDGs (chapter 1–7). The chapters provide a review of the
diverse opinions and critique of the concepts. The chapters also show the multidimensionality of concepts articulated in donors’ policy papers, reports and projects and
that even within academic literature there is no common approach to those concepts.
These chapters lay the groundwork for understanding the complexities that programs and
projects face when operationalizing concepts such as justice, poverty, democracy, human

9

rights for which there might not be a common definition, and where approaches in
definition are contested.
Chapters 2–7 begin with a block paragraph in italic are based on my personal
experience of living through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development
challenges I witnessed after Armenia gained independence. The inspiration to begin
chapters with the real life experiences came from the book Creating Capabilities by
Nussbaum (the story of a woman Vasanti)12 and interviews with ordinary people cited in
the World Bank publication Voices of the Poor.13 Though these opening paragraphs are a
reflection of my personal experience, I argue that they were experiences of many people
and not only in Armenia, but in other ex-Soviet countries as well. The experiences are
narrated in the first-person plural to highlight the shared experiences and common
challenges faced by people when ex-USSR republics embarked on the post-Soviet
development path. The intent of including these paragraphs at the beginning of the
chapters is also to accentuate that the concepts that are analyzed are not only theoretical
conceptions belonging to the realm of academia and policy making, but, most
importantly, they are notions and aspirations which are an integral part of everyday
human experience.
Democracy has been a term frequently presented by the international donor
community in their aid efforts to describe the aspirations of people in developing
countries for a type of society that ensures better protection of human rights and the type
of governance that contributes to overcoming development challenges. The term has been
applied both in reference to countries with low living standards and high poverty levels
12

Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach.
Deepa Narayan et al., Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? (2000); Deepa Narayan-Parker et al.,
Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change (2000).

13
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and to countries with relatively high living standards, but marred by human rights
violations. The debate about the term and its relation to human rights and development
has been intensified by the foreign and military policy interventions by Western countries
from Asia to Eastern Europe under the rubric of democracy promotion.
In spite of the ambiguity, the concept of democracy promoted by Western donors,
including Canada, through financed projects remains as an overarching goal to be
achieved via introduction and advancement of its claimed constitutive elements such as
human rights, justice and rule of law. These constitutive elements are formulated based
on conceptions and experience in Western countries and are advanced as means to shape
developing countries into models of societies that are perceived as creating an
environment that protects citizens and enables their development. Even in its program
architecture and project coding approach, CIDA followed this rationale by subsuming
human rights and rule of law under a broader concept of democratic governance.14
Though MDGs did not explicitly refer to democracy, democracy was continuously
among CIDA’s programming outcomes and the concern about CIDA’s involvement.
Therefore, this dissertation begins with the concept of democracy which not only
occupies a central position in the Government of Canada foreign policy and development
claims, but also as a framework towards which the analyzed CIDA projects were
geared.15
Chapter 2 presents the debates on the concept of democracy and identifies the
approaches in defining what constitutes democratic governance. It positions the discourse
about democracy within its relevance to the promotion of human rights, rule of law, and

14
15

For coding guidance see “CRS Purpose Codes (valid as of July 2010).”
All analyzed projects were under the CIDA sector focus of democratic governance.
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its contribution to development. The chapter also addresses the use of notions of
democratization and human rights in attempts to redesign societies in developing
countries in accordance with the Western model of governance and the criticism of
negative consequences those efforts have had. The chapter also acknowledges the
potentially constructive role of the international development efforts of Western countries
in the area of democratization and human rights in bridging the gaps in developing
countries, especially in capacities of civil society to meet the needs of the poor and assist
in the enjoyment of their human rights, and expanding the space for more diverse
opinions.
While democracy is advanced as a governance framework which contributes to
and sustains the results of development efforts, addressing poverty has been a central
concern of those efforts. Even before MDGs were introduced as ultimate goals within
CIDA’s programme architecture, poverty reduction was regarded as a principal objective
for Canada’s international development efforts. After the inclusion of MDGs in CIDA
programming, poverty reduction remained the ultimate target of Canada’s efforts and was
addressed in CIDA’s periodic reports to Parliament. Despite the fact poverty reduction
has been occupying a central position in the aid agenda of donors and their international
development efforts, there are still ongoing debates among academics, politicians, and
practitioners the definition of poverty. Chapter 3 highlights different approaches in
defining what constitutes poverty. It explores poverty as a multi-dimensional concept
which encompasses more than income deprivation. The chapter considers the
consequences poverty has on the self-perception of the poor, as well as societal and legal
challenges faced by them such as discrimination, stigmatization, and violation of their

12

social and economic rights. The chapter concludes with debates on the responsibilities
and considerations to be observed while undertaking international development aid
efforts to address poverty.
The discrimination and stigmatization that the poor face intertwines the issue of
poverty with human rights. Along with poverty reduction, promotion and protection of
human rights has been among the major priorities indicted in Government of Canada
policies and CIDA’s programming documents. Promotion of human rights has not only
been outlined as a key element of Canada’s development efforts, but also presented as the
projection of Canadian values. Though human rights are given centrality in the rhetoric of
Western donors and international governmental and non-governmental organizations, as
in case with democracy and poverty, the nature and scope of human rights are still
contested. Chapter 4 approaches the discourse on human rights as a concept which
continuously evolves and reflects diverse values from different times and societies. It
presents debates about identifying human rights and what they entail, whether they are
universal claims or are bound to localized experience (relativity approach) and whether
human rights and their interpretation are political in nature. While acknowledging the
diverse approaches in defining and interpreting human rights, the chapter notes that there
is growing reliance on laws and codified norms in discussions about the promotion of
human rights. Specifically, it refers to appeals to norms set in international human rights
treaties and adoption of responsibilities through states’ accession to and ratification of
these treaties. But the chapter also underlines the pitfalls associated with the legalistic
approach to human rights, including associating what entitlements people can have with
what laws say.
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The focus on the promotion of democracy, advancement of human rights, and
poverty reduction in Canada’s foreign aid to developing countries has been inextricably
intertwined with assistance to development and sustaining its results. However, while
development is presented as raison d'être for donor aid, there are diverging visions of it,
including what—if any—role human rights play in the process, and the duties of
assistance to developing countries. Chapter 5 examines the intersection of human rights,
development, and poverty reduction. The discussion on the right to development shows
how developing and Western industrial countries have divergent approaches on the
nature of development and whether development raises arises rights and corresponding
duties. On the integration of human rights into the development agenda and the role they
play in development, the chapter concentrates on mainstreaming human rights into
international development initiatives, the positive input human rights can have, and the
potential tensions they can bring.
Within the general human rights rhetoric and views on how to address the issue of
poverty and underdevelopment, there is growing assertion to also focus on the protection
and promotion of social and economic rights. While MDGs were not articulated in the
language of rights, they addressed issues such as adequate food, employment, health, and
education which are established in international human rights documents on socioeconomic rights. Chapter 6 outlines the evolution of social and economic rights through
the analysis of norms and obligations developed within the United Nation’s fora and
expert guidelines advanced in the authoritative documents such as Limburg Principles on
the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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The chapter examines the debate on juxtaposing civil and political rights and social and
economic rights, including the contestation of fixed categorization of the rights into
different groups and hierarchy among them. The chapter focuses on justicability claims
for economic and social rights, promotion and protection of these rights through the legal
framework, and role of justice institutions.
Making justice institutions efficient and the advancement of legal and judicial
reforms was part of CIDA’s supported priorities and projects. Though international
development donor activities are focused on capacity building of justice institutions and
assistance to improving access to justice particularly for the poor in developing countries
and justice being a commonly referred term, there is a lesser attention paid to what justice
denotes. Chapter 7 underscores that justice is a complex concept that encompasses
diverse expectations about the processes, outcomes, and institutions within the society.
The chapter also focuses on development efforts aimed at reforms of justice institutions
and legal reforms (top-down), their role in development, poverty reduction and impact on
the poor, as well as lessons learned from those initiatives, including the criticism of legal
transplantation. The legal empowerment of the poor and access to justice development
initiatives are presented as bottom-up approaches in international development activities.
Since the early 2000s, international development activities and donor programing
have been guided by and geared towards Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
MDGs became the culmination of the transformative process of setting international
development goals. As CIDA reports to Parliament show, from the first years of the
endorsement of MDGs, CIDA incorporated them in its program architecture. Chapter 9
illustrates the contribution of the antecedents of MDGs, particularly of the World Summit
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for Social Development (WSSD) and OECD’s International Development Goals (IDGs),
and the background they had set for the politics of negotiating MDGs. The chapter
questions the juncture between human rights and MDGs and the role that human rights
can play in their advancement.
The dissertation also focuses on the theoretical approaches which have had an
important contribution to MDGs and international development – capability(ies)
approach (CA) (chapter 8) and human rights based approach (HRBA) (chapter 10). CA,
pioneered by Amartya Sen, moved the discourse about poverty beyond income
measurement and focused on such considerations as education, health, and nutrition. It
also connected development with human rights and placed it within the framework of
fundamental freedoms that enable people to choose to live the life they value. With
growing impetus to intertwine human rights and development efforts, in 1990s
governmental and non-governmental organizations either adopted HRBA polices or
streamlined human rights into their international development programming. In 2001, in
its Sustainable Development Strategy: 2001–2003, CIDA acknowledged the implication
that human rights have on international development, including “the growing recognition
that a human-rights approach to development assistance is not just desirable but
necessary.”16 CIDA was also among three donors of the conference where the United
Nations Development Group (UNDG) adopted the Statement on a Common
Understanding of a Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation
(2003).17
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The final chapters focus on the case analysis: four projects financed by CIDA;
CIDA’s historical path of inclusion of concepts of human rights and poverty in its policy
documents; reports to the Parliament as well as Government of Canada policies (chapters
11–15). Chapter 11 sets the background for the analysis through a brief introduction of
Canada’s aid efforts and government policy documents before 2000 and reference to
public opinion about Canadian foreign aid. The analysis of CIDA’s policy documents and
reports to parliament illustrates the place assigned to human rights, poverty reduction and
MDGs within the CIDA’s program architecture. The chapter also addresses reports on
Canadian aid efforts by the Auditor General of Canada and the review by the Parliament
on Canada’s role in democratic assistance. Chapter 12 studies the JURIS project,
financed by CIDA and aimed at supporting the Action Program for Judicial Reform of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Chapter 13 focuses on a regional project financed
by CIDA – SEARCH, which dealt with legal and judicial development and human rights,
among other issues. A multi-year initiative to which CIDA also contributed – Ghana LAP
– is researched in chapter 14. Chapter 15 examines Secure Tenure and Safe Space for
Lesotho Widows, Orphan and Vulnerable Children, a project which intended to advance
tenure security and inheritance rights.
The initial research proposal also suggested exploring the concept of resilience as
applied to human rights, access to justice, and legal and judicial development. However,
the analysis of the available data did not produce sufficient information to be formulated
into findings. Therefore, the dissertation does not address the concept of resilience as it
requires a more specifically tailored and separate research project. The dissertation
concludes with findings, which aim to contribute to scholarship on international

17

development and theoretical approaches that integrate the principle of indivisibility of
human rights and their essential role in poverty reduction.
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2

THE SWAN LAKE OR DANCING WITH DEMOCRACY
It was a summer day in August 1991 and last weeks of the summer
holidays to enjoy watching action movies guilt free before pupils and
students would go back to studies. It was the afternoon. Many people were
caught by a surprise bordering bewilderment of not understating what was
happening and why. Instead of expected action movies, the Swan Lake
ballet by Tchaikovsky was going on and on. While lined up ballet dancers
on the screen were in motion, the real actions were taking place outside
the broadcast. The septuagenarian communism system was making its last
attempt to set the tone before being forced out from the main stage of the
world dancehall and “Democracy” beginning to set tunes and rhymes
instead.
In the Soviet Union, people were promised a brighter future full of
“rights” and “prosperity” to come or as it was commonly presented
within the society that the communism was not behind the mountains,
which meant that the bright future18 was coming soon. But eventually it
became a part of the joke in the Soviet Union that reflected the attitude of
people towards the promise of the bright future in this commonly used by “Yes, indeed communism was not behind mountains. We passed them and
there was no communism there.” 19 Reaching democracy came to
symbolize that aspiration for the brighter future.
The promotion of democracy has become a polarizing concept. Proponents

present democracy as a benign concept that is best positioned to ensure enjoyment of
human rights, or—using two concepts interchangeably—promote democracy as a
framework to contribute to and sustain development and poverty reduction efforts.
Opponents of Western countries’ efforts to promote democracy point out the negative
consequences those efforts have had and see them as meddling in other countries’ affairs.
This chapter addresses both sides of the debate, but it places these contested views within
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propositions on the concept of democracy and what democratic governance encompasses.
The chapter examines the relevance of democracy to the promotion of human rights, rule
of law, and its contribution to development. The chapter also underlines how
international development efforts of Western countries in the area of democratization and
human rights are important and needed to bridge the gaps in developing countries,
especially in capacities of civil society to meet the needs of the poor and assist in the
enjoyment of their human rights, and to expand the space for more diverse opinions.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union—which allowed communism to return to a
more theoretical concept—the era of a new brighter future with democracy came to
substitute as the means of bringing respect to rights of ordinary people and ensuring their
prosperity. In the speeches of politicians, Western advisors and human rights advocates
proclaim democracy as THE way to the promised land where those they called “ordinary
people” would have the living standards which other people in the West enjoyed behind
the Iron Curtain. Namely, freedom to join parties and associations; freedom to promote
the plurality of opinions without fear of being either thrown into a prison or being
committed to a psychiatric institution; freedom to participate in political debates; and
freedom to elect those who would govern them in an open and transparent process. The
promises of the new brighter future were accompanied with the majority of “ordinary
people” suddenly finding themselves losing most of what they had, struggling to feed
their families. Or, as these “ordinary people” put it, their mouths were opened [which
meant having freedom of speech] but there was nothing to put in the mouth, implying the
scarcity of food. But not so “ordinary people”, namely new government functionaries,
local and international business interests connected with them, organizations which were
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involved in promoting the newly appeared buzzwords—human rights, rule of law and
democracy—saw the possibilities of having the new brighter future in the present.
Government functionaries and those connected to them benefited from what the
privatization implemented under the rubric of economic liberalization and rule of law.20
International organizations, even if they had good intentions, were asserting to be the
voice of the “ordinary people.” But those “ordinary people” who were told that they now
held power neither could feel that they had power even to decide what food was going to
be on their tables, if any, nor could they see that those who were speaking on their behalf
even asked to define their priorities. As Almond puts it,
The hangover from People Power is shock therapy. Each successive crowd is sold
a multimedia vision of Euro-Atlantic prosperity by western-funded "independent"
media to get them on the streets. No one dwells on the mass unemployment,
rampant insider dealing, growth of organised crime, prostitution and soaring death
rates in successful People Power states.21
But the generally presented narrative is that “the link between democracy and human
rights is interdependent, intricate, mutually supportive and symbiotic.”22 As the summary
of the International Round Table on Democracy and Human Rights emphasizes,
“[h]uman rights can be protected effectively only in a democratic state.” It argues that a
“functional democracy” based on the rule of law, and which is reflective of diversity,
equality, and individual freedoms, is an obstacle to “concentration of power” by a small
20

This paragraph is based on my personal perceptions of events while I lived in Armenia, recollection of
news stories and, most importantly, the conversations and perceptions I heard among people. The reader
may also refer to Belohosrká and Jaskiernia, “Explanatory Memorandum,” 20; Mirzakhanyan, “Economic
and Social Development,” 201–205; and Moreau, “(Ex-)Communist Elites and State Capture,” 519.
21
Almond, “The Price of People Power.” Almond while elaborating on People Power notes, “‘People
Power’ was coined in 1986, when Washington decided Ferdinand Marcos had to go. But it was events in
Iran in 1953 that set the template. Then, Anglo-American money stirred up anti-Mossadeq crowds to
demand the restoration of the Shah. The New York Times's correspondent trumpeted the victory of the
people over communism, even though he had given $50,000 and the CIA-drafted text of the anti-Mossadeq
declaration to the coup leaders himself.”
22
Collins and Kędzia, Democracy and Human Rights: The Role of the UN, 6.
21

number of individuals and can prevent violation of human rights.23 Democratization has
been seen as a process through which people can gradually gain power in decision
making over the institutions that affect them. It is conceptualized as a process of
“transition from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian systems to democratic political
systems.”24 Democracy has become among the most referred to and promoted concepts
by international organizations and bi-lateral organizations, but it should be noted that the
concept, as Gallie points out, has “an essentially contested character”25. Landman and
Häusermannn too argue that “there is not now, nor will there likely be, a final consensus
on [its] definition or content” 26 and with no internationally agreed definition of
democracy “conceptual confusion remains.”27 Scholte, however, argues that there are
common themes that are present in all perceptions of democracy. In democracy,
… a community of people exercises collective self determination. Through
democracy, members of a given public- a demos- take decisions that shape their
destiny jointly, with equal rights and opportunities of participation, and without
arbitrarily imposed constraints on debate. In one way or another, democratic
governance is participatory, consultative, transparent, and publicly accountable.
By one mechanism or another, democratic governance rests on the consent of the
governed.28
Brinkerhoff provides that the democratic governance is a “political regime” where
citizens have the “right to govern themselves (democracy) with structures and
mechanisms that are used to manage public affairs according to accepted rules and
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procedures (governance).” 29
In the educational video by CivilNet, it is stated that, “in many countries, the
democracy is called such a governance system when people through elections form those
who govern them.” The video presents the main difference between the authoritarian and
democratic governance through who holds the right to make decisions. The system of
decision-making under the authoritarian system is depicted as a triangle with the decision
maker on the top, while the inclusive circle depicts the democratic governance system.
The authoritarian system is described as “a few or one person has the right to decide
instead of everybody. S/he or they make decisions based on their whim and they are not
accountable to anybody. They have the right to impose their will on others.” While, in
democracy, “all citizens equally have the right to partake in decision-making. Thus, in
this case the citizen’s right to decision-making is inalienable.” 30 Democracies are
characterized by “universal suffrage, regular elections, civil society, the rule of law and
an independent judiciary.” 31 In democratic societies, individuals and groups enjoy
opportunities to contest political power and participate not only in the “choice of leaders
and policies” but also “in the allocation of societal resources.”32 Democratic societies
provide protection of “certain categories of human rights, especially civil and political
rights,” but “the most popular definitions of democracy” also refer to “some economic
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and cultural rights, such as property rights and the rights of minorities.”33 As Donnelly
points out, “[d]emocracy, although not strictly necessary for development, especially in
the short and medium run, may restrict predatory misrule that undermines
development.”34
Such conceptions of democracy assume that the democratization process is an
internally driven process moving from authoritarian regimes to “democratic political
systems,” 35 when people of a given country using their sovereign rights of selfdetermination jointly, through a transparent and accountable political process free from
coercion and internal and external interference, consent on political and societal
institutions which are reasonably just to everybody, provide equal opportunities and
outcomes. While the aspirations of people are important drivers in the transition to
democracy, the role that external actors, especially Western governments and nongovernmental organizations, and the way their funding of local actors steer
democratization processes are of no lesser—if not of more—importance. In this regards
Almond’s description of the role and type of those external actors is worth mentioning:
Throughout the 1980s, in the build-up to 1989's velvet revolutions, a small army
of volunteers - and, let's be frank, spies - co-operated to promote … People
Power. A network of interlocking foundations and charities mushroomed to
organise the logistics of transferring millions of dollars to dissidents. The money
came overwhelmingly from Nato states and covert allies such as "neutral"
Sweden.36
When reflecting on Western donor involvement in developing countries Klein uses the
“allure of the blank slate.” In her article she refers to the US State Department Office of
33
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the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, established in 2008.37 The first
head of the office was the former ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, whose office
had a mandate to design “‘post-conflict’ plans for up to 25 countries that are not, as yet,
in conflict.”38 She goes on to elaborate,
The plans Pascual's teams have been drawing up in his office in the state
department are about changing "the very social fabric of a nation", he told CSIS.
The office's mandate is not to rebuild any old states, you see, but to create
"democratic and market-oriented" ones. So his reconstructors might help sell off
"state-owned enterprises that created a nonviable economy". Sometimes
rebuilding, he explained, means tearing apart the old.39
Democracy is among the panaceas offered by Western countries and international
organizations to remedy the development challenges faced by countries and make
governments more accountable and transparent. Multiple actors varying from contractors,
NGOs and international organizations are at the frontlines of promoting and transplanting
those ideas. However, there has also been criticism on how much they adhere to
promoted standards. The argument is that “‘democracy builders’ lecture governments on
transparency and ‘good governance’, yet most contractors and NGOs refuse to open their
books to those same governments, let alone give them control over how their aid money
is spent.”40
Despite this criticism of Western aid to democratization, there is a need to
highlight that without such donor support local political and civil society actors involved
in the promotion of democracy cannot mobilize sufficient financial resources locally to
sustain the momentum since local populations generally do not have extra money to
37

Currently subsumed into State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). For
more see Serafino, In Brief: State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).
38
Klein, “Allure of the Blank Slate.”
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
25

donate to such causes and/or fear that state officials might target them for supporting
critical views. It should be also acknowledged that there are many local organizations that
have provided important services, including assisting those in need to claim and enjoy
their rights. Without the Western donor support such services would have not been
available. Their existence also enables broader and more diverse space for the discourse
and advocacy of salient issues within the society. Therefore, the assistance of Western
donors, including through development projects in areas of democratic development, rule
of law, and human rights programs and projects channelled through their development
agencies are presented as a helping hand with only benign intentions to assist locally
driven aspirations. The justification for such assistance is that it will contribute to
building societies which will be more equitable, especially for those marginalized,
disadvantaged, and poor.
This premise, however, has come under more scrutiny and criticism in recent
years when studying Western interventions in the Middle East, especially those
accompanied by military force. In several cases, social and economic standards were
higher under the previous authoritarian regime, while Western interventions brought a
loss of those standards and even a worsening of governance. The process of
democratization and assistance through development projects by Western governments
has come to be viewed with suspicion regarding the real aims of the projects. It has also
contributed to the growth of sceptical voices questioning whether “democracy” and
“human rights” are what really people need first in developing countries. But on the other
spectrum is scepticism about whether their local institutions and culture are able to
accommodate the transplanted notions of democracy and laws.
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When democratization is perceived as another facet of the Western driven
globalization where the intent is not benign, but rather to assert its domination and pursue
its own political and economic interests, there is greater temptation to see
democratization and protection of human rights, particularly rights aimed at provision of
basic needs, as separate processes. Democratization can lead to the establishment and
functioning of institutions that are conducive to protection and enjoyment of human
rights, including rights of the poor and marginalized, and enable their participation in
governance through elections and accountability mechanisms. However, there are still
considerations to be addressed regarding whether the promotion of democracy and
human rights should be tied together. In addressing the distinction between the concepts
of democracy and human rights, Langlois notes, “[i]f one assumes that democracy has to
come before the observation of human rights, or even with the observation of human
rights, it can be argued that this could delay the achievement of human rights indefinitely.
Waiting for democracy in order to achieve human rights may mean an interminable
wait.”41
If the reasoning to focus on human rights outside a democratic framework that
enables the populace to participate and debate decisions affecting them is to be accepted,
it would devolve the enjoyment of human rights to an act of charity granted by the elite
and those in power. Human rights would not be regarded as entailments, the scope of
which is determined through the participation of people. If rights and their scope are
determined by the elite and those in power without the input of governed, and without the
real mechanisms of public accountability, the self-interest of the elite and those in power
is to give small concessions in order to maintain the status quo rather to satisfy the real
41
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needs of people. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the elite agrees on changes in the
status quo from which it benefits, and accepts the introduction of certain democratic
institutions, because the poorer members of society “can threaten the elite and force it to
make concessions.” The latter can resort to different protest methods or even a
revolution; to restrict such actions is costly for the elite. That is why the elite “will try to
prevent them. It can do so by making concessions, by using repression to stop social
unrest and revolution, or by giving away its political power and democratizing.” If the
cost of maintaining the contested status quo through repressions is perceived as being too
high for the elite, it “would like to buy off the citizens with promises of policy
concessions – for example, income redistribution.” 42
Democracy also may contribute to the development by “enlarge[ing] people's
choices”43 because “democratic governance expands the range of options for human
development.”44 The UN publication Governance for the Future argues that,
The predictability of principles enables economic agents to respond to incentives,
and to make rational decisions. Mutual accountability among state and non-state
actors promotes transparency and confidence for nation-building and enhances
deliberative decision-making. Democratic governance seeks, in common with
good governance, efficient institutions and a predictable economic and political
environment that makes economic growth possible, and public services
effective.45
A responsive and deliberative governance system is better positioned to accommodate the
objective variations in capacities and needs of people and to be more reflective in
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changes in those needs. When a governance system is top-down without the proper
channels to discuss the issues of importance for those whom it governs, even if it
provides choices to people to function, those choices can be either insufficient or
irrelevant to the actual needs. On the contrary, the democratic governance system
provides channels to individuals and groups to participate in the decision-making process
(also allowing a bottom-up information flow). This deliberative process not only makes
the outcomes of the decision-making more relevant to the actual needs within the society,
it also provides potential to expand the scope of the options available to meet those needs
if they change or expand.
Though democracies enable the participation of different social groups in
policymaking, there can be “differences in the capacity of groups to organize, contest and
influence public policy.” 46 Limitations in financial resources, information, and the
availability of time to devote to activities other than income earning, can affect groups’
abilities to equally participate; even if democratic mechanisms are present. It is not only
the poor in developing countries who face challenges in having their voices counted, but
also in countries which claim long histories of democracy. As Schlozman et al. note,
“[y]ear after year, decade after decade, and from one generation to the next, the affluent
and well educated have participatory megaphones that amplify their voices in American
politics.”47 In developing countries, and countries in transition where democratization is
taking its nascent steps and where the transparency and accountability mechanisms are
still weak, the voices of the poor can be usurped by the rich, including through vote
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buying.
When septuagenarian communist state structures crumbled, it was the democratic
right to self-determination that inspired hundreds of thousands of people to stand in the
streets and demand their rights. I still vividly remember the elated sense of partaking in
the decision making despite many uncertainties. But two decades after the Swan Lake
finally made the “democracy” as the main rule of game, elated feelings were erased when
many people found themselves forced to survive in poverty. The voices of the poor came
to be treated not as messages to act for elected and public functionaries and quests for
participation, but rather actionable commodities remembered only during election cycles
for the highest bidder.

Poverty keeps people in the trap of destitution, but more

importantly cages their rights to reach and impact political and social developments that
affect them and the societies in which they live.
There is no agreement on the definition of democracy and the set of attributes
required for a governance system to be characterized as democratic. Regardless,
democracy is evoked when people call for changes in or the replacement of governance
structures and institutions which either suppress them or do not provide relevant options
to meet their needs and expectations for a better life free from fear and want. Democracy
is invoked when referred to when Western governments interfere to either assist in the
process of locally driven change or to impose that change. Democracy is questioned
when Western governments’ efforts result in the deterioration of governance structures
and conditions that people live in, be they political or economic. However, until Western
democratic societies are perceived as able to provide environment for people to feel freer
and safer, to have more options to better utilize one’s capacities and enjoy higher living
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standards, calls for democracy, indifferent to what exactly is understood locally to be
democracy, will remain at the centre of local and international political discourse.
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3

THE STORY OF AVOS’KA OR THE LOUD WHISPER OF POVERTY 48
The money and bread had been disappearing in the “new” country with
the same pace and manner as the “old” country disappeared – fast, and
catching the majority of people by surprise. Finding bread resembled a
tenuous “treasure hunt” where people would find out through the word of
mouth the place they needed to rush to queue for the bread and basic food
items. But despite efforts it was the wind which was mostly passing
through the mesh of people’s avos’kas. In the meantime, many people
found themselves joining what in statistics was depicted as “less than a
dollar,” but that depiction was only a dot in the palette of the condition in
which they found themselves.
While assistance to democratization initiatives is an important component of

international development aid, addressing the issue of poverty has been at a core of both
international development and local efforts. In spite of being at the centre of international
and local policies and activities, what constitutes poverty is still debated. This chapter
highlights diverse approaches in explaining poverty and treats poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon which is more than an income deprivation. The chapter
examines how poverty affects self-perception of the poor, as well as societal and legal
challenges faced by them such as discrimination, stigmatization and violation of their
social and economic rights. The chapter also presents debates on responsibilities in
international development aid to address poverty and issues to be aware of while
undertaking development initiatives.
The portrayal of poverty has been characterized by a mosaic of notions and
attributes, including stereotypes propagated through printed and visual information
mediums. The images of squalid desperation, misery, and the eyes of people conveying
no hope for the future (unfortunately in many instances the poor are stripped from agency
in such portrayals) have become posters for what has to be urgently addressed and to
48
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mobilize public around combating poverty.49 During the twentieth century, countries
undertook economic and social reforms to address the domestic issues of poverty, but
during 1980s the discourse and efforts to deal with poverty moved also to the global
level.50 Reiterating Kumar, nowadays “[p]overty is probably the most important human
rights and development issue facing both developed and developing countries.”51 Poverty
is viewed not only as a manifestation of material depravations but also as an injustice.
Rukooko argues, however, that the treatment of poverty as “social injustice” is a recent
phenomenon. He points out that “[i]n Greek philosophy poverty is not particularly
negative. …The biblical conceptualization of poverty seems supportive of poverty. Jesus
for instance, taught that heaven will be more easily accessed by the poor than by the
rich.” 52 Though, “in earlier times” poverty might have been viewed as a "natural
phenomenon,” nowadays it is considered, as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights puts it, “a social phenomenon aggravated by discrimination.”53
As in case of democracy, however, the notion of poverty is interpreted and
perceived differently depending on the country, the support culture in a society, and even
among individuals. Akindola highlights this difference in understanding the concept of
poverty and its implications by pointing out that “[a] generally acceptable working
definition of poverty is as elusive as ever, making poverty reduction strategies more
complex. An important reason for this has been that individuals’ experience of poverty
varies significantly.” He emphasizes that what one individual might perceive as poverty
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may not be regarded as poverty by another. 54 The perception of poverty is also prone to
change and adjustment based on expectations, even if the conditions improve and reach
the level of prior expectations. Based on personal experience and observations of people
in Armenia, I noticed that the perception of what constituted poverty shifted with the
growth of expectations about what living standards should be and the income needed to
satisfy them. Even though there was an increase in income and improvement in living
standards in comparison to hardship experienced after the collapse of the USSR, when
those increased income and improvements did not satisfy or surpass our new
expectations, the feeling of being poor persisted. Sindzingre rightly underscores the
physiological point of view in understanding poverty—“the feeling that one is poor”
which is perceived through the lenses of “income, health, education, and employment” as
well “the resources of others (relative poverty), the perceptions of the other’s perceptions,
and on expectations as to future welfare – that is, the perceptions of social mobility
prospects offered by a society.”55 Similar considerations on variations in understanding
poverty are voiced by Narayan-Parker et al. in the study Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone
Hear Us? where they indicate that “[p]overty varies across and within countries; its
precise contours and dimensions are always contingent on time, place, and social groups
involved. Aggregate data by definition do not reveal location specific variations.”56 But
even if there is no agreement what constitutes poverty, “defining poverty remains central
to formulating appropriate policy interventions.”57
Akin to the issues generally invoked by defining the concept of poverty, Riddell
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underlines divisions in opinions also associated with the definition of extreme poverty.
He notes that “it may come as a surprise (even shock) to discover that today scholars
remain divided about how extreme or absolute poverty should be defined and how it can
be best assessed and measured.” 58 This fragmented approach to poverty, according to
Øyen, leads to the diversity of views and “call[s] for eradication, abolition, reduction and
alleviation of extreme poverty as well as all other kinds of poverty.” The diversity of
opinions is driven by the individual rationale of what contributes to extreme poverty, as
well as why and how it has to be eliminated. However, when using the same phrase there
is an assumption that the reference is to the same experiences and facts, which might not
be the case. Therefore, this “vagueness and dualism in the concepts [also] add to the
vagueness of the research agenda.”59 But as Riddell argues, the initial step in “eradicating
extreme poverty is to ensure we agree on precisely what poverty is—how it is manifested
and its key characteristics.” 60 A common understanding of poverty and its specific
attributes may mitigate misconceptions propagated due to the inclusion of diverse
meanings into the same phrase and make expectations on policy outcomes more
predictable. But the question still remains whether it is feasible for the phenomenon
which is not only closely linked with individual experiences and social environment, but
its perceived attributes are also prone to continues adjustments with the changes within
the society. But the question remains of whether it is feasible to define the phenomenon,
given that it is closely linked with individual experiences and social environment and its
perceived attributes are prone to continuous adjustments in a changing society. With
these challenges in defining poverty, there still will be a tendency to discern and focus on
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certain attributes and apply indicators which can be better measured and which have
more straightforward associations.
Poverty is most commonly associated and equated with low income, but there are
certain issues with this approach. One is a presumption that it is possible to apply easily
quantifiable monetary amounts to various types of poverty, “including the things that
poor people say they need to live a decent human life.” Another concern with the focus on
income is the perception that people do not face poverty if they are able to receive basic
food and services and if their lives are improved by an ability to gain a minimum
income.61 In addition, the income level approach to poverty not only conceals the fact that
people do “not live by bread alone,”62 but also can give an excuse to governments not to
address the broader social, legal, and political factors that contribute to poverty. As Mack
summarizes, “[t]he problem is so complex because most of the time poverty is not an
outcome of specific economic problems alone, but a political, social, cultural, geographic
or climatic one.”63 However, there is a growing tendency among practitioners and experts
to argue for the consideration of more criteria when examining poverty and greater
reflection of “the way people themselves understand what is of value to them in order to
live humanely.”64
There is more agreement, especially among development professionals, that
“poverty is multidimensional – that is, it is composed of a number of different elements
and cannot (and therefore should not) be explained or measured by one attribute only.”65
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It is a “hybrid concept”66 which Rukooko describes being “constructed out of speciﬁc
actions and struggles, compromises and temporarily settled relations of cooperating and
competing social actors in relation to material goods.” 67 Cottrell and Ghai expand on the
aspects of a person’s life that poverty, which they see as “the lack of qualities that
facilitating a good life,” can affect.
…access to conditions supporting a reasonable physical existence enabling
individuals and communities to realize their spiritual and cultural potentialopportunities for reflection, artistic creativity, development of and discourse on
morality, and contribution to and participation in the political, social and
economic life of the community.68
Thus, poverty is presented as a both material and spiritual “absence representing the
world view of particular actors.”69 Sedmak describes poverty “as ‘identity deprivation’, as
the deprivation of cultivating and using resources of identity”70 and associates absolute
poverty “with a complete loss of resources [when] an effected person has no access to
inner resources that would strengthen her resilience and give her a sense of orientation,
motivation, and vision.”71
However, the point on the aspect of spiritual absence warrants noting that poverty
does not necessary manifest itself in the former. On the contrary, individuals might
choose to live a life of poverty and austerity to achieve spiritual enrichment for religious
reasons or even for completely secular reasons. The important factor is whether they
made a choice to live in “poverty” or whether they are confined to poverty with obstacles
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not allowing them to overcome poverty. But even if it is the latter case, while not
underestimating the objective facts that poverty can and do contribute to the sense of
isolation and desperation, it should also be acknowledged that even in the most destitute
conditions people can and they do maintain the spiritual side of what is to be a human.
Assuming otherwise would mean stripping those who find themselves in poverty, even
unwillingly, of the last things they have the agency to control – it is their inner world,
hopes, believes and aspirations and treat them as “empty,” “emotionless” living bodies.
In the World Bank study Crying out for Changes people “equate poverty with
powerlessness and impotence, and … relate wellbeing to security and a sense of control
of their lives.” Those interviewed often mentioned the ability to be a good person (e.g. to
be able to buy clothing for the family or be able to help others when they have problems).
It is the feeling of “moral responsibility, with having the wherewithal to help others, and
with having enough money to be able to give to charity or a religious organization.”72
That said, there is also a perception that people who live in poverty are poor because they
are lazy and apathetic.73 The argument of “laziness,” if put within the policy context, can
lead to such extremes as criminalizing unemployment in the manner proposed in 2014 by
the president of Belarus – Alexander Lukashenko. He aimed to reintroduce the Soviet-era
legal concept of “social parasitism” (“tuneyadstvo”) for people who “‘intentionally don't
work,’ including by imposing forced labor.”74 In 2015, the president signed a decree
which introduced fines for unemployment that are applied to citizens and permanent
residents who do not “‘participate in financing state expenditures’ for at least 183 days a
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year.” 75 It is a view of “the poor as a homogenous grouping” and vagabonds that ignores
“diverse experiences of poverty and lives of the poor, even locally, let alone globally.”76
But the poor, as any group in society, are not homogenous, nor are the reasons
that contribute to their poverty necessarily similar, though they can be some commonly
shared experiences. Of course, it is a rather unpopular, and in some ways politically
incorrect, view to assume that there can be people in any society who choose not to work
even if there are opportunities and they are capable. They might view the available
income earning opportunities as requiring too many efforts or below their expectations of
the type of employment they are willing to pursue and instead to prefer to rely on
assistance and social networks. For example, during the economic hardship in Armenia
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many families began relying on working the land
and growing their food. There were many families who embraced the need to overcome
the hardship by doing labour and energy intensive agricultural work to substitute for food
and income, but there were also people who, while having access to the same
opportunities, considered the work too hard and instead would expect the government,
donors and/or social security networks to assist them.
There are undoubtedly people who would prefer to rely on social assistance even
if they can work, however, in my experience there were also “many poor people [who
were] hardworking and resilient.” 77 Narayan-Parker et al. try to explain the contradiction
between the hard work that the poor put to earn for basic needs and the perception of
“laziness.” They argue, “[t]he apparent contradiction, however, might be resolved this
way: workers short of food become exhausted. ‘Apathy’ and ‘laziness’ minimize effort.
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Such attitudes and behaviour can be seen as a strategy for conserving energy.”78 The
perception that people find themselves in poverty because of their “laziness” also ignores
the growing group of working poor in low paid and part-time jobs, including in
developed countries. Those who argue that laziness is the cause of poverty do not want to
notice people like Maria Fernandes who died while taking a nap in the running SUV
between her three part-time jobs. She worked for the chain Dunkin’ Donuts, but in three
different locations. But even with the work in three places for the multinational company
whose CEO in 2013 “received $4.2 million in pay, stock options incentive awards and
perks last year, up 120% from 2012,”79 Fernandes’s landlady mentioned that she fell short
on her rent a couple of times “struggling to come up with $550 a month for the basement
apartment … that she rarely slept in.”80
Poverty generally is associated with the poor “lack[ing] adequate and secure
livelihoods.” Unemployment, precarious and temporary jobs, meagre wages, unhealthy
and unsafe work conditions are only a few of the challenges faced by the poor everyday.81
In rural areas, poverty can manifest in the lack of “access to land and irrigation, lack of
seeds and fertilizers, deficiencies of transport, and the overexploitation of common
resources such as pastureland, forests and fish.” 82 They live in places, such as remote
areas, which disadvantage them, face hazardous housing conditions which are
overcrowded and polluted. To add to their vulnerabilities, the places they live either have
poor or no proper infrastructure to access water, power and sewage facilities.83 The poor
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face challenges in diversifying sources of income and food and “[w]ith their opportunities
so limited, many people living in poverty are drawn into work that is anti-social,
dangerous and illegal, such as sex work, child labour, bonded labour and other slaverylike practices.”84 Khan presents many facets of poverty by summarizing,
[t]o live in poverty is to live in uncertainty and insecurity. For poor people life is a
daily struggle to secure survival: food, work, a roof over their heads. At every
turn there is fear, not only of disease and hunger, but also of gangs and guns,
police brutality, family violence or armed conflict.85
Not only do structural imbalances within the society exclude the poor from the
participation in society and enjoyment of their socio-economic rights, they also face selfexclusion because of the shame associated with poverty can result in depravation of basic
socialization. The study Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change found that, for
example, the destitute may not be included in social and family events and even if invited
“may decide not to go because of being unable to appear and behave appropriately.”86 For
those who are especially the “new poor,” shame associated with loss of status makes
them into “invisible poor”, and leads to self-exclusion resulting in reluctance to ask for
help.87 As a poor man from Bulgaria shared,
There was a man in our apartment building. A silent, shy fellow, always very
neatly dressed. They found him dead in his apartment. The doctor said that he had
become so feeble that he died of a common cold; they found just a piece of stale
bread in his flat. It’s a pity we never spoke with him. He had dignity, that fellow.88
Therefore, to retain at least some sense of dignity and self-esteem, the poor opt to keep “a
few scarce assets even during times of hunger, illness, or other hardship” because
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ownership of assets is also perceived to be “symbols of status.”89
The vulnerabilities faced by the poor are not only characteristics of the poverty
faced by people in developing countries, but also in developed ones—though maybe to a
different degree. Howard-Hassmann and Welch underline it by noting that,
To be a member of the working class, or to be unemployed, in Canada or the
United States is often to live in margins of society. The margins became even
more remote from the center in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.
Poverty was exacerbated by declining social supports and the proliferation of lowwage, dead-end jobs, at the same time that the number of secure, unionized
industrial jobs declined.90
Poverty is not an act of God, but is an outcome of imbalances in societies and
malfunctioning of governments.91 The poor are routinely harassed, including by corrupt
officials, exploited by employers and face discrimination.92 UN Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, indicates that
“[d]iscrimination is both a cause and a consequence of poverty.” Open and hidden
discrimination largely contribute to poverty. The poor are discriminated and stigmatized
by “public authorities and private actors precisely because of their poverty. Thus, those
living in poverty tend to experience several intersecting forms of discrimination,
including on account of their economic status.”93
The poor experience discrimination and marginalization in the enjoyment of their
economic and social rights. Additionally, their ability to equal enjoy civil and political
rights is curtailed though they “desire to have influence and control over institutions that
89
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affect their lives.” 94 The enjoyment of civil and political rights requires “not only an
understanding of the dynamics of society and access to public institutions, but also
confidence in themselves.” 95 Socially excluded poor find themselves politically
marginalized. Their access to information is more limited and they lack “political power
necessary for meaningful participation in political decision-making.”96 The outcome of
political underrepresentation is that their voices are not taken into account in the
decision-making process and their needs often are not reflected. Socio-political exclusion
and poverty create the self-perpetuating cycle of marginalization of the poor, because
“[s]ocially and politically excluded people are more likely to fall into poverty, and the
poor are more vulnerable to social exclusion and political marginalization.”97 The capture
of public institutions with political and economic elite that are powerful with no efficient
mechanisms to hold them accountable leaves the poor with the sense of exclusion and
alienation.98
These feelings are reflective of what an interviewee from Bulgaria shared for the
study Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change,
We the Bulgarians are serfs. We all know that if you are down…we are afraid of
those on the top. The people cannot gather together to put them in their place.
There are some young ones who wanted to make a debate with the mayor on the
local TV; they announced that everybody could ask him questions and what
happened? He asked them not to interrupt him when he was speaking, they cut the
telephone lines, he delivered a speech, and he went home.99
Poverty as a multifaceted phenomenon demands that it is addressed by taking into
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account factors that contribute to and propagate it. Poverty alleviation, poverty reduction,
and poverty elimination are strategies frequently used in international aid discourse. Toye
shows the distinctions in these approaches by noting that poverty alleviation
“temporiz[es] … poverty rather really confront[s] it” and poverty elimination while
having the right purpose “has a utopian feel about it.” But it is poverty reduction that is
“resolute and realistic.”100
When channelling international development aid aimed at addressing poverty
Riddell suggests three possibilities:
•
•

•

first, aid could help to speed up the general process of development and
poverty eradication;
second, if current development processes do not sufficiently benefit the
poorest, aid could be targeted at and channelled directly to those living in
extreme poverty;
third, aid could be used to help alter the process of development so that wealth
creation and decision-making become more inclusive of poor people.101

Aid to the poor is viewed not only as a matter of policy decisions and but also the moral
duty to assist those including “foreigners in distant lands.”102 These duties for Pogge
include the duties “not to harm” and acknowledge that “[i]f the unfairness of the global
order we impose causes poverty to persist in the poor countries, then [the] moral
responsibility for the associated deaths and deprivations is not diminished by diversity of
nationality and geographical or cultural distance.”103 Therefore, efforts to assist the poor
should also be guided and reflect the context specific to those factors and their
importance and “be informed in particular by the view of poor people.”104 These efforts
need to look into specific issues and obstacles the poor encounter and recognize that
100
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issues and obstacles can “differ radically across groups and within different countries,
regions, and localities.”105 When inquiring on opinions and views of the poor, they should
be “ treated as free and autonomous agents.” There should be an acknowledgment that
the poor have the right to make decisions on issues which impact their life and be
considerate of their abilities “to fulfill their own potential.” 106 While inquiring and
incorporating the voices of the poor in international aid, Easterly underlines that foreign
aid is “inherently difficult” because the poor hold weak power.
The sad part is the poor have had so little power to hold agencies accountable that
the aid agencies have not had enough incentive to find out what works and what
the poor actually want. The most important suggestion is to search for small
improvements, then brutally scrutinize and test whether the poor got what they
wanted and were better off, and then repeat the process.107
There are different approaches in understanding poverty and how to tackle it and the role
the poor should have in the process, but within those different approaches there is
growing articulation about the connection between poverty and human rights. Human
rights are seen as emanating from human dignity, while poverty can adversely affect
human dignity. Poverty restricts the choices people have, while human rights expand
those choices and empower people to choose. 108 Poverty itself has become to be
recognized as “a serious global human rights issue.”109
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4

POLICE CORDONS OR PROMENADE TO HUMAN RIGHTS
It had become routine for police to block roads leading from the provinces
and obstruct people wanting to reach the capital to protest against yet
another rigged election. Police cordons were set up in the outskirts of the
capital and not only the potential protesters but also people who needed to
go to work or attend other everyday matters were not allowed into the
capital. In the country which was still doing the first steps in recovery
from the economic collapse and facing rampant poverty, where scarce
jobs were available mostly in the capital, police cordons were not only
hampering the enjoyment of civil rights. They were obstacles in accessing
employment and to “the right to a standard of living adequate for …
[themselves] and for … [their] families.”110
When an individual or a group lays a claim to a certain set of entitlements, the

concept of human rights is referred to with the assumption that it is understood what it
implies. However, the concept of human rights constantly changes and expands and
encompasses diverse values from different times and societies. What human rights
represent is an evolutionary process in which ideals are the manifestation of the outcomes
of negotiations and reinterpretations within societies. That process of redefinition
includes also basic assumptions as who is human, whether rights are inalienable part of
the human, whether there is a set of entitlements that is universally applicable, or whether
human rights should first and foremost be a result of locally framed expectations of
societal norms.
This chapter approaches the discourse on human rights from this perspective of
continuous evolution where both local and universal norms are in interplay. It presents
debates on what constitutes human rights and what claims they lay, whether those claims
are universal or are bound with localized experience (cultural relativism approach) and
whether human rights and their interpretation are political in nature. The chapter also
underscores that there is growing reliance on laws and codified norms in formulating
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what constitutes human rights, their scope and how they should be promoted. There is
particular focus on appeals to norms articulated in international human rights treaties and
an assumption of human rights related obligations by states through accession to and
ratification of these treaties. The chapter further examines drawbacks associated with the
legalistic approach to human rights, including equating what entitlements people can
have with rights and freedoms set in laws.
Human rights are evoked when individuals feel aggrieved or when NGOs or other
actors position themselves as defenders of those individuals. Individuals call upon human
rights to justify their claims and use them as shields to ward off the claims of others.
Human rights are appealed to when aiming to expand the scope of equality and rights to
the greatest number of individuals. In the meantime, human rights are used to censor and
silence opinions which may deviate even slightly from human rights orthodoxy and lead
to public sanctioning of those “deviants.” In foreign relations human rights have become
a reference point to justify the transfer to a “better model” for the benefit of those in far
lands. Human rights have been used to also provide the cover of piety to military
interventions, sometimes under false pretence. The article by Cockburn in The
Independent on Libya is helpful to illustrate such instances of using human rights. By
juxtaposing the speech by David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in
Benghazi in September 2011 after the overthrow of Qaddafi “your city was an example to
the world as you threw off a dictator and chose freedom,” Cockburn notes, “Mr Cameron
has not been back to Benghazi, nor is he likely to do so as warring militias reduce Libya
to primal anarchy in which nobody is safe. The majority of Libyans are demonstrably
worse off…” While protection of human rights and stopping atrocities were the main
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justification for the military intervention, he also questions some of that premise by
pointing out “there was no evidence for several highly publicised atrocities supposedly
carried out by Gaddafi's forces that were used to fuel popular support for the air war in
the US, Britain, France and elsewhere.”111
On the other end of the spectrum of the discourse of human rights is when states
where there are ongoing violations of human rights oppose changes to improve living
conditions by claiming human rights are just a foreign agenda. They aim, not only to
undermine the legitimate claims that their citizens have, but to also ignore the need to
engage with the populace. Whatever the reason for evoking them, human rights will
continue to mobilize and polarize and remain one of the most frequently referred to
phrases. Speaking about the hype around human rights, Iyer notes,
‘Human rights’ has become one of the fashionable phrases of our time. The
concept has been elevated to the status of a ‘global religion’. Seldom goes a week
pass without some new report or initiative or campaign being launched on the
subject somewhere in the world. The concept has also given rise to the whole new
‘industry’—an issue which has divided people as much as it has united them.112
While human rights promote the ideas of inclusion and tolerance, human rights are also
used to create what is perceived as the pantheon of the commandments “thou shalt” or
“thou shalt not”113 and self-appointed advocates with priestly zeal and with much less
forgiveness assume the role of defining what and who are good and evil. Those who
might question the established and promoted narratives may be treated as modern day
heretics. But, as with any idea, the concept of human rights is not immune from being
challenged by either its proponents or opponents.
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Human rights are both a perceived and prescribed set of entitlements which one
has and which can be enjoyed by virtue of being regarded a “human,”114 and which put
duties on all members of society as well as state to enable the enjoyment of those rights.
But those entitlements, their scope and responsibilities that they put on individuals and
state, are continuously reshaped and adjusted to reflect the competition over values
during different times and in diverse societies. As Rukooko puts it, human rights are “a
product of struggles and compromises.”115 Habermas presents human rights as “Janusfaced, looking simultaneously toward morality and the law.” As moral norms they are
applied to everybody who has “a human countenance,” while as legal norms they provide
protection to individuals as part of a certain “legal community,” typically as “citizens of a
nation state.” 116 Whether a “legal or moral or social concept,” they are seen as a
“relational concept” which can lend protection to the weak against the more powerful,
and offer safeguard from the unnecessary intrusion by the state into lives of individuals.117
Donnelly describes human rights as “the rights that one has simply as a human
being. As such they are equal rights, because we are all equally human beings. They are
also inalienable rights, because no matter how inhumanely we act or are treated we
cannot become other than human beings.”118 Similarly, Blakeley and Raphael, anchoring
the universal application of human rights to every individual by “virtue of the fact that we
114
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are human,” claim their inalienability as “expressed at the global level” and which
“cannot be taken away from us, except for some rights in particular contexts which are
themselves governed by ‘due process’ and the rule of law.” 119 Though, they also
acknowledge that there are certain rights, like right to life, freedom from torture and
prohibition of slavery which are applicable all the time and are non-derogable when
“there are no circumstances whatsoever which would allow for these rights to be
curtailed.”120
For Brysk human rights are “a set of universal claims” which safeguard “human
dignity from illegitimate coercion, typically enacted by state agents.” 121 The UN
OHCHR, which sees human rights stemming from “cherished human values that are
common to all cultures and civilizations,”122 frames them as “the language of basic human
wants” which “help in articulating wants and the response of those who have to address
those wants.”123 As “universal legal guarantees” they provide protection against actions
and omissions that hamper fundamental freedoms and entitlements and they “[c]annot be
waived or taken away.”124 Or, putting it into Dworkin’s words, “someone has a ‘right’ to
do something, impl[ies] that it would be wrong to interfere with his doing it, or at least
that some special grounds are needed to justify any interference.” 125 In Gabel’s
interpretation, however, rights are “social experiences that are merely possible rather than
the experiences themselves.” It suggests that an individual is “a passive locus of possible
119

Blakeley and Raphael, “Governing Human Rights: Rendition, Secret Detention and Torture in the ‘War
on Terror,’” 161.
120
Ibid.
121
Brysk, “Introduction: Transnational Threats and Opportunities,” 3.
122
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide
to Measurement and Implementation, 10.
123
Ibid., 9.
124
Office of the United Natoins High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Frequently Asked Questions on a
Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation,” 1.
125
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 188. See also Ferraz, “Poverty and Human Rights,” 591.
50

action, rather than as in action with others already.” Another consideration is that rights
are perceived to be given from the outside authority, “from ‘the State’ which either
creates them (in the positivist version of the constitutional thought-schema) or recognizes
them (in the natural-law version) through the passage of ‘laws.’” This approach assumes
that people are able to engage with each other because they have “been ‘allowed’ to do so
in advance.”126
In recent decades the acceptance and codification of rights was mostly done either
through peaceful adoption through “State” mechanisms or promotion through
international codification mechanisms, such as international treaties. But the proposition
that rights are “being granted…from an outside” 127 would negate the centuries of
struggle, including revolutionary, to assert the rights which people perceived they had
even in the absence of the law which would “grant” them. Of course, there can be a
discussion whether the rights individuals believe they possess are anchored in the belief
that exist in divine sources or whether they are an outcome of the social contestation and
agreement and being “authoritatively given by a society to itself.”128 Even as social
constructs “once … accepted through a norm-creating process, they become binding on
the community”129 do not make an individual a mere a passive observer and recipient of
rights but still leave a space for an individual to be among the creators. It allows a space
to see rights also as a reflection of localized experiences. The approach to rights as being
“framed locally”130 Ensor formulates, “as on one hand, the individual interests that rights
126
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protect are subject to local social forms, while on the other hand, the character of
societies (which rights reinforce) differ across communities and through time.” There
should not be an assumption that human rights speak with local norms and, if human
rights language is “transferred, unchanged, from one context to another,” it maybe seen
“as a challenge or threat to a community.”131
However, it should be mentioned that these definitions of human rights seem to
imply that it is understood who is the “human” to whom these entitlements belong. But
within the human rights rhetoric, even who qualifies as a type of “human” that triggers
rights and protections is still debated. Abortion debates accentuate that question by
challenges from both sides. The article “After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby
Live?” Giubilini and Minevra in the context of suggesting post-birth abortion is
illustrative of this contention. They contend that “[t]he moral status of an infant is
equivalent to that of a fetus, that is, neither can be considered a ‘person’ in a morally
relevant sense.” While stating that the fetus and infant “are human beings and potential
persons” they argue that both cannot be considered as “a ‘person’ in the sense of ‘subject
of a moral right to life.’” They continue to define the person “to mean an individual who
is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being
deprived of this existence represents a loss to her.”132
In spite of diverse opinions about what human rights are and even contestation of
who is regarded a “human,” human rights are used to lay a claim to combat societal and
political dogmas. But in the meantime, the human rights movement gradually relies on a
more authoritative, and perhaps less locally reflective, perception of what human rights
131
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are and how the model society has to look. Iyer rightly notes that within the human rights
movement, as in other social movements, there is “a fair share of individuals, institutions,
and many professional human rights activists who are driven by ideology and dogma,
rather than by a sense of genuine commitment to the notion of human rights, familiarity
with social realities, and a sense pragmatism and common sense.”133 He continues to
stress that human rights professionals need to acknowledge that human rights are prone to
redefinition, because “different cultures and societies…interpret human rights differently,
in accordance with the values that underpin those societies.” He criticizes the reluctance
within the human rights movement to admit this reality and argues that it leads to
“inconsistences in their approach to fundamental issues—inconsistences which most
ordinary people find very difficult to understand or overlook.”134
The claim of universality of human rights as being “applicable through the world,
and reach into all political, cultural and religious systems” has been also challenged on
the basis that it forces Western values, which are products of Western cultures, and
historical development on other societies.135 Even the existence of ratified human rights
agreements does not resolve the challenge to the universality claim, because there is still
an issue with “whether their content is sufficiently reflective of international diversity of
thought and belief to be legitimate.”136 In Kennedy’s opinion the “institutional practice of
human rights promotion” conveys the “abstract idea about people, politics and society”
and “one-size-fits-all emancipatory practice” that does not sufficiently reflect the
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“possibility for particularity and variation.”137
There are propagandists, as the authors cited in paragraphs above, who seek to
demonstrate the “organic match between human rights and key elements in cultures and
religions worldwide.”138 Falk aims to reconcile the claim of universality by stating, “that
only the subaltern discourse that encompasses the full panoply of human rights can
establish the moral, political, and cultural ground for the genuine embrace of human
rights on a universal foundation.”139 O’Manique outlines his proposition of universality
by indicating that “rights and law are human manifestations of the propensity to develop
found in all living organisms. Human rights encompass all what is required for total
human development.”140 However, he goes to acknowledge the localized experiences in
conceptualizing and constructing rights. He elaborates,
Defining rights and law is very different from defining tables or horses. A horse is
a horse no matter what one believes it to be, but what right or law is will very
much depend on a person's or a community's beliefs. Ultimately, rights and law
within a community are what that community says they are. Rather than defining
law and rights for all of the world's communities, I am saying that what are
usually called law and rights have probably evolved from behaviors and
institutions which emerged as integral parts of the beginnings of human evolution
and are, consequently, common to our species. Furthermore, an awareness of
those common origins could help us to determine the nature and function of law
and rights in our own communities and in the world community.141
This proposition to determine the commonly shared societal and legal norms that are
nevertheless the result of the localized evolutionary norm development process is
attractive and has its merits when observing the developments within Europe which
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encompasses diverse communities and ethnicities with their unique cultures. But a closer
look into the legal and human rights framework of countries that have common heritage
reveals that there is still divergence on the treatment of fundamental rights. For example,
countries which have a common heritage shaped by Christianity diverge on a
fundamental right—the right to life—as reflected in debates about the capital punishment.
Countries in the European Union abolished the death penalty and do not extradite
convicted criminals if they can be executed. 142 Meanwhile, in the USA, capital
punishment not only exists but the debates are about what constitutes more “humane”
ways of depriving the convict of life.
The decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, Minister of Justice v. Burns and
Rafay, illustrates the divergence in treatment of a fundamental right in countries which
otherwise share similar values towards human rights – Canada and the USA. In their
decision on the extradition sought for Canadian citizens accused of murders in the USA,
without the assurance that the death penalty would not be applied, the Supreme Court of
Canada ruled that extradition would violate the right to life, liberty and security
guaranteed by the section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.143 These
examples are provided not to challenge the merits of the proposition that commonly
shared values and norms can serve as a basis for their universal application. It is rather to
indicate the strong influence of localized experiences even within communities which
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have common or similar origins and heritage. But, as Uvin points out, “at the end of the
day, there is probably no perfect solution to the relativity conundrum.”144 He argues that
because human rights are normative “rather than descriptive facts, it is impossible to
ground them with uncontested certainty in a universal manner.” Human rights are always
going to be contested because they use the “language to make claims with, to conceive of
and fight for social change” and are about the concepts of a better world and about
political aspirations.145
The contestation of the concepts and understandings of human rights in framing
and reframing them as social constructs draws them into a political process. The framing
of the nature, scope and application of human rights enters the political process not only
through the contestation over ideals by individuals and groups in a given society; it is
also an outcome of the positions and decisions adopted by more structured institutions
such as political parties and the law making process in national parliaments. On the other
side, political order and institutions governing society themselves can be outcomes of
human rights as a result of readjustment to meet human rights standards. Furthermore,
contestation over human rights as a part of the local political process for social changes is
integrally linked with international human rights norms and standards. The local political
processes are linked to aspirations to meet international human standards and choosing
which standards to meet, and they also contribute and challenge international the human
rights norm setting process in international fora.
But “[i]f we accept that human rights are social constructions,” as Hoover
indicates, “then it follows that they express the political order in which they have been
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created” and it raises questions about “their status as universal norms of social life.” He
also argues that “the admission that human rights are only conventional” bolsters
opinions that human rights reflect “interests of western powers” which are able to
dominate “weaker states and disempowered people.” He points out that “[i]f we suspect
that human rights might be unavoidably political, we are forced to consider whether this
politics is objectionable – and it would seem that for many people it is.”146 Human rights
politics faces strong objection when it is among Western countries’ foreign policy tools
and is used to ostracize countries which stand on the way of Western foreign policy
agendas. The opposition to politicizing human rights is most salient when human rights
demands by Western countries are promoted and imposed selectively. That is, when
human rights politics is determined not so much by the graveness of human rights
violations in a country or oppressiveness of its state structures, but rather by the rationale
of whether those structures are conducive for Western economic and political interests.
There are also proponents of human rights politics because it is seen as a way to
garner wider support to address human rights violations. It is sometimes regarded as more
a peaceful means of enforcing compliance with human rights standards. Butler explains
the merits the politicized nature of human rights through the need to enforce them using
foreign policy tools. While human rights are codified either in constitutions or
international treaties, “protected through the courts,” but with “the world judicial system
is still incomplete, politicized enforcement sometimes occurs through the human-rights
based foreign policies of major sovereign states rather than through courts.”147 Though he
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asserts that, “enforcement in the courtroom is morally preferable.”148
People have and will continue to have a different conception of rights and the
means of their promotion and enforcement, but there is growing reliance on appealing to
laws and codified norms when discussing and promoting human rights.149 Developing
laws, according to Kennedy, is seen “as an emancipatory end in itself, leaving the human
rights movement too ready to articulate problems in political terms and solutions in legal
terms.”150 Furthermore, as Evans points out, “[i]n contrast to the moral abstract nature of
the philosophical discourse, the legal discourse focuses upon a large corpus of
international human rights law, mostly generated under the auspices of the United
Nations.”151 They are codified in international human rights treaties and are ratified by
states,152 laying ground for what is interpreted as “an expression of the international rule
of law for the purpose of protecting the individual regardless of any other conditions such
as nationality, religion or status.”153
McInerney-Lankford indicates that, through a voluntarily accession process, states
are able to negotiate the parameter of obligations they are willing to assume
“circumscribed through reservation and derogation.” The voluntary accession and states’
consent to the terms “secur[e] a clarity and legitimacy that approaches based on
principles and values or even general principles of international law may not avail of as
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easily.”154 It can be also argued that accession to international human rights instruments is
a manifestation of “a new sovereignty regime signalling changes in the prerogatives of
sovereignty, setting new limits to its legitimate exercise.”155 But even with the voluntary
accession and consent by sovereign states to impose certain standards of behaviour on
themselves, the fact that sovereign states still remain the main decision-makers able to
withdraw that consent leaves the notion of what is the “legitimate” norm open to
challenge. The statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom during the
Conservative party conference in Birmingham in September, 2014 is descriptive in this
regard. He stated, “[t]he suggestion that you’ve got to apply the human rights convention
even on the battlefields of Helmand. And now – they [European Court of Human Rights]
want to give prisoners the vote. I’m sorry, I just don’t agree.”156 Such a statement stands
against even less aspirational interpretations of international human rights within the
governance framework where sovereignty, not human rights, is the main linchpin of the
legal system as described by Cohen.
…although the international legal norms and rules regarding the prerogatives of
sovereign statutes have changed, sovereignty has not been displaced by human
rights as the basic principle of the international legal order. International human
rights treaties are not designed to abolish state sovereignty or to replace it with
global governance and global law but to prod states to erect and commit to a
common international standards and to abide by it in their domestic law and
polices.157
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However, the legalistic approach has it drawbacks as it is mostly concerned with “whatthe-law-says”158 and pays less attention to “the political process that shapes the extent to
which rights are enforced and realised in people’s daily lives.”159 VeneKlasen et al.
criticize the overreliance on the legalistic approach by indicating that “[w]hile working
with laws and legal systems is critical” it also contributes to the failure “to expand the
scope of rights.” They argue that “[i]nstead of starting with people’s daily problems,
rights groups usually use a discussion of law as an entry point into communities, failing
to relate to how people experience the world.”160 In addition, the legalistic approach to
human rights is becoming a more favoured approach in international human rights
discourse and if there are failings within human rights regime “the usual response is to
clarify legal rules by drafting more international law, rather than to question the
efficacy.” 161 By closely tying human rights with law, there is an assumption that
individuals do not have human rights unless they are incorporated within the legal
system.162 But even if human rights are framed through the language of law, whether
domestic law or international instruments, their moral application is not dependent on
them being codified within enforceable laws. 163 However, recognizing human rights,
whether morally or legally, is not sufficient; there should also be an enabling
environment and mechanisms created to facilitate the enjoyment of rights.164
Whether human rights are viewed or interpreted through the legalistic or social
and moral construct lens, the interpretation and the definition of the scope is a dynamic
158
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and ever expanding process with “newer” rights being claimed and expected to be
codified and enforced. This process encompasses claims adjusted to accommodate the
continuously changing understanding individuals and societies have of what they are
entitled, which is shaped by local experiences and how and by whom they have to be
satisfied. But localized experiences are neither standalone nor isolated. They are in
constant interaction by affecting and enriching each other and setting common standards
with corresponding duties to meet those standards. Though, it should be noted that the
dynamic nature of human rights may also be a source of tension within and among
societies, particularly when it concerns resource distribution, such as in socio-economic
development and guaranteeing social-economic rights.
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5

DOES IT INDEED TAKE TWO TO DANCE? OR HUMAN RIGHTS MEETS
DEVELOPMENT
1994. The ceasefire is signed. There is hope in the air that the country will
finally embark on the path of development, the economy will grow and
people will have a better life. No more food allocation cards, they will
have decent jobs, better nutrition and access to health. Many do not have
much money nor do they have job opportunities. But they are told that
international donors requested that the government liberalizes prices,
stops state subsides, including of bread – their staple food. Nobody asks
them when the decisions are made. Their opinions are of lesser
importance. Now, many of them can afford even less, while a few are
getting rich and quickly. In time, people learnt that academics and
practitioners called the recommendations by highly paid international
advisors a “shock therapy,” but for them, who had little, it was shocking
“development.”
Development and poverty reduction have been closely associated with each other

and advocated as mutually reinforcing processes aimed at improving the livelihood of
people, advancing opportunities within societies, and contributing to efficiently
functioning governance institutions capable of satisfying people according to their needs.
Increasingly, human rights are introduced into the discourse of development and its role
is magnified in poverty reduction efforts, thus compelling a reassessment of the nature of
international development initiatives. Chapter 5 analyzes the intersection between human
rights, development, and poverty reduction. Debates on the right to development show
the contesting approaches developing and Western industrial countries held on the nature
of development. They also raise the question of whether development triggers rights and
corresponding duties. While addressing the integration of human rights into the
development agenda and the role they play in development, this chapter examines human
rights mainstreaming into international development initiatives, the role they can play in
development and poverty reduction, as well as the potential tensions they can cause.
In its introduction, the report of the UN Secretary General on An Agenda for
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Development states “Development is a fundamental human right.”165 It continues, “People
are a country’s principal asset. Their well-being defines development … The enormous
challenge of development cannot be undertaken by people whose every thought is bent
towards getting enough to eat or recovery from debilitating sickness.”166 In his article
“Poverty: A Denial of Human Rights” Speth writes,
The right to be free of the crushing burden of poverty must be counted among the
most fundamental of human rights. Poverty is brutal. It is embedded in all realms
of the existence of poor people, and extends beyond lack of income. Perhaps the
most basic human right challenged by human poverty is the right to life.167
Donor agencies rationalize the provision of aid with the claim that it contributes to
development with a focus on social justice and assistance to the poorest. CIDA, in its
Sustainable Development Strategy, argued that “[d]emocratic governance and human
rights are essential for development progress.” It contended that a “democratic society”
which is based on human rights and the rule of law “is more able to provide … poverty
alleviation for its citizens. With this recognition, CIDA has promoted democratic
governance and human rights for over a decade.” 168 But despite aid, with the gap
persisting or growing between developed and developing countries, and criticism of the
effectiveness of aid, the paradigm has been shifting from “aid as help, to development as
a general process that could not be affected by aid alone.” 169 Currently, there is
recognition that development is “no longer … narrowly conceptualised as economic
development or growth” but by the ability “to respond to the multidimensional nature of
poverty.” Therefore, when “framed in these terms, human rights become a constitutive
165
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element of development and human rights violations become both a cause and symptom
of poverty.”170 There is also a growing tendency to see development in terms of human
development that “address[es] the human being in relation with both resource
management and participation.”171
The discourse on the intersection between human rights, development, and
poverty reduction has gained prominence only in recent decades. Uvin points out that
whether in discourse or practice, development and human rights evolved separately. He
argues that “[t]he problem originated from both sides, an act of choice, not a necessity.”172
Among the reasons was the fact the human rights movement dominated by richer
Western countries prioritized, if not exclusively focused, on civil and political rights (CP)
while marginalizing attention to economic, social and cultural rights (ESC). Thus,
“[b]eyond routine declarations about the indivisibility of all rights, for all intents and
purposes most ESC rights have not been part of human right practice for most of the last
half century.”173 Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948
included both CP and ESC rights and recognized that “[e]veryone is entitled to all the
rights set forth in … [the] Declaration,”174 in 1966 CP and ESC rights were divided into
two separate conventions. While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) raised the immediate obligations of governments, rights enshrined in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were left to
the progressive realization conditioned by the availability of resources.
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Sengupta mentions that the dissatisfaction in the international community by this
“split in the commitment to human rights” is because such an approach was contrary to
the interdependence of human rights acknowledged in the Proclamation of Tehran
(1968). The Proclamation asserted that “[s]ince human rights and fundamental freedoms
are indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights is impossible.” 175 The Declaration on Social
Progress and Development (1969) affirmed that development should guarantee “the
promotion of human rights and social justice, which requires … [t]he recognition and
effective implementation of civil and political rights as well as of economic, social and
cultural rights without any discrimination.”176
Within the human rights rhetoric, the concept of development initially received
more prominence through the notion of the “right to development.” It was initiated by a
Senegalese jurist M’Baye in 1972 during the debates about the New International
Economic Order (NIEO).177 The Declaration on the Right to Development adopted in
1986 reiterated the indivisibility of rights by stating, “All human rights and fundamental
freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration
should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights.” 178 It also asserted “the right to development … [as]
an inalienable human right.”179 The concept of the right to development also “provided
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legal and ethical authority to the Third World’s request for the international redistribution
of resources.”180
But the Declaration had a push back from the most developed countries: the US
voted against it and eight other countries (Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland,
Denmark, Israel, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom and Japan) abstained.181 During the
discussions of the Declaration, the US voiced its strong objections, and the Third
Committee’s Summary Record of 61st Meeting illustrates US objections. The US position
was that,
unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the declaration on the right to
development just adopted by the Committee was imprecise and confusing.
Development, which the declaration defined as the constant improvement of the
well-being of the entire population, was not assured by governmental promises
but by performance. References to the human rights of peoples were inconsistent
with the proper concept of human rights as rights of the individual.182
The declaration, which treated the right to development as both individual and
collective,183 was also criticized for not clearly specifying to whom those collective rights
belonged which “nourished the suspicion of Western industrial countries.” The
understanding of Western countries was that developing countries viewed themselves as
rights-holders and Western countries as those who had a duty to provide aid to them.184
180

Uvin, “From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How ‘Human Rights’ Entered
Development,” 2010, 164.
181
Bunn, The Right to Development and International Economic Law: Legal and Moral Dimensions, 44.
See also Marks, “Human Rights and Development,” 170.
182
Third Committee, Summary Record of 61st Meeting, November 28, 1986, A/C.3/41/SR.61, December 5,
1986, para 190, cited in Bunn, The Right to Development and International Economic Law: Legal and
Moral Dimensions, 43 (footnote 69).
183
“…right to development is an inalienable human right and that equality of opportunity for development
is a prerogative both of nations and of individuals who make up nations.” Declaration on the Right to
Development. The Declaration also reaffirms individual and collective responsibility for development (Art.
2.2)
184
Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1009. Also referred in Ferguson, “The Right to
Development and the Rights‐Based Approach to Development: A Review of Basic Concepts and
Debates,” 7.
66

The US delegation expressed its opposition to the premise that development would be
achieved by the redistribution of resources from developed to developing countries. The
delegation also asserted that would weaken “human rights agenda of the United Nations”
which, it argued, was “overflowing with issues posed by numerous failures to respect the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
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But, as Kennedy stresses, when

“emancipatory projects” among which is addressing how the issues of development and
poverty are being framed in the language of rights, those “[e]fforts that cannot be
articulated in these terms seem less legitimate, less practical less worth the effort.”
Increasingly, people of good will concerned about poverty are drawn into debate
about a series of ultimately impossible legal quandaries- right of whom, against
whom, remediable how, and so on - and into institutional projects of codification
and reporting familiar from other human rights efforts…186
While human rights practitioners and activists place human rights at the centre of
development, governments in developing countries give primacy to development before
human rights, particularly civil and political rights, and argue that development leads to
better protection of human rights, including social and economic ones.187 Curtailment of
freedoms is justified as needed to maintain stability required for development. Among the
summary arguments of why precedence is given to development priorities, Donnelly
names liberty trade off when “[t]he exercise of civil and political rights may disrupt or
threaten to destroy even the best-laid development plan, and must therefore be
temporarily suspended.” Justifications include the exercise of freedoms (such as freedom
185
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of speech, assembly) and can contribute to divisions in the society that fragile states may
not be able to cope with.188 The stance of contrasting human rights and development
rather seeing them as complementary wilfully diverts attention from shortcomings within
the governance structures and institutions which hamper development in the first place.
These shortcomings are among the sources of making a state fragile by making relevant
structures and institutions inflexible to accommodate changes required for development.
They also undermine the ability of societies and countries to sustain the results of
development.
The term development which has been among the buzzwords of policy and
academic discussion for decades, but as Rist mentions, “its actual meaning is still elusive,
since it depends on where and by whom it is used.”189 In his overview of meanings of
development Haque distinguishes between the conservative, the reformist, and radical
traditions.
In the conservative tradition, development is understood in terms of increased
economic production, consumption, and accumulation; further social
differentiation, adaptation, and integration; more political stability, participation
and institutionalization; or enhanced physiological orientation towards
entrepreneurship and achievement. In the reformist tradition, on the other hand,
development is perceived in terms of higher economic growth with some degree
of redistribution… in the radical tradition, development is construed in terms of
progressive changes in the forces and relations of production, freedom from all
forms of class exploitation, the realization of a classless society, or the liberation
of peripheral nations from the world capitalist system.190
The debate over development includes various definitions and measures and, depending
on what each development agency decides what “development ‘is,’” it shapes their
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goals.191 But as Sumner and Tribe point out, “[a] common theme within most definitions
is that ‘development’ encompasses ‘change’ in a variety of aspects of the human
condition.”192
Within the context of developments, change should not be seen in a sense of just a
linear, chronological transition from a past condition (A1), to the present condition (A2)
then to the future one (A3). For example, during the economic and political transition
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, such linear movement from one condition to
another was viewed by people as stagnation rather than development. The process was
regarded as development only if the change in conditions provided essentially better
options to function within the society. Therefore, the change as development is rather
expected to be an advancement when the current condition (B) is an improvement and is
essentially better than the previous one (A). The future condition (C) has to manifest
higher living standards and provide better options in comparison to the current condition
(B). However, improvements in material conditions of people and state infrastructure
alone may not be regarded as development unless these improvements take place within a
framework which also enables individuals to reach the potential to which they aspire. To
illustrate this argument, I would like to mention that when there was a gradual general
increase in income of people in Armenia in the mid-1990s, and there were more
economic activities taking place, the perception was still that there was lack of
development. The reason was that people did not view those changes as creating enabling
institutional frameworks and environments for applying their full potential and making
choices to live the life they desired. The consequence was and is still the brain drain and
191
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emigration of skilled workers.
During the last decades, bilateral and multilateral development donors have also
been mainstreaming human rights into their international development activities.193 Some
donors have an expressed agenda to promote human rights and directly integrate “human
rights into country programs or existing aid interventions in different sectors or toward
particular groups, such as children’s rights, women’s rights, the rights of minorities and
indigenous peoples, health, education, and livelihoods.” Most commonly initiatives are
undertaken through projects which aim at “the realization of specific rights, the
protection of particular groups, or in support of human rights organizations.” In instances
where human rights are not among the explicitly stated goals, they are implicitly
promoted through governance projects which “indirectly address civil and political
rights,” or increasingly through access to justice and anti-corruption projects.194 Human
rights also direct development processes from being mere aggregate wealth accumulation
mechanisms in society to activities that are more sensitive to the needs of individual
members of society and transform the wealth into the richness of individual experiences.
On the relationship between development and human rights, Marks argues that at
the theoretical level “both deal with advancing human well-being.” While development is
concerned with “material conditions” and allocation of benefits of economic activities
within society, human rights put restraints on power to “eliminat[e] … repressive and
oppressive practices.” 195 Integrating human rights into development is important to
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empower people to address their needs, claim their rights,196 and combat discrimination
and marginalization. By incorporating human rights in development, the structural roots
of discrimination and marginalization are challenged and give rise to obligations to
address those structural impediments.197 Human rights can not only contribute to the
advancement of claims by individuals, but also serve “as indicators of progress toward
their achievement and ultimately the objectives to be attained.”198 By placing humans at
the centre of development, whether as an individual or a member of a collective, human
rights bring forward their expectations of well-being as standards to which development
should be aiming. These standards do not only concern access to and enjoyment of
material resources, but also how society has to be structured to enable access to
opportunities of importance for an individual and the responsibilities that governments
have to meet those standards. Human rights also serve as a background for relations
between recipient governments and donors and facilitate the shared view of what issues
affect the realization of rights and actions to be undertaken to address them.199 Human
rights are not only means for donors to contribute to development, but also expand their
focus by including considerations of justice and political participation.200
In the meantime, while discussing the role human rights plays in development,
there should be an understanding that “[c]ertain human rights may be relevant to
particular development processes and activities, but the relevance may not be
generalized, nor involve all human rights.” 201 The needs of people and their living
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conditions are the outcomes of local experiences; therefore, for human rights to
contribute to development they have to be reflective of particular experiences. These
experiences also encompass competition over what issues need to be prioritized and how
those issues should be addressed and by whom. Therefore, as Pettit and Wheeler rightly
point out,
While economic, social and political rights are indivisible in practice, this does
not imply that there will be no conflicts between rights. Rights-based approaches,
if reduced to technical and operational plans that ignore political context and
power relations, will fail to be effective in promoting social justice in a
sustainable way.202
Western donors have provided trillions of dollars in foreign aid to developing countries
with the aim to improve the lives of those most in need, but that mostly top-down
approach with projects transplanting Western institutions has yet to produce declared
expectations. International development efforts have been driven more by the
perspectives of donors, shaped by their own development experiences and what they
considered as the achievements of their societies, rather than by views of recipient
societies and what they regard as an achievement. But, foreign aid should be provided
with “the understanding that helping other countries is not the same as forcing them to
adopt western institutions, modes of governance, dispute-resolution systems and
rights.”203 Without sensitivity to the views of people and communities on development
priorities and attitudes towards foreign aid, donors face alienating the very people they
want to help. Uvin acknowledges that “at the level of daily practice people seem not to
participate enthusiastically in the projects and programs implemented by aid agencies.”
The priorities set by development practitioners and solutions to reach them do not
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necessarily match with ones that local communities and people have in their minds. Even
if there is such divergence of expectations, when the discourse is dominated by Western
countries, “governments and people are willing to conform to dominant discourse,
especially if such conformity brings with it large flows of money and opportunities.”204
The promotion and enjoyment of socio-economic rights is one such instance of
the divergence in opinions. Without questioning the importance of civil and political
rights for people at the local level, including for the poorest, there should be recognition
that violations of, and obstacles to enjoying, socio-economic rights can have a more
dramatic and immediate impact on the everyday life of the poor. Though there is an
increasing importance placed on the socio-economic rights within the dominant
development discourse, they are still “by far, the most frequently unfulfilled human
rights.”205 Pogge’s position is that their “underfulfillment also plays a major role in
explaining global deficits in civil and political human rights demanding democracy, due
process, and the rule of law.” People living in extreme poverty whose physical and
mental state are adversely affected by poor nutrition, illiteracy, and constant concern
about the well-being of their families do not pose either much threat nor are they
regarded as of political importance for the ruling elite. As a result, those who have the
duty to ensure that the poor are able to access and enjoy their rights “pay much less
attention to the interests of the poor than to the interests of agents more capable of
reciprocation, including foreign governments.”206
When the poor face impediments for in making their voices heard and their
interests be reflected in polices, both national and international development efforts may
204
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be captured by more powerful groups prioritizing their own interest which do not
necessarily benefit those most in need. The promotion of rights, such as social and
economic rights, may also affect the material resource redistribution and be perceived to
adversely impact the interests of groups which have more access to decision makers. The
disproportionate power influence can also dilute initiatives that benefit the poor. Despite
such constraints, the promotion of the social and economic rights of the poor, and
ensuring access to those rights, have grown into major themes within international
development assistance. Access to and guarantee of basic nutrition, education, health, and
opportunities for providing livelihood for oneself and the family have come to be viewed
as an integral part of the development process rather than its charitable outcome.
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THE GEOMETRY OF HUMAN RIGHTS OR WHERE IS THE PLACE OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Yet another election was organized and conducted. Each time they entered
voting booths with the hope that their votes would be counted, their voices
would be heard and that the election would lead to changes that bring
higher standards of living, better employment opportunities and progress
in social protection. Millions of dollars were spent- both by the national
government and international donors. The outcome was another rigged
election and them questioning the utility of spending millions on elections
with predetermined outcomes and asking whether money could have been
better used on improving their social conditions. Was the right to vote
more immediate than the right to have some basic economic and social
protection? Should there be a question of choice? After casting their votes,
they went back to their families some with no prospects of job, income,
and economic and social stability, and with the only way out from that
situation—the airport.
The focus on improving social and economic conditions, particularly for the poor,

has been a prominent feature within both human rights and poverty reduction discourse.
The enjoyment of social and economic rights (SER) is viewed as an important means, not
only for improving the livelihood of people or merely satisfying their basic needs, but
rather as contributing to their abilities to partake in society the way they deem important.
Though SERs have been given heightened attention, including in international
development debates, the debates still carry contentions from previous decades. This
chapter outlines the progression of SERs through the analysis of norms and obligations
developed within the United Nation’s fora and expert guidelines advanced in
authoritative documents such as Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR).
The chapter examines the debates that contrast civil and political rights to SERs,
including the contestation of fixed categorization of the rights into different groups and
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the hierarchy among them. The chapter also addresses justicability claims for SERs,
promotion and protection of SERs through the legal framework, and the role justice
institutions can play.
The recognition of the need to address social and economic problems that hamper
development, and the sentiment that advancements in social and economic conditions are
important for stability and peace, have been among the declared core principles of the
international community from the inception of the UN. Article 55 of the UN Charter
states, “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations…the United Nations shall
promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health,
and related problems.”207 The 1997 publication, CIDA’s Policy on Meeting Basic Needs,
contended that “[b]asic rights are the foundation for meeting basic human needs.” The
document elaborated that “[p]erforming the basic functions of life (the intake of adequate
nutrition, maintenance of health, protection, reproduction, growth) and taking part in the
socio-economic and cultural life of the community (learning, understanding,
communicating, producing, exchanging) are considered to be people's most basic
needs.” 208 Within international development discourse, states have been viewed as
primary duty-bearers to further economic and social development and to undertake
relevant reforms by garnering available resources.209
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However, efforts to advance social and economic rights as a part of a unified
human rights agenda faced challenges from the initial steps of the agenda setting process
and codification of the relevant norms. In 1947, a decision to draft a human rights treaty,
Covenant, was made at the UN Commission on Human Rights. But the drafting process
stretched for nearly twenty years and from the beginning of the process the Commission
decided not to include social, economic and cultural rights in the Covenant.210 In its
resolution, the UN General Assembly disagreed with the position by the Commission and
asserted that “the Universal Declaration regards man as a person, to whom civic and
political freedoms as well as economic, social and cultural rights indubitably belong.”
The resolution asserted that without economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights a person
could not be regarded as “the human person whom the Universal Declaration” held as a
model of a free person and called to include ESC in the Covenant.211
The Commission prepared a draft which included ESC rights but the unified draft
faced objection from some states. The United Kingdom and the United States rejected
equal consideration of ESC, and the reasoning was that they were not justiciable rights.212
The United Kingdom, United States, Belgium, India, and Uruguay submitted a resolution
requesting that the UN General Assembly re-examine the decision of having all rights
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listed in a single document.213 Despite the push of some countries to have a unified
document, in 1952, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 543 (VI), which tasked
the Commission to draft two separate covenants of human rights. 214 It took more than a
decade to draft and adopt the covenants in 1966 – International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It
took another decade for them to enter into force.
The split of rights into different categories with civil and political rights claimed
to require the immediate realization and ESC rights being left to the discretion of states to
progressively implement rekindled arguments on the nature of rights and corresponding
obligations and criticisms of treating rights differently.215 Reflecting on the juxtaposition
discourse between civil, political, and ESC rights, Raes posits that there is “no
fundamental difference between … ethical basis … of [both] set[s] of rights.” The
argument being that both are related and are “prerequisites for one another” and “[a]ll of
these rights conceive human beings as persons, as the source of intentions and purposes,
decisions and choices, as actors capable of choices they may be held responsible for and
as capable of engaging and valuing certain forms of self development.”216 Within the
discourse on differences between the two sets of rights, the proponents of the approach
argue that civil and political rights are individualistic and ECS rights are collectivist
because they focus on the group. Addressing this argument Raes asserts that “all human
rights are rights of individuals” because ESC rights are rights which belong to
“individuals within particular communities.” The fact rights belong to individuals and
213
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individuals are at the centre of human rights discourse does not make them
“individualistic.” For example, political rights, such as freedom of assembly or
association are commonly exercised with a group.217
Another conventional argument is that ESC rights put positive obligations,218
promotion or protective actions, upon duty-bearers219 and “socio-economic rights advance
human rights deep into the sphere of allocation of scarce resources” while CP rights
assume a negative- preventive stance.220 However, this conventional dichotomy has been
challenged because the realization of certain negative rights still requires actions of dutybearers. 221 The organization of elections in developing countries, including with the
substantial financial and technical support of foreign state donors, highlights the
challenge of categorizing rights as positive and negative. Not infrequently, even people in
developing countries where elections tend to be marred with violations and outcomes that
are far from fair, seeing the organization of elections thorough the state’s “positive”
obligation raises questions of the utility of spending millions on elections, believing that
the money could have been better spent if used to improve their social and economic
condition. But the UNDP stresses that “it is important to understand that both sets of
rights have positive and negative dimensions, and that the language that has evolved to
describe these different dimensions now includes state obligations to respect, protect, and
217
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fulfill.”222
The Masstricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
place on states, as primary duty-bearers, obligations to respect, protect and fulfill ESC
rights and declares that “[f]ailure to perform any one of these three obligations constitutes
a violation of such rights.” The obligation to respect denotes that states do not interfere
with the enjoyment of ESC rights. The obligation to protect requires states to prevent,
including preventing third parties, from violating these rights. For example, “the failure
to ensure that private employers comply with basic labour standards may amount to a
violation of the right to work or the right to just and favourable conditions of work.”223
Ssenyonjo argues that the obligation to protect also refers to “the State’s obligation to
exercise due diligence not to violate human rights in other States and not to permit nonState actors within the State’s jurisdiction to violate human rights in other States.”224 The
obligation to fulfil implies that states have to take appropriate legislative, administrative,
budgetary, judicial actions and other measures towards the full realization of ESC
rights.225
Article 2(1) of ICESCR stipulates progressive full realization of ESC, including
through enactment of laws, with states acting “individually and through international
assistance and co-operation.”226 The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UN OHCHR) interprets “progressive realization” as recognition that “some
rights may have to be given priority over others, because not all rights can be fulﬁlled at
the same time or at the same place.” It also recognizes, however, that there are core
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obligations that states have “derived from the rights to life, food and health, to ensure that
all individuals within their jurisdictions are free from starvation. Core obligations must be
treated as binding constraints; they cannot be traded off.” 227 Another dimension is what
Darrow and Tomas emphasize—“it is important to recognize that not all human rights are
permitted to be realized only progressively.”228 Jorgensen and Serrano-Berhet add that
“[a]lthough economic, social, and cultural rights often are realized progressively,
guarantees imply immediate obligations.”229
UN OHCHR lists following obligations which are of immediate effect:
•
•

•

The obligation not to discriminate between different groups of people in the
realization of the rights in question;
The obligation to take steps (including devising speciﬁc strategies and
programmes) targeted deliberately towards the full realization of the rights in
question; and
The obligation to monitor progress in the realization of human rights.
Accessible mechanisms of redress should be available where rights are
violated.230

States are also immediately bound by the obligation to not discriminate, which implies
immediate steps “to identify the most disadvantaged or vulnerable with respect to the
proposed policy measures, with data disaggregated as far as possible according to the
prohibited grounds of discrimination reﬂected in international human rights
instruments.”231 The ICESCR ties the implementation of economic and social rights not
only with progressive realization but also with availability of resources, which raises the
question how feasible it is for developing countries with limited resources to ensure the
227
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enjoyment of social and economic rights. Is it true that “even with the best of efforts, it
may not be feasible to realize many of the alleged economic and social rights for all.”232
In addressing such arguments, Sen underscores that “if feasibility were a necessary
condition for people to have any rights, then not just social and economic rights, but all
rights—even the right to liberty—would be nonsensical, given the infeasibility of
ensuring the life and liberty of all against transgression.”233
Prima facie it may appear that for an individual to enjoy life and liberties it is
sufficient that there is no interference in their enjoyment, thus no positive action from the
state, requiring resources, is needed to protect those rights. However, in reality there are
multiple state institutions which are “positively” involved in ensuring that liberties and
freedoms are enjoyed. For example, police forces ensure that the right of life and security
of a person is guaranteed against interference by other individuals and groups. There are
more state institutions which could be listed as having positive obligations to ensure that
individuals enjoy rights and freedoms argued to raise only “negative” non-interference
obligations. For these institutions to exist and effectively function, substantial financial,
material, and human resources are allocated. Therefore, if the feasibility argument
connected with the availability of resources were to be accepted, spending resources on
such institutions as judiciary, policing, constitutional and legal reforms that are needed to
guarantee life and liberties of a person might look even less justifiable in conditions
where people die of diseases and hunger and hardly have any possessions or shelter to be
protected by those institutions.
The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in addressing the wording in ICECSR “to the
maximum of its available resources” indicated that states “are obligated, regardless of the
level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for
all.”234 Nevertheless, the Limburg Principles also acknowledge there might be factors
beyond states’ “reasonable control [that] may adversely affect its capacity to implement
particular rights.”235 Khan also calls to overcome interpretation of progressive realization
as a denial of rights in the Covenant by “acknowledge[ing] that the capacity of the state
to deliver on these rights is an element to be taken into account when judging whether it
has complied with its obligations.”236 The Limburg Principles “take into account the fact
that some constraints may be beyond a single State’s capacity to address” 237 and interpret
“`[i]ts available resources' refer[ing] to both the resources within a State and those
available from the international community through international co-operation and
assistance.” 238
Kuruvilla et al. note that “[t]he principles of the ‘margin of discretion’ and of the
‘progressive realization’ of rights focus attention on nationally-owned efforts to improve
the enjoyment of human rights of citizens and on international responsibility to support
these efforts.” 239 International donor assistance and the provision of resources to
nationally driven efforts in developing countries to address failures in the enjoyment of
SERs have been an important contribution to ensuring the progressive realization of the
234
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rights. Projects have been financed and implemented to address the issues of hunger,
creation of employment opportunities, tenure security (like right to housing and land
possession which is also used to access food), dealing with health issues (maternal and
child health, HIV/AIDS, communicable diseases, etc.), and other initiatives aimed at
advancing the livelihood and well-being of people. Such assistance of donors is presented
as a volunteer commitment rather a positive obligation to contribute to local initiatives to
ensure progressive realization of SERs; nevertheless, the donor assistance is an important
part of nationally undertaken obligations to guarantee these rights. But there is also
criticism that donor assistance is a top-down push of polices which may not be sensitive
to a local context and that they are templates of ideals shaped by visions and experiences
from donors’ own historical development and their national interests. Sensitivity to the
local context and reflection of local interests in donor projects harnesses local ownership
of donor financed efforts and addresses the most salient issues faced by communities (not
the ones that are perceived by donors to be of importance for communities). Such an
approach ensures a better utilization of local capacities. The report by the SecretaryGeneral of UNCTAD recognizes the importance of the local context in realising the
aspirations held by “[m]ost people in most countries … a decent job, a secure home, a
safe environment, a better future for their children, and the right to voice their opinion on
how the larger community goes about achieving these goals.”240 It asserts that “[t]here is
no universal blueprint for achieving these ends, and the institutions and policies that are
required can only be fashioned around the matrix of local capacities, conditions and
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needs.”241
While there is acceptance of the importance of social and economic rights both
for the well-being of individuals and development, there is still an ongoing debate on
whether those rights raise claims of violations that can be rectified by judiciary systems.
Those who oppose adjudication of social and economic rights argue that they are “too
vague, costly, and institutionally complex for the judiciary to implement.”242 However,
the multiplicity of court cases in regards to CP rights, particularly those which are
concerned with the interpretation of the nature and scope of the right(s) under
consideration, is an indication that CPs are not as explicit as they are claimed to be. Even
the right to life, when put in the context of the discussion of euthanasia and withdrawal of
life support when a person in vegetative condition, shows that such a basic right is open
to interpretations.243 Freedom of religion has not only been among the most contested
concepts not only involving interpretations of how it should be balanced against other
rights, but even what constitutes “religion” and which practices are “religious” ones. The
status of a religion can also trigger financial consequences either through tax exemptions
or impose taxation on people, as is the case in some European countries, or raise the
question of which “religions” are entitled to support in countries where there are state
financial allocations for religious institutions. Linguistic rights of diverse groups,
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particularly when they are legislated official languages, require substantial financial and
human resources to guarantee and ensure their enjoyment. Therefore, if the vagueness or
financial implications or complexities were the arguments against ESRs to also be
guaranteed and protected by judiciary, that approach would assume that CP rights are
simple, straightforward, and require no or insignificant financial input. Such an
assumption is not accurate.
Another consideration invoked in the opposition of the adjudication of SERs is
that the implementation of SERs “requires allocation of resources among competing
objectives of social policy, and other forms of affirmative action, that should be left to the
discretion of politically accountable public officials.”244 While ensuring the enjoyment of
SERs requires decisions on allocation of resources, including through costing of proposed
priorities and initiatives in state budgets, political agendas and processes are also prone to
being skewed towards the interests of those who have power and the capacity to have
their voices counted. The poor and marginalized have far fewer avenues to influence
political processes and public officials, or to have their needs reflected in policies.
Therefore, unless the judiciary rectifies discrimination faced by groups which do not have
political clout to have their needs taken into account in public policy making, these
groups might wait perpetually to enjoy even basic SERs and have their basic needs
satisfied. But Osiatyński adopts a position that SER can be better implemented by
“shifting the emphasis from social and economic rights to social needs and treating
rights as one of a number of instruments that help to satisfy such needs … In short, a
needs-based approach to social and economic rights assumes that all people have valid
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social and economic needs that should not be dismissed.” 245 Though, as Ferraz illustrates,
seeing through “needs” lenses still leaves the challenge of how they relate to rights –
“[t]he crucial challenge… is … the justification of rights to these needs, i.e. why one
should have rights that impose duties on others to provide them with the resources
required for the satisfaction of these needs.”246
On the other side of the adjudication debate are those who argue that it is the
erroneous rigid categorization of civil and political rights and SERs that creates obstacles
for when interpreting the latter within a judicial framework.247 In a 2008 speech to the
European Court of Human Rights, High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour
noted,
… a final issue that has long been close to my heart is the effort to bring
economic, social and cultural rights back into what should be their natural
environment - the courts. The unnatural cleavage that took place decades ago
when the full, interconnected span of rights set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights were split into supposedly separate collections of civil and political
rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other has
done great damage in erecting quite false perceptions of hierarchies of rights. In
the area of justiciability of rights, particularly, the notion of economic, social and
cultural rights as essentially aspirational, in contrast to the “hard law” civil and
political rights, has proved especially difficult to undo.248
In a similar vein, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN
CESCR) in its General Comment 9, while addressing the issue of judicial remedies of
violations of ESC rights stated, “In relation to civil and political rights, it is generally
taken for granted that judicial remedies for violations are essential. Regrettably, the
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contrary assumption is too often made in relation to economic, social and cultural rights.
This discrepancy is not warranted either by the nature of the rights or by the relevant
Covenant provisions.” 249 But the UN CESCR document also addressed the scepticism
towards the adjudication of SERs by pointing out the impact of such an approach to
vulnerable groups in the society. The document, while responding to arguments that
decisions that deal with resource allocation should be made by “political authorities
rather than the courts,” stresses that courts are already adjudicating on issues with
resource consequences. The document emphasizes that confining SERs to a category
which places them outside of courts conflicts with the principle of the indivisibility and
interdependence of rights – CP rights and SERs. Such an approach “would also
drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable
and disadvantaged groups in society.250
In recent decades, guaranteeing the enjoyment of SERs by vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups, and the implementation of SERs through judicial decisions have
both been gaining prominence “on grounds that are often relevant to development.” In
some cases states have either needed to justify their acts or to follow due process in
addressing issues if those acts negatively affected “access to basic services or
disproportionately harm[ed] particular individuals or groups.” 251 Gauri and Gloppen
advise when weighing on the pros and cons of litigation of SERs to remember that it is “a
diverse phenomenon, both in substance and form.” Both the participants and form of
litigation may vary. Litigation by individuals and groups is driven by the pursuit to
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improve their situation and address their needs. The litigation of social and economic
rights by organizations and other actors “on behalf of others, usually disadvantaged
groups in society” is, nevertheless, also “a means to achieve policy change.”252 Moreover,
if the litigation of SERs process is positioned within “a broader mobilization process” it
may not only raise the visibility of a case, but also further a successful outcome of the
case and “a favorable judgment [to be] implemented.”253 In addition, for the rights to
“create and allocate obligations,” they depend also on effective and reliable judicial
institutions. Inefficient and corrupt institutions undermine the ability to claim rights.254
Professional and independent judges play an important role in developing
jurisprudence on SERs.255 To efficiently perform the role, UN CESCR General Comment
9 proposes that judges’ training reflect the understanding of “justiciability of the
Covenant [ICESCR].” The efforts, according to the document, should also include raising
awareness in courts and tribunals on the essence and implications of ICESCR, as well as
on the importance of judicial remedies in the fulfillment of commitments undertaken
under ICESCR.256 In the meantime, there should be an acknowledgment that the ability of
courts to deliver judgments on SERs is significantly affected by “their independence from
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the state and dominant social interest, and on the financial resources at their disposal”257
and the capability of judges.258 However, seeking and providing remedy when SERs are
infringed does not necessarily imply a judicial remedy. It also refers to administrative
remedies that are “accessible, affordable, timely and effective.” But even with
recognition that judicial remedies are not the only way to achieve the realization of rights,
it still held that a judicial remedy is crucial to achieve rights listed in ICESCR; “judicial
remedies are necessary.”259 As Klein recaps, “[t]here is no single comprehensive theory of
the judicial role in enforcement even among the SER-friendly. Those who favour
adjudication of SERs agree that courts ought to share the task of defining and enforcing
the rights with government and other actors, but there is little agreement on how.”260 She
also underscores that even those who are proponents of the judicial enforcement of SERs
recognize that “their full implementation threatens to strain judicial capacities and push
boundaries of judicial legitimacy.”261
Such arguments underscore the complexities and challenges that the adjudication
of SERs can face. But they do not take into account that, as human rights are indivisible
and interdependent, judicial remedies for SERs will be still sought through reframing
violations of SERs as violations of CP rights (although with varying degrees of
success). 262 Therefore, the reluctance to adjudicate SERs is more homage to the
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traditional categorization of rights and is also driven by a concern that judicial decisions
might be perceived as dictating the decision making on resource allocations within the
society over elected officials who are delegated through elections. Adjudicating on SERs
while paraphrasing them as CP rights may make them be perceived as “legitimate,” as
well as impartial and less intrusive into the functions of public officials. It does not,
however, change the fact that the outcomes of such adjudication still may enter the realm
of issues that the opponents of adjudication of SERs claim make such adjudication
impractical. At the end of the day, the opposition to the justiciability of SERs may be
matter of semantics rather than substance.
The question remains however, paraphrasing Gloppen’s question which addressed
social rights to include economic ones, is the litigation worthwhile as a strategy to fulfill
social and economic rights? SERs for a long time served as catalysis for the mobilization
of different groups, to be defined in policies which reflected the political aspirations
rather than rights to be adjudicated in courts.263 VeneKlasen et al. point out that “[t]he
legalistic approach to rights all too often focuses on ‘what-the-law-says’ and downplays
the dynamic aspect of the political process that shapes the extent to which rights are
enforced and realised in people’s daily lives.”264 In Yamin’s opinion litigation and “court
centric strategies to address ESC rights … resolves relatively narrow issues … [while]
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underlying structural factors are generally left unaddressed.”265 Onazi’s criticism of the
justiciability approach in enforcing SERs is that the “discourse does not consider other
forms for participation apart from courts for the purpose of securing economic and social
rights.” He adds,
To be clear, the objective, however, is not to dismiss the importance of
justiciability. From the point of view of the poor, the aspiration for justiciable
economic and social rights is more important today that it ever has before. But the
point that I wish to highlight is that justiciability discourse does indeed stall or
obscure much needed work on alternative ways in which economic and social
rights can be provided.266
In the discourse of justiciability, rights which cannot be legally enforced are treated “as
social aspirations or statements of objectives.”267 Whelan and Donnelly propose that
“non-justiciability is often presented as a defect of rights in general and of economic and
social rights in particular” and stress that “access to courts” should not be regarded as a
“measure of social (recognition of) value” of rights. They note that “[a]lthough judicial
remedies do usually enhance the value of a right to a right-holder, justiciability does not
exhaust the essential functions of rights and justiciable rights are not the only kind of
rights.”268 Moreover, protection of rights does not only depend on the duty of institutions
to secure and enforce them, but individuals too have “secondary responsibility for doing
their part to ensure that the social institutions they share have adequate resources to
provide such protection.”269 Orend details that the “secondary responsibility of requires of
all persons some degree of social engagement, political participation, and reasonable
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sharing of the tax burden require to fund such institutions.”270 However, even individuals
have direct, legally prescribed obligations to satisfy SERs of others, such as dependants
and their immediate family members and failure to provide the necessities of life (e.g.
food, housing, health care, etc) may lead to criminal convictions. 271
Even with the ongoing debate on the merits of codifying SERs as justiciable
rights and the contribution that justice institutions can have in protecting and
guaranteeing the enjoyment, of those rights, as well as to the development in general, it is
not practical to overlook how laws and justice institutions have been playing an
increasing role in regulating interactions within societies. Laws and justice institutions,
including courts, are presented as being among the essential and core building structures
that ensure the successful functioning of societies, with international development actors
spending millions on projects in support and reform of those institutions. Within reform
initiatives, justice and access to justice have become the catchwords associated with
efforts rationalized as contributing to improving the conditions of the poor and
marginalized.
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7

IN CONSTANT MOTION OR WHAT IS THERE FOR JUSTICE
The white landscape of a snowy city was dotted by the rows of people on
streets selling items varying from fuel wood, food, clothing, shoes and
newspapers. With not much employment opportunities available, vending
in streets became the only opportunity to provide for at least basic
necessities of families. The constant motion was not only due to the
interaction with customers, but also with the need to not freeze while
standing for hours next to stalls. Holding warm cups of coffee with hands
purple from cold was not of much help. But the weather was not the main
vulnerability factor they faced. It was demands to pay informal “fees” for
the “place” and law enforcement officials randomly and arbitrarily
“enforcing” the “laws” that exacerbated the feeling of injustice,
particularly faced with challenges to access justice to fend off what felt as
an oppression exerted in the name of “laws.”
Assistance to national legal reforms and building the capacities of justice

institutions have been among key international development efforts financed by donors.
As poverty is a central concern of the international development agenda, activities
supporting reforms in the justice sector are also expected to contribute to the efforts
which address the issues leading to and resulting from poverty. The activities that target
not only institutions but also individuals, particularly the poor, have been gaining
prominence through legal empowerment and access to justice initiatives.
Justice institutions and access to justice are commonly referred terms in such
initiatives, while there is less attention paid what “justice” actually implies. This chapter
examines the complexities of interpreting what is justice; the term that encompasses
diverse expectations about processes, outcomes, and institutions within the society. The
chapter also focuses on development efforts aimed at the reform of justice institutions
and legal reforms (top-down), their role in development, poverty reduction, and impact
on the poor, as well as lessons learned from those initiatives, including the criticism of
legal transplantation. Bottom-up approaches, the legal empowerment of the poor and
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access to justice development initiatives, have been advanced to overcome the criticism
of state and institution centric, top-down reform initiatives. This chapter addresses what
such bottom-up approaches entail and their role in development.
Within development practice, access to justice and justice sector reform projects
are positioned to be among initiatives that can contribute to the establishment of the
context that enables people to thrive. But before proceeding with the discussion of access
to justice we need, quoting Rhode, to “begin … with what we mean by ‘justice.’”272 In
our quest for justice “we want to order and explain our intuitive beliefs about what
fairness requires in different situations—beliefs that are at least to some degree uncertain
and conflicting, whether within each person’s thinking, or between different people.” 273
Human rights are positioned and presented as vocabulary to articulate claims for justice,
including for “achieving justice outside the clash of political interest.” 274 Justice is seen
as expansion of “equity, sustain[ing] outcomes across time, respect[ing] human rights.”275
But Kennedy highlights issues with such an approach by criticizing the international
human rights movement which “often acts as if it knows what justice means, always and
for everyone—all you need to do is adopt, implement, interpret these rights.” He argues
that “justice is not like that. It must be built by people each time, struggled for, imagined
in new ways.”276 Addressing the perpetual shifts in the concept of justice, Engels wrote,
…this [ideal of justice, eternal justice] is but the ideologised glorified, expression
of the existing economic relation… The justice of the Greeks and Romans held
slavery to be just; the justice of the bourgeois of 1789 demanded the abolition of
feudalism on the ground that it was unjust ... The conception of eternal justice,
272
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therefore, varies not only with time and place, but also with the persons
concerned…277
But the concept of justice as expectations from societal process and outcomes not only
varies from the group perspective (culture, ethnicity, religion, country, etc.), it is also
reflective of diversity of personal beliefs of each individual. Even individual beliefs and
expectations change with age and experience. As a child, for me, justice was that our
parents provided me with exactly the same items my sibling had. But as I grew up I
began to perceive justice as fair treatment and our parents providing us with the same
opportunities—but which did not necessary result in the same outcomes because we were
allowed to make different choices and we made those choices. The change in the
individual conception of justice not only changed with the age but, most importantly, it
transformed as a result of living and working in different countries and cultures. This
transformation is a process of accommodating those values from diverse cultures that are
perceived as enabling the optimum functioning of the society and rejecting ones that are
regarded as contributing to the dysfunctional processes and disparity in the outcomes.
Groups and societies too morph and shape the concept of justice based on more
than just the evolution of local experiences of what the ideal society is. It is also an
outcome of cross-pollination and contestations of notions of “ideal societies” across
groups and societies. It is a process of incorporating the characteristics of the model of
society perceived to be closest to the ideal—even if that model is from another society—
and discarding characteristics from their own society if they are seen to be oppressive and
flawed. It is a quest for the essence of society. In Kolm’s opinion, “[f]acing the question
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of justice is in fact a condition for the very existence of a society.” He argues that “in all
societies the most elaborate thinking is notably applied to solving, dissolving or
displacing the question of justice.

The modern world is too advanced to accept

displacement into the hands of an autocrat or into the exclusive obedience to a
tradition.”278 As Taylor points out, “[t]o an academic social scientist, justice is a nebulous
but far from negligible concept that underlies the operating system of individuals,
families, tribes, communities, and nations both separately and collectively.”279
The interpretation of justice varies from “political and social contexts” and as a
political term justice “is more confusing than helpful for a clear conceptualization.”280 As
is the case with the call to “establish a ‘just world’ without defining what the standard of
this action must be in order to qualify as just and what exactly the notion of a ‘just world’
actually might mean conceptually.” 281 In the interview for Politico magazine, the
philosopher Michael Sandel provided the following summary of the word justice,
… the simplest way of understanding justice is giving people what they deserve.
This idea goes back to Aristotle. The real difficulty begins with figuring out who
deserves what and why.
Broadly speaking I think there are three answers to the question ‘What is justice?’
There’s the utilitarian answer which says justice means maximising happiness.
Answer number two, given by Immanuel Kant, which says that justice is a matter
of respecting human dignity, certain categorical duties and rights. And the third
answer is the answer that Aristotle gave: justice means giving people what they
deserve, where what they deserve depends on their virtue and depends on sorting
out hard questions about the good life.282
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Brück defines justice as “equal opportunity for participation in all aspects of life, personal
and social.”283 Valentini describes justice as “a set of principles whose function is to
distribute entitlements to valuable social goods broadly construed- including liberties,
opportunities, income and wealth- among a plurality of agents competing over
them…[which] they need to pursue their ends and goals.”284
As a political conception, justice according to Nagel “requires a collectively
imposed social framework, enacted in the name of all those governed by it” in which
authority is accepted even if there is a disagreement “with the substance of its
decision.”285 It is related “only to a form of organization that claims political legitimacy
and the right to impose decisions by force.”286 According to Valentini’s presentation of
the liberal perspective, institutions are just if

“under circumstances of reasonable

disagreement about justice” they enable “respect each person’s basic rights, and allow
competing reasonable accounts of justice to confront each other fairly, through broadly
democratic procedures.”287 For Rawls “[j]ustice is to be understood in its customary sense
as representing but one of the many virtues of social institutions” but it should “not be
confused with an all-inclusive version of a good society; it is only one part of any such
conceptions.” He emphasizes the need “to distinguish that sense of equality which is an
aspect of justice from that sense of equality which belongs to a more comprehensive
social ideal.”288
Rawls formulates justice in two principles:
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…first, each person participating in practice, or affected by it, has an equal right
to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all; second,
inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that that they will work
out for everyone’s advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which
they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all. These principles
express justice as a complex of three ideas: liberty, equality, and reward for
services contributing to the common good.289
Elaborating on the second principle, Rawls draws attention to the idea that inequality is
permissible only if “there is reason to believe that practice with the inequality, or
resulting in it, will work for the advantage of every party engaged in it.” He stresses that
his second principle assumes that “every party must gain from the inequality.” 290
Koller categorizes Rawl’s first principle as the description of the “society’s
political system” and “the distribution of political basic rights and basic liberties” while
the second principle is about the “society’s socio-economic system,” which deals with the
issue of “the distribution of social and economic primary goods.”291 Within the liberal
conception of justice, “institutions establish entitlements” that allow everybody to pursue
their goals “without preventing others from doing the same.”292 In the context of socioeconomic justice, institutions are just “when they bring about just outcomes and rectify
existing inequalities” and the “individual obligations of justice” is to contribute to
“working of just institutions.” 293 Sen acknowledges that institutions are given an
important role in the discourse of justice, but he contends that instead of “treating

289

Ibid., 165–166.
Ibid., 167.
291
Koller, “The Principles of Justice,” 40.
292
Valentini, “Assessing the Global Order: Justice, Legitimacy, or Political Justice?,” 595.
293
Pellegrino, “Beneficence, Justice and Demandingness: A Criticism of the Main Mitigation Strategies,”
98.
290

99

institutions as themselves manifestations of justice” it is preferable “to seek institutions
that promote justice.”294,295
There is recognition among development practitioners that legal and regulatory
systems play an important role in development and that “judicial systems shape the rules
and structures that influence the opportunities available to different segments of the
population.”296 There have also been calls for “concepts of law, regulation, rules systems
and justice … to be infused more broadly into development programming.”297 Since the
1960s, there have been investments made, including financial, in reforming justice
systems in developing countries with the aim to alleviate poverty. The main assumption
in the initial projects was that “law and justice matter in development because they can
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help either to ‘free’ the market or to hold it under the control of the state.”298 The model
promoted in developing countries emulates Western legal frameworks “as they were key
for economic growth, and economic growth is the recipe for eradicating poverty.”299 It
was also expected that “there would be spillover from an effective and instrumental
orientation in economic law to ‘democracy values’ such as access to justice and
protection of civil rights.”300
The anticipated outcome that growth would automatically contribute to
democracy and the protection of human rights did not happen: “human rights had to be
pursued as an independent goal.” 301 Subsequently, there was an increased focus on
domestic institutions and the promotion of greater judicial independence, constitutional
guarantees, and access to justice. This shift “led to ideas about the construction of ‘the
rule of law’” and understanding that substantial efforts were required “to dismantle older
systems” and “to create the new culture and institutions needed to protect democratic
freedoms.” 302 Important legal and judicial institutions such as courts, ministries of
justice, bar associations, law schools become the focus of reform initiatives.303 Judicial
reforms address improvements in the performance of judicial institutions and training “as
well as an enhanced focus on process, procedure, and access to justice; they may involve
the supply side reforms, as … reforms to judicial institutions, or demand side to access to
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justice reforms.”304
Elaborating more on judicial reforms, Rittich notes that “judicial reforms appear
to be driven by efforts to improve the position of marginalized groups.” Though there has
been an increase in access to justice projects, the support for reforms still mostly focuses
on addressing the issues at the supply-side. The initiatives mostly relate to “the old goals
of facilitating transactions and securing property and contract rights.” The reforms have
been concerned with the rule of law and a stable investment environment, as well as with
institutions and judges capable of litigating on property issues pertaining to property and
contract rights.305 In the Governance for the Future publication it is contended that
“rights can only be guaranteed by the State,” therefore, strengthening the judiciary system
which “is the guardian of the constitution and plays a key function in building the rule of
law, protecting human rights and enabling economic growth” should be among important
objectives in developing countries.306 With the executive and legislative branches the
judiciary equally contributes to good governance, and the judiciary is essential to hold the
other state institutions fully accountable “under the law, for their activities and
decisions.”307 Independent judiciaries contribute to the perception of the public “as an
impartial, accessible body that strives to protect their rights.”308
Within a human rights discourse, it is courts, as a part of the formal justice
system, that are mostly viewed as mechanisms to protect and enforce rights, including in
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litigations against authorities to hold them accountable.309 Courts provide protection of
human rights by applying national and, depending how international legal principles and
instruments relate to the national system, international human rights standards. They play
a role in interpreting and advancing human rights standards and when “the national
statutory framework is lacking basic standards for rights protection, a progressive
judiciary can expand domestic normative protection to protect disadvantaged groups.”310
There also has been growing trend of using courts for bringing forth cases on social and
economic rights. Litigation on social and economic rights is not only a means for
individuals to remedy the violation of their rights and improve their condition, it is “also
a strategy pursued by actors and organizations on behalf of others, usually disadvantaged
groups in society, as a means to achieve policy change.”311
But judicial enforcement of rights is also associated with expensive and lengthy
litigations which can either put a significant burden on the destitute, or make them too
costly even to initiate the case. Therefore “[l]itigation is sometimes perceived to be an
inappropriately punitive means of holding public authorities and policymakers to
account, or to privilege individual claims over broader social interests.”312 In countries,
especially the least developed ones, where courts operate in state official language which
might be different from the language spoken by the majority of the population, or a
significant part of it, access to and usage of the court can be a challenge. Also, in such
countries the functioning of the formal justice is hampered by institutional weakness and
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deficiencies in skills and financial resources. They are also dependent on donor financial
support in operations to address some of those deficiencies.313
Among the factors that discourage people accessing formal justice system
Wojkowska and Cunningham indicate weakness and dysfunctionality of the system,
especially in post-conflict countries where “formal justice systems have eroded over time
or become de-legitimized following lengthy periods of grave human rights abuses.”314
Other deficiencies within the formal justice system that can deter access, especially by
the poor and marginalized, are high levels of corruption, lack of judicial independence,
“[e]xcessive delays due to overloaded and poorly operated case management,” lawyers
fees, “…excessive ‘legalese’ in court proceedings [which] can confuse and intimidate”
and the location of courts in larger cities which people in rural communities may be
unable to reach due to the time and money required to make the journey.315 These
deficiencies also contribute to the choices of people to seek justice instead within the
informal justice system.316, 317
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In conditions when state institutions have a limited reach of power, the principles
based on which they function also “have limited meaning and legitimacy for everyday
citizens.”318 Informal justice systems are entrenched within local communities and social
norms and carry “local legitimacy and authority that is not always afforded to formal
operators.”319 The decision makers within the informal justice system generally command
more knowledge about local customs, therefore, their decisions are perceived to be more
culturally acceptable for community members involved in the dispute.320 However, like
the formal justice system, the informal system is prone to elite capture by those who
benefit from discriminatory practices. The informal justice imitations which are mostly
dominated by older men in communities may contribute to inequalities in communities.
Within the informal justice system “women, children, minority groups and the disabled
are often highly discriminated against.” In addition, gaps in the knowledge and skills of
informal justice leaders, in combination with the influence they have, may deprive the
poor of opportunities if they were to use the formal justice system.321 Among other
concerns is what International Council on Human Rights Policy calls “diluted due
process guarantees and other procedural protections” which can lead to the violation of
rights and hamper access to justice.322
Despite the informal justice system being utilized by a significant percentage of
the population in countries where the formal justice system lacks the credibility and
indigenous peoples to control criminal events, regulate social life, organize public order and resolve their
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reach, external programs of justice sector reforms323 traditionally “overemphasi[zed] …
formal institutions (courts, lawyers, prosecutors, police)” and transplanted Western legal
models.324 However, the models that are promoted are from countries with well-financed
and functioning state apparatus and in developing countries where they are promoted “the
state is weak, has limited reach and legitimacy.” The reform initiatives even if they focus
on several institutions with the “‘justice sector’ (judiciaries, ministries of justice, police,
prosecutorial services, legal aid, etc.) can be compromised by weaknesses in the other
arms of the state governance apparatus necessary for functioning justice institutions.”325
Judicial reform is seen as a part of the governance strategies because it contributes to
judicial independence, rule of law and promotion of human rights.326 Aid money spent
largely on the formal justice systems, including on making state courts more efficient,
with the assumption that “modernized systems of case management, newer buildings and
facilities, and business friendly laws will have a trickle-down effect that will inevitably
facilitate better governance, more effective rule of law, better access to justice and
economic development.”327
The expectations that these improvements lead to poverty alleviation have been
323
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contested due to lack of evidence.328 While addressing the causal links between judicial
reforms, effective courts and economic development, Santos brings in the contrary
argument that “economies in countries that reformed their judiciaries in the last two
decades have not fared well and many of them are doing worse than before.”329 In his
presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Development, William H. Goodridge (member, International Development
Committee, Canadian Bar Association) noted that based on the experience of the
Canadian Bar Association it was not possible to “assume that one model … [would] work
the best” when dealing with legal and justice systems because “different models may
work in different places at different times.” He acknowledged that even in Canada “the
vast majority of people only ever use the formal justice system at the lower court level,
the entry level. In fact, the most people usually avoid courts completely and use other
types of dispute resolution.” That is why he questioned focusing Canada’s aid on higher
levels of justice sector with which the poor do not interact much. He argued that
“[p]aradoxically … the majority of Canada’s aid aimed at improving justice systems goes
into the supreme courts, the law ministries, and other places that actually have little
impact on the lives of the poorest and most disadvantaged.”330
In addition to the lack of evidence, the weakness of knowledge about justice
programs is due to “a lack of sufficient understanding of how change occurs within and
through the justice system, and of how reform programmes can contribute to such change
… adequate qualitative parameters for assessing programs and projects are not
328
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available.”331 The preference is for quantitative assessments of development programs,
including those in assessing justice reform programs, “primary focus[ed] on ‘efficiency’
of the justice system.” But the traditional criteria used to assess justice reform programs
are deficient because,
(i) it is difficult to assess the positive or negative impact of programmes on poor
people’s lives; and (ii) the definition of ‘fair and effective’ justice risks being
subjected to elite capture. Practical and meaningful indicators for justice
programmes are scarce.332
In addition, there are challenges to present “justice” as “as a stand-alone sector in
development”; therefore, it is argued that it should be understood “as a sector that infuses
most aspects of almost every development activity.”333
In other sectors of development it is more feasible to derive and agree on
measurable indicators and expected outcomes, as well as on priorities, but with justice
programs the challenge comes from differences in the concept of justice itself.
Hammergren succinctly summarizes it stating,
According to many judges, their role is not to provide “Justice” but to resolve
conflicts by using the law and where necessary providing a definite interpretation
of its meaning. When the populace calls for justice this is usually not what they
mean, and in the minds of many reformers it is not the answer either. Are the
programs really about forwarding justice with a capital J or they are about making
certain institutions and the functions they perform work better? Donors, or at least
their home judiciaries, know something about the latter. Whether they have
answers for the former is a good question, and if they do not, the corollary query
is why they are acting as they do.334
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However, as Sage et al. reason “law and justice reform should not be seen as forging
some perfect rule or institutional form.” They should be considered as processes which
enable the compromise between differing interests.335
It might be argued that when justice moves from a realm of theory to practice it
may be neither pragmatic nor feasible to be overly concerned with defining what
“justice,” as it is delivered by relevant institutions, encompasses in a practical sense. It
may be more practical to focus on processes of delivering justice rather than outcomes.
But this approach still leaves open the main concern of whether just processes necessarily
lead to outcomes perceived as just by the parties involved; or, whether outcomes that
might not be considered as just for some in balance of general social good that injustice
still can be considered as just. Despite such challenges in conceptualizing justice,
including in practice, however, justice institutions are essential mechanisms for the
amicable resolution of conflicts within the society and in arbitrating differing individual
and group interests.
Legitimate justice institutions are also instrumental for peaceful societal changes
and “have the ability to change in equitable ways.”336 They are “not static and therefore
‘perfectable’ bodies, but rather are continually shaped and re-shaped in response to the
demands of society.”337 It should be also recognized that relatively just societies are the
products of not only adaptation of laws and institutions but also shared evolving norms.
In Fukuyama’s words, “although formal law and strong political and economic
institutions are critical, they are not in themselves sufficient to guarantee a successful
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modern society. Liberal democracy has always been dependent on certain shared cultural
values to work properly.”338
There is an acknowledgement among governments and experts of the role that law
can play in development339 considering that “law itself has become a constitutive element
of development: respect for the rule of law … and the recognition of certain legal rights
have become definitional to the achievement of development itself.”340 The law and
development movement which came to prominence in the 1950s and 1960s positioned
law as a central component of social change and saw legal development assistance as a
factor in an effective protection of individual freedoms, leading to more social equality
and involvement in decision making.341 Carson and Daniels in their summary of the
movement underscore that its presumption was that “the nature of law and its role in
development well understood but that the functions that law could and would serve
within a society were universal, unaffected by variations in cultural, historical, economic,
and political realities.”342 The supporting assumption of proponents was that as the law
sustained the market system and liberal democracy all countries could follow the Western
development pattern.343
As Glenn points out, during the initial period, the movement was “characterized
by an effort to transfer western legal methods and education to jurisdictions characterized
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as less developed…”344 It was the pursuit of the model which some consider the “ideal
situation that also does not exist in the West.” 345 In his critical assessment of the
movement, Al Attar writes that “[l]aw and development, for its part, was an avenue via
which such First World prerogatives could be transposed upon an emergent Third
World.” The way developing countries emulated the institutions of developed countries
was a means to externally influence their independence and development path. Despite
references to self-determination, practitioners promoted and reinforced “Euro-American
legal consciousness as an effective protagonist in the pursuit of Third World social
advance.”346 In 1972, writing on the relationship between law and development, Trubek
brought up two points of that conception,
First, there is the implicit concept of development which equates it with gradual
evolution in the direction of the advanced, industrial nations of the West. Second,
given its definition of development, the core conception quite predictably equates
modern law with the legal structures and cultures of the West. The Third World is
thus assumed to be doomed to underdevelopment until it adopts a modern
Western legal system.347
The strongly held conviction that it is Western institutions that are conducive to
development drives the imposition of “desired legal reform” in countries which have
diverse “legal and cultural traditions, economic organizations, or political structures.”348
However, the general assessments of the approach and efforts to implement them
were critical and even negative. 349 In subsequent efforts the movement incorporated
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issues of democracy and social considerations, but those still involved in international
development pursued “the idea that there is one basic model that should be followed by
all developing and transition countries.”350 But the initiatives that promote or transplant
best practices—in their opinion—from developed countries often may not have proper
knowledge of the local context or take local dynamics into consideration.351 Even so, if
the local considerations were taken into account and institutions were the outcomes of
continuous evolution of local norms, the following issues would still remain. Would such
institutions have been able to deliver social arrangements and structures that are regarded
as models where the treatment of people is more in compliance with human rights
norms?352 Or would they rather institutionalize and prolong existing local practices that
might be discriminatory but socially acceptable under the guise of being reflective of
local considerations? The argument could be assessed through the similar lens of
universalist and cultural relativist approach to human rights. If the assessment of law
reform projects is done with the assumption that Western legal models provide a better
framework for the enjoyment of rights that are considered as universal, then it might be
argued that legal transplantation enables better protection of those universal rights. Such
an argument could be countered by assuming that there is not one framework to achieve
the same outcome, but rather people living in different countries with diverse cultural
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power dynamic could enjoy similar protection of their rights.
But the question still remains whether those localized diverse cultural power
dynamic processes do not inherently lead to outcomes which are more reflective of local
aspirations rather than universal ones. Also, if local conditions are to be prioritized, rather
than transplanting external models, does it assume there should be tolerance of possible
discriminatory practices which might result from institutionalizing local conditions? At
the end of the day, laws and legal framework are not mere technical tools, but rather
outcomes of various complex interrelated political and social processes and in turn they
also affect those processes. As Tamanaha argues, development scholars and practitioners
understand the role that the local conditions play, but it is the multiplicity of
interconnected factors which affect law projects in the development setting and
stalemates them. As he puts it,
Because it is impossible to know or consider everything, one might be tempted
to give up in despair. Law and development practitioners have plowed ahead
anyway, using general templates on transplanting legal codes, bolstering
courts, training lawyers, and hoping for the best.353
Cohen et al. also stress the multiplicity of social and political considerations which come
into play when undertaking legal reforms because to bring in changes in “legal,
regulatory and social values is complex, politically charged work that proceeds with
multiple stakeholders and through multiple agents.”354 Underlining the political nature of
law Kennedy states,
The lawyer’s denial that law is political or ethical, apology or utopia, the political
scientist’s denial that politics is legal, and the secularist’s denial that humanism is
religious have all been equivocal denials at best. Sure, we know law is a secular
project, just as we are all, all secular men and women … Law and politics have
353
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been disciplinary divided by a smoky mirror, the lawyer claiming to see in politics
only subjective arbitrariness and ideology... 355
While the legal systems are political due to the multiplicity of actors involved in
negotiating and shaping them, organizations that are involved in reform initiatives regard
issues within institutions as requiring technical assistance. This approach leads to a
preference for “technical solutions – expert missions, sharing of best practices, training
programs.”356 But the legal framework is not only about institutions that are expected to
impartially arbitrate conflicts and interests in a society. The legal framework most
importantly provides the basis for how the political and governance structures in a society
are organized and sets the parameters of their authority.
The criticism of rule of law based legal reform projects has been that they are
“inherently top down, state-centred, fostering legal elites, carrying a false pretence of
political neutrality, creating more formalism and bureaucracy.”357 The reforms are also
time consuming and there are challenges to showing and establishing a causality link
between the activities and expected outcomes.358 Despite the criticism such projects have
faced, the role the law plays in shaping and organizing societies should not be
underestimated. Laws outline social arrangements and prescribe the expectations from
them. As social structures and processes continuously undergo transformation and
change, laws also incorporate and reflect, as well as facilitate social changes. Gready and
Vandenhole recap two views on law and social change by noting that in one view the law
precedes the change (proactive)—“it may trigger, facilitate or speed up change”—and
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another view is that it follows (reactive)—“law follows change- it legally codifies and
thus consolidates the change that has taken place.”359 In Rittich’s words, “[l]aw is a
condition of possibility of both social justice and democratic participation; even if law
were not explicitly emphasized, it would remain important to assess effects of the legal
and institutional environment on the realization of social goals.”360 Within the context of
the rule of law, Otto speaks to its substantive elements construed as “justice” referring “to
the moral foundations of the law, to fundamental conceptions of justice, and in particular
to human rights.”361
Kelsen, however, delineates law and morals. He argues that “law is a coercive
order, that is, a normative order that attempts to bring about a certain behavior by
attaching to the opposite behavior a socially organized coercive act; whereas morals is a
social order without such sanctions.”362 While there are institutions that impose sanctions
prescribed by laws, morals also impose sanctions. Asserting that morals do not sanction
behaviours and opinions deemed to be in violation of acceptable social norms or certain
values, which may be treated with secular holiness, is to ignore instances of individuals
being boycotted by other individuals and groups for even expressing opinions which are
perceived to be in violation of those norms and values and, as a result, losing their jobs
and livelihood. Sanctions based on moral considerations can have as a detrimental impact
on affected individuals as is the case with those imposed by law. But, unlike sanctions
imposed by law which are the outcomes of the due process, sanctions imposed based on
359
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morals maybe outcomes of individual and group whim, particularly groups which
dominate norm and value setting discourse within a society.
Addressing the role the law plays in the society, in 1971 A Manifesto for Law
Reform Honorable Turner emphasized that the “law is not just a ‘technical body of rules’;
it is the organizing principle for the reconfiguration of society. Law is not just an agency
of social control; it articulates the values by which men seek to live.”363 The law as a
foundation for institutions is the approach of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of
the Poor: “[t]he law is the platform on which rest the vital institutions of society. No
modern market economy can function without law, and to be legitimate, power itself
must submit to the law.”364 Within societies, law plays various roles and is used by
different actors to promote and accomplish their goals. Discussing these differing roles,
Otto provides that “[l]aw is used by states as an instrument of development policies, by
market parties as an instrument of economic activity, and by NGOs as a channel for
helping the poor in obtaining access to justice. This variety of users, ideologies and
objectives is reflected in international rule of law promotion.”365 But as Trubek cautions,
the law in relation to development itself should not be viewed as “produc[ing] economic
development” or “bring[ing] about political development.” The law only facilitates the
organization of the “free market system” and prompts “the centralized bureaucratic state
which depends for its legitimacy on a belief that its decisions are rational.”366
In a similar line, Tomas contends that “laws and institutions cannot provide …
opportunity by themselves; it is the application of those laws and the factual functioning
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of those institutions that can.”367 In her opinion, the concern should not be about the
existence of particular laws “but rather how laws and institutions relate to people and
how people perceive, use, change and develop them.”368 Laws, while being the important
for individuals to access justice,369 “ideally would be … required for the exercise of all
human rights by all community members for the community's development,”370 but they
do not necessarily ensure that there is “equality of access and equality of treatment before
the law for rich and poor.”371 The poor might find laws to be exclusionary and even
unfairly targeting them. As Khan rightly points out,
Exclusion may be de facto as well as de jure. That is, even if the law ostensibly
serves those living in poverty, it may force people to negotiate nearly impassable
bureaucratic barriers (often paying bribes in the process) in order to work, go to
school or be treated in hospital, legally. The upshot is that poor people may be
better off living outside the ambit of the law, even if doing so keeps them poor.372
Furthermore, instead of protecting the poor, law can be used to provide a veil of
neutrality and legitimacy to discriminate the poor. For example, sanitation regulations
can be used against poor vendors who earn their livelihoods by selling in streets and
hinder their ability to support themselves and their families. But such regulations are
presented as needed to ensure societal good by controlling public health. While working
in informal economy, the poor might miss out on retirement pensions if laws provide a
progressive increase in state paid pensions amounts tied to the years of work for which
there are formal payments made to the government during the course of the “official”
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employment.
Laws can also be used as tools to control and exploit the poor by, for example,
“permit[ing] compensation so low and employment conditions so onerous that the
workers remain poor” or establishing ownership rights which favor landowners at the
expense of tenant farmers. It can go even as far as criminalizing poverty and the poor.373
Among such instances when laws create “new crimes” Pande lists beggary, and squatting
in a public place, which are treated as “status offences.” He elaborates, “[s]tatus offenders
are persons whose condition or behaviour is designated by the laws of a State, but not
necessarily violate of the accepted customs or standards of that society or community.”374
Even the laws written with the intention of assisting the poor can inadvertently have a
negative impact on the poor, such as the law to formalize land ownership by the poor
allowing land to be used as collateral. This law resulted in an increase in prices thus
“stimulating land speculation, and push the poor out to the periphery.”375
Although they were written decades ago, and in Canada, the words of Honourable
John N. Turner describing how poor experience law and justice is worth quoting in length
as it can be argued that it speaks to predicaments that the poor face both in developed and
developing countries.
…it is the poor who suffer most from society masked in the trappings of the law.
For it is they who are victimized when urban renewal arbitrarily disrupts a
373
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neighbourhood; it is the poor who are hurt when creditors garnishee wages or
repossess furniture; it is the poor who are deprived when welfare agencies deny,
reduce or terminate welfare benefits on vague, unarticulated or clearly illegal
grounds; it is the poor who are penalized when Draconian clauses permit
landlords to withhold repairs or capriciously evict them into the street; it is the
poor who are hit by bail procedures linked to financial means; it is the poor whose
privacy is invaded and whose dignity is denied.
The poor do not use lawyers. They are often thought of as having no need of
lawyers. Too many of us think of lawyers as counsellors to corporations, drafters
of estate plans or wills, advisors on creditors' rights. But if the poor are rarely
plaintiffs they are often defendants. They are bewildered and bemused by
legalities they face daily as parents, consumers, tenants, recipients of public
assistance and accused offenders. Too often the poor see the law not as a friend
but as an enemy, not as an aid but as an adversary, not as a remedy but as an
obstacle.376
The laws that reflect the class bias of those educated and in power, and the “norm” to be
complied with, can be used to perpetuate stigmatization of the poor. They can also be
used to discriminate them by reframing issues faced by the poor as deviances from the
legal norms which may reflect the worldview of more wealthy members of society.377 For
example, children from poor families can be taken away under the justification of neglect
and abuse even if no such thing happens, but is perceived as such by state authorities if
poor families are not able to provide housing and/or food to the level considered
normal.378
Exclusion and discrimination can lead to “other social, economic, political and
376
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criminal injustices” and even minor disputes “negatively affecting livelihoods, and
economic and social development.”379 In her criticism of “narrow legal approaches, as in
using the law to deliver rights” Khair argues that “they fail to comprehend how people
actually experience their world and tend to sustain hegemonic hierarchies.” 380 The
perception by the poor of the legal and judicial system is that it is not responsive to their
needs and cannot be trusted. Years of corruption and inefficiency plaguing judicial
institutions contribute to the unwillingness of the poor to pursue their claims. In addition,
they “might not regard their problems, often involving complex socio-economic
elements, as ones that could be redressed through the formal legal process.” The poor
may acknowledge grievances, but still “fear of retribution may well keep them from
approaching the court for redress.”381
Even though the most of the poor “do not experience justice in expensive
courthouses under the ruling of a well-trained judge,”382 international aid donors still
mostly invest in state legal institutions. The rationale is that the support of state legal
institutions is important for development and when those institutions are reformed they
are able to perform their duties without the need for outside funding. 383 The focus on state
legal institutions means lawyers, judges and other actors of the formal justice system
become the main recipients of aid activities. However, for the system to deliver, it also
requires that the cooperation between those actors is also addressed. The report of the
CIDA supported and UNDP implemented access to justice and rule of law project is
379
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illustrative in this regard. The project defined “justice” in its annual report as “the
outcome of a system composed of numerous actors, institutions, and processes.” The
report elaborated that,
For justice to obtain- for those who access the justice system to be able to achieve
a just outcome- each of these components must execute their discrete functions,
and also work together. For example, it is not enough that the police are able to
effectively investigate cases; they must also be able to cooperate with the public
prosecutor’s office if their findings are to enable the state to hold a perpetrator
accountable. Prisons may be able to adequately accommodate, nourish, and clothe
inmates, but if they do not liaise with courts, then hearings are missed, and the
human rights of pre-trial detainees held illegally or unnecessarily are violated. In
the other words, supporting the development of technical capacities is necessary,
but not sufficient, to promote access to justice and the rule of law. Efforts must
also be invested in developing capacities for communication, cooperation and
collaboration, and the confidence which underpins them.384
But to achieve such cooperative functioning of various factions of the justice system
requires a change in the institutional culture – a process that can take years to manifest.
Reflecting on its experience of implementing judicial reform projects, Office of
the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada emphasized that
all judicial reform projects take years to accomplish. A change in a judicial
system, whether it deals with judicial conduct, judicial education or even court
administration, fundamentally entails the changing of values and attitudes. …[the
report text is whited out]... It requires time to establish the trust and confidence of
the beneficiary and subsequently a ‘buying’ from this beneficiary in both the
project goals and the methodology for its achievement.385
384
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There should be an understanding that those changes are not going to manifest
themselves immediately; they will be outcomes of gradual progress. In his presentation to
the House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Development, William H. Goodridge reminded the House that rule of law was not an
immediate outcome in Canada, implying the evolutionary process, and that there should
not be expectations of immediate changes in countries which face “social, political, and
economic challenges.” He further stated that “[b]ilding vales takes longer than
transferring technocratic skills.” That is why he advised that “[t]he impact of donor
supported activities may not be evident for 10 years or more, so ... [there is a need] to
adjust both the way we plan and design projects and our own expectations. We need to
set realistic goals, and we need to ensure that performance measurements reflect that
understanding.”386
In his analysis of the World Bank’s access to justice initiatives, Maru, while
acknowledging that “a better-functioning judiciary benefits all citizens by strengthening
the rule of law,” also stresses that “if the intention to widen access to justice is genuine,
reforms should also consider the specific justice needs of poor people.”387 Bottom-up
approaches which are “less state-centred and less biased merely on court reform”388 are
more focused on reforms and activities to access to justice or the legal empowerment of
the poor.389 Although there is considerable overlap between the two, access to justice
approach is primarily concerned with the ability of the poor to access the formal
386
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institutions of justice, while the legal empowerment “considers the empowerment of the
weak and the poor to be the main goal, seeing lack of power as the basic problem
underlying poverty.”390 But the difference between them is not clearly delineated and
“legal empowerment may involve access to justice and access to justice may involve
legal empowerment.”391
Andreassen’s critique of the presentation of legal empowerment as having access
to justice and formalized rights, which put the poor in a better position to move out is
poverty, is that “legal empowerment should not be reduced to a narrow concept of access
to justice institutions and the rule of law.” Legal empowerment should be placed within
the framework of human rights, “social ethics and communal action” and moral norms. If
the legal aspect implies “justiciability of human rights,” its moral side underlines “the
social ethics of human rights as embedded in social relations and collective action.”392 But
for legal empowerment to have benefits for the poor, there is still should be initiatives
undertaken to improve the accessibility of justice institutions. As the report by the UN
Secretary General, Legal Empowerment of the Poor and Eradication of Poverty, notes,
“reforming the law on paper is often not enough to change the reality on the ground. The
poor also need a legal and judicial system that is accessible to them and that can make
their legal entitlements practical, enforceable and meaningful.”393 The analyzed JURIS
project similarly viewed access to justice as the ability of justice sector actors to deliver
decisions which were timely, affordable to litigants, and fair, and empowerment of the
poor through educating them on rights, laws and legal procedures.
390
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In Final Draft of the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights underlines that “[w]ithout effective access to justice, [the poor] are unable
to seek and obtain a remedy for breaches of domestic and international human rights law,
exacerbating their vulnerability, insecurity

and isolation, and perpetuating their

impoverishment.”394 However, Sheldrick rightly brings up the fact “[n]otions of access to
justice are inherently problematic” because

“there is no clear definition of what

constitutes either access or justice.”395 Though there is an acknowledgment that there is a
need for a more holistic approach to access to justice when experiences of poor are
concerned, there is still a tendency to see access to justice through the narrow
understanding of the “access to courts,”396 “ability of citizens and communities to make
use of courts”397 and formal justice systems, and the “guarantee of legal representation.”
398

In this reductionist view, access to justice is frequently interpreted as “the accessibility

of lawyers and courts to potential claimants.”399
Access to justice is also "defined in terms of ensuring that legal and judicial
outcomes are just and equitable” 400 International Council on Human Rights Policy
emphasizes that “[a]ccessibility … involves far more than the physical creation of new
institutions or offices. It is equally necessary to make institutions economically, socially,
394
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linguistically and culturally accessible. If attention is not given to issues of access,
assistance for reform may merely reinforce the privileges of those who are already
advantaged.” 401 The Final Draft of the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights in its recommendation adopted this expanded understanding of the access
to justice. It acknowledged the importance of access to justice not only through the
formal, but also non-formal dispute resolution mechanisms. It recommended
improvements within formal justice systems by “training judges, lawyers, prosecutors
and law enforcement officials in meeting the specific needs of various groups living in
poverty,” “domestic legal recognition and judicial recourse” of rights enshrined in
international human rights instruments or waiving court and legal fees for those who
cannot afford them. It also called for legal information to be available to the poor in a
form which is suitable for them.402
Increasingly, access to justice programs have begun to include activities in legal
aid, legal literacy and education, rights awareness, support to paralegals, and alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. 403 This shift reflects the fact that, in many
countries, diverse factors economic, social, political, and knowledge – undermine the
access to the formal justice system.404 For example, legal illiteracy and costs can prevent
the poor from even initiating a complaint “to challenge administrative or judicial
decisions that affect them adversely.”405 For those disadvantaged in the society such
obstacles frequently become insurmountable. Legal empowerment initiatives aim to
401
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address those barriers by “assisting the poor to engage with the formal system while
improving the accessibility and quality of non-state dispute resolution mechanisms.”406
The Legal Empowerment of the Poor (LEP) approach has been trying to address
the criticism that one of the reasons why there is still poverty is “partly because the poor
do not enjoy legal rights or the power to exercise those rights.” 407 The approach
broadened the scope of discourse by making the poor the “subject in law and
development discourse” rather than being treated as “the indirect, long-term beneficiaries
of institutional reform.”408 Empowerment of the poor is considered not to be only about
resource allocation, but also requires such political, legal, and institutional frameworks
that are responsive to the needs of the poor and vulnerable while also holding leaders
accountable. 409 The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor in its report
“Making the Law Work for Everyone” remarked that “[l]egal empowerment is the
process through which the poor become protected and are enabled to use the law to
advance their rights and their interests, vis-à-vis the state and in the market.” It enables
the poor to enjoy their rights and opportunities by relying on their pursuit and assistance
of “supporters and wider networks.” In the legal empowerment of the poor there has to be
acknowledgment of their civic and economic identity “as citizens, asset holders, workers,
and businessmen\businesswomen.” In addition, legal empowerment has to include the
opinions of the poor, formed through “information and education.”410 The Commission’s
vision of legal empowerment was “as a process of systematic change” that enabled the
406
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poor and did not “use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and advance
their rights and interests as citizens and economic actors.”411
The definition the legal empowerment by Domingo and O’Neil, regarding it as a
transformative process, includes the use of both formal and informal laws and justice
institutions by marginalized individuals “to advance their rights or interests.”412 Sengupta
frames legal empowerment through the human rights framework as derived from
principles set in international human rights law which extends the obligation of the rights
set in those instruments beyond the nation state to “the entire community of states, which
have recognized these rights.”

413

Nevertheless, the legal empowerment as a

transformative process is not neutral and aims at challenging the inclusion of existing
power relations within the state and societies. Holding “power holders to account or …
contest[ing] unjust power relations”414 always bears a potential for backlash from those
groups which benefit from such power imbalance, because to address the issues the poor
face requires not only the redistribution of economic resources, but also social and
political powers. The analyzed Secure Tenure and Safe Space for Lesotho Widows,
Orphan and Vulnerable Children project viewed the empowerment of vulnerable groups,
and raising awareness about their rights and property ownership, as a means to improve
their social standing; subsequently improving their socio-economic conditions. However,
public awareness about rights was not welcomed by all community members, as in the
case of awareness raising on the rights of children, which was believed would contribute
to children being disrespectful to the authority of family members.
411
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The UN Secretary General report on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and
Eradication of Poverty acknowledges that “[l]egal empowerment must be firmly
anchored in the realities of poverty and exclusion.” Because legal empowerment of the
poor may undermine the interest of certain groups, and be perceived as creating winners
and losers, there might be scenario when those whose interests are threatened hinder
“reforms that could empower the poor and the disadvantaged.” Addressing the concerns
of those who regard the legal empowerment as a threat to their interests may be done
through “building alliances with stakeholders and seeking ways to overcome cultural
impediments to legal empowerment of the poor.” 415 Despite challenges the legal
empowerment provides the poor with knowledge and skills enabling them to frame their
grievances into respective rights and claim them from duty-bearers who are responsible
for satisfying those claims. Legal empowerment is also important in fostering the
autonomy of the poor to defend their rights and build the skills so that they may represent
themselves without being interceded by lawyers and/or paralegals.
If, in the earlier top-down initiatives the focus was on the supply side of the
justice by building the capacities of the judiciary and legal profession through trainings
and education, the bottom-up approach has widened the scope by focusing on the demand
side including through empowering the poor. In the former approach the “assumption [is]
that the establishment of an independent judiciary would improve access by increasing
people’s willingness to make use of the courts. This would, in turn, generate a body of
law that would support economic development and the establishment of better
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functioning markets.”416 The bottom-up, “justice demand,” approach, in addition to seeing
the poor among the agents of the transformative change to improve their lives, see “[t]he
(market) rationale behind ‘building demand for legal and judicial reform’” because the
demand will enhance “volume and quality of legal and judicial services.”417 Bottom-up
approaches are credited for being directly concerned with the issues that the poor
experience, however, as Hammergren observes, they “may have a bottom-up focus but
still follow a “top-down” logic.”418 Other critiques of bottom-up approaches include that
they may “suffer from over-ambitiousness” by aiming to resolve large scale issues such
as “alleviation of poverty, eradication of injustice and protection of human rights, while
changing existing power structures, not only locally but also nationally.” Not reaching
these ambitious goals, even with the disclaimer that changes take time, can lead to
disappointment and frustrations associated with the previous legal reform programs.419
Access to justice might appear as elusive as the notion of justice itself as it is
reflective of diverse individual experiences. It is shaped by individual perceptions and
expectations to what tangible and intangible resources one is entitled to, and individual
ideas about who is responsible for safeguarding the access to, and enjoyment of, those
resources. Though laws and institutions that enforce them are not the only means through
which such guarantees are provided, they have been given centre stage. Modern societies
are marked by the ever increasing number of laws and regulatory instruments affecting
multiple aspects of interactions within the society and making it challenging—even for
416
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ordinary people in developed countries—to navigate through them and to deal with the
institutions that enforce them. In spite of acknowledging the associated complexities,
international development projects have been transposing this approach into developing
countries. Improvements in legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as functioning
justice institutions, are presented among the main factors contributing to a decrease in
societal conflicts, enhancing the predictability of social transactions, and further
development. It is assumed that predictable and legitimate institutions provide better
guarantees and expand freedoms that individuals can enjoy, thus providing more
opportunities to choose the life one would like to live and prevent avoidable deprivations.
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8

TO BE OR NOT TO BE,420 TO DO OR NOT TO DO: EXAMINING THE
CAPABILITY(IES) APPROACH
Poverty and deprivation have been closely associated with low income. However,

in recent decades the analysis of the well-being and individual welfare has been
broadened to include other than income considerations, including what opportunities
people need to have to obtain and enjoy the level of well-being they choose, as well as
institutions which guarantee those opportunities. The capability(ies) approach (CA) is
among the main analytical frameworks applied in the broad conceptualization of the issue
of poverty, causes contributing to it, inequality, justice and their impact on the individual
well-being. This chapter examines CA through the writings of pioneering scholars
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The chapter also focuses on interrelations between
CA and human rights.
8.1

THE APPROACH
Since the 1980s, the discourse on capabilities has been shifting the view of

poverty as a multidimensional concept which includes such considerations as “income,
consumption, education, health, sanitation, nutrition, assets and access to basic
amenities.”421 It focuses on the role of individuals in changing their conditions, public
policies, and institutions. 422 It also links poverty to human rights. The idea of a
connection between human rights and development acquired prominence through the
works of Amartya Sen whose “early 1980s challenges to conventional development
wisdom and ultimate redefinition of the overall goal of development-development as
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freedom.”423 The capability approach (CA), also referred as the capabilities approach, is
increasingly used to evaluate the quality of life across countries, public policies, social
institutions, as well to frame issues of justice, equality, and opportunities. The
contributions by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum are the primary works referenced
and analyzed when discussing or applying this approach. The United Nations
Development Programme drew on their propositions and with its human development
reports has played an important role in tying development and human rights and bridging
theory and international development practice.424 UN OHCHR tapped into the capability
approach to develop the human rights-based definition of poverty.425
The capability approach moved the discourse about development and poverty
from the income driven explanation to a more multidimensional consideration of the
causes and consequences of poverty. Development and poverty are not analyzed through
the narrow lens of “economic growth and macroeconomic performances,” but rather
through a multifaceted analysis by “mainstream[ing] human rights paradigm into
development practices.”

426

It includes certain fundamental freedoms and social

arrangements that provide a framework for the enjoyment of those freedoms to achieve
the level of functioning individuals value. It provides a conceptual framework for
analyzing the interconnectedness of the opportunities to enjoy the freedoms with human
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well-being and views poverty as a depravation of freedoms.427
Nussbaum uses the term “capabilities approach”, in plural, to “emphasize that the
most important elements of people’s quality of life are plural and qualitatively distinct …
[and which] cannot be reduced to a single metric without distortion.” She defines it as “an
approach to comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing about basic social
justice.”
It holds that the key question to ask, when comparing societies and assessing them
for their basic decency or justice, is, “What is each person able to do and to be?”
In other words, the approach takes each person as an end, asking not just about
the total or average well-being but about the opportunities available to each
person.428
The approach treats individuals “as agents who have their own goals … make their own
choices, and are not mere receptacles for resource-inputs and satisfaction.”429
CA has a strong and enduring impact on development discourse, but it should be
understood that “the capability approach is not a theory that can explain poverty,
inequality or well-being; instead, it rather provides a tool and a framework within which
to conceptualize and evaluate these phenomena.” 430 Weiss and Sirkin describe the
capability approach as “a broad framework for sustainable development,” where the goal
of development is to expand capabilities “valuing both individual and contextual factors
as essential components of policies, programs, and evaluation for social change.”431 In
describing the capability approach Srinivasan notes that it “provided a compelling
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alternative to income/growth-centred methods for conceptualising the ends of
development, evaluating wellbeing/poverty and formulating development policy.”432 The
capability approach focuses on “actual opportunities a person has, not the means over
which she has command” and also on the variations between them.433
In his seminal work, Development as Freedom, Sen describes the focus of human
capability approach to be “on the ability – the substantive freedom – of people to lead the
lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have.” 434
Development eradicates “unfreedoms” (such poverty, tyranny, poor economic
opportunities, social depravation, etc.) which curtail choices and opportunities for
individuals to exercise their agency.435 Therefore, development, which “expand[s] the real
freedoms that people enjoy,” moves the discourse of development away from being
“identified with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal
incomes, or with industrialization, or with technological advance, or with social
modernization.”436 Still acknowledging that “[g]rowth of GNP or of individual incomes”
are key in expanding freedoms individuals enjoy, he adds that “freedoms depend also on
other determinants, such as social and economic arrangements … as well as political and
civil rights.”437 Development as the expansion of freedoms is concerned about the “ends
that make development important” rather with looking at “some of the means … [that]
play a prominent part in the process.”438 Freedoms of individuals are considered to be a
constituent part of development, therefore, “attention is… paid particularly to the
432
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expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kind of lives they value- and have
reason to value.”439 Sen defines capability as,
… alternative combinations of functioning that are feasible for … [an individual]
to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to
achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to
achieve various lifestyles). For example, an affluent person who fasts may have
the same functioning achievement in terms of eating or nourishment as a destitute
person who is forced to starve, but the first person does have a different
“capability” set than the second (the first can choose to eat well and be well
nourished in a way the second cannot).440
It involves the individual autonomy of decision making in determining the quality of life
a person wants to attain, and in prioritizing which competence and actions to harness to
attain that quality of life.
Among substantive freedoms are capabilities “like being able to avoid such
deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature
mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate,
enjoying political participation.”441 As Nussbaum interprets, capabilities are not just inner
abilities of an individual “but also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination
of personal abilities and the political, social, and economic environment.” 442 In her
version of “capabilities approach” Nussbaum refers to these substantive freedoms as
combined capabilities and distinguishes them from basic capabilities (“the innate
faculties of the person that make latter development and training possible”443),444and
internal capabilities. Internal capabilities are different from the basic ones in that they
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are abilities developed through lifelong learning “in most cases, in interaction with the
social, economic, familial, and political environment.”445 In Alexander’s words, “basic
capabilities invariably require appropriate external conditions both for their full
development (as internal capabilities) as well as for the ability to exercise and realize
different functionings (combined capabilities).” 446 Sen defines functionings as the
“various things a person may value doing or being,”447 for example working, resting,
being literate,448 being in good health or being well nourished,449 and “a set … of such
functionings makes up a person’s life.”450 However, Sen stresses that a functioning should
not be “seen as freedom of any kind, such as capability,” but see a capability as an
opportunity to have a combination of functionings that an individual is free choose to use
the opportunity or not.451
Capability as freedom denotes “the extent to which the person is free to choose
particular levels of functionings (such as being well-nourished), and that is not the same
thing as what the person actually decides to choose.”452 Nussbaum points out that “[a]
functioning is an active realization of one or more capabilities.”453 Burger and Christen
interpret capabilities “as a special kind of dispositional qualities human beings may or
445
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may not activate. One can freely choose not to realize one’s capabilities, but to do that
requires that one has the possibility to exercise them, if one wishes to.”454 An outcome—
such as attaining “being” or “doing” that which a person cherishes—is important, but a
focus on available possibilities that enable an individual to decide whether to engage or
not engage one’s facilities underscores the liberty of individuals in shaping and reshaping
their lives and that there is no one prescribed way to achieve it.455
Nussbaum accentuates that the emphasis is on people’s “choice or freedom” of
the set of opportunities that a good society should promote and respect for “people’s
powers of self-definition.”456 The approach is concerned “not just on what person actually
ends up doing, but also on what she is in fact able to do.”457 As Robeyns distinguishes, the
difference “between achieved functionings and capabilities is between the realized and
the effectively possible; in other words, between achievements on the one hand, and
freedoms or valuable options from which one can choose on the other.”458 Therefore, “[a]
capability is an opportunity or a freedom and [a] functioning is an outcome or
achievement.”459 Furthermore, as Whiteside and Mah expound, “[t]he more capabilities a
person has, the greater her effective freedom to make choices about her life and work.”460
However, Van Ootegem and Spillemaeckers criticize that focus on “freedom” and
“choices” because, even if in theory they are considered as worthwhile, for “[s]ome
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people … increased freedom [is associated] with increased insecurity and doubt.”461
Personal aptitudes can affect how individuals make use of their abilities and some of the
choices may lead to negative outcomes. But even the acknowledgement of such potential
weaknesses in certain individuals point out that each individual has a different way of
converting abilities and resources to enjoy life they want, thus shifting thinking from onesize-fits-all model to one which is reflective of individual characteristics.
Nussbaum points out that heterogeneities in abilities and physical differences
impact on the conversion of resources into functionings and argues that this information
should also inform public policies.
Some of the pertinent differences are physical: a child needs more protein than an
adult for healthy physical functioning, and a pregnant or lactating woman needs
more nutrients than a nonpregnant woman. A sensible public policy would not
give equal nutrition-related resources to all, but would … spend more on the
protein needs of children, since the sensible policy goal is not just spreading some
money around but giving people the ability to function. Money is just an
instrument.462
Such sensitivity to individual variations underscores that approaches to address the
deficiencies which prevent people from enjoying the quality of life they want require
more considerations than a simple allocation of resources. There is a recognition that the
approaches should be dynamic to be relevant to changes in individual aptitudes,
expectations of the life individuals value and environment in which they function.
Because of the heterogeneity among individuals affecting “the degree to which
resources can be converted into capabilities differs from person to person,” 463 the
approach focuses on an individual conception of the good and on “the actual lives we
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lead and are free to choose to lead.”464 It should also be stressed that “[t]he level and
quality of the achieved functionings and capabilities depends on not only personal
characteristics, but also on the features of the society one lives in.”465 The capacities that
individuals can have “can be enhanced or hampered depending on the opportunities they
face in their familial, social and political circumstances.”466 CIDA in its 2003–2004
Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) underlines the complexity and multiplicity of
societal and political factors that affect the ability of people to thrive. It states that
“Canadians, strong supporters of development assistance understand that global
imbalances—in wealth, environmental quality and standards, freedom, democracy,
security, and opportunities for economic and social development—can prevent people
from achieving their full potential and leading productive, creative and fulfilling lives.” 467
While Sen placed capabilities in the centre of the discourse, he did not outline a
specific list of capabilities which are of particular importance.468 He argues,
[t]o insist on a ‘fixed forever’ list of capabilities would deny the possibility of
progress in social understanding, and also go against the productive role of public
discussion, social agitation, and open debates. I have nothing against the listing of
capabilities (and take part in that activity often enough), but I have to stand up
464
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against any proposal of a grand mausoleum to one fixed and final list of
capabilities.469
As Srinivasan notes, that reluctance comes from the “concern that it is individuals who
have the legitimate right to choose and prioritise capabilities and functionings achieved
… whether for themselves specifically or as part of collective discussion and decisionmaking about social arrangements that in turn impact upon these individuals’ agency,
choice and freedom.”470 Another concern expressed by Sen on establishing the list of
capabilities is the problem of assigning relative weights and importance to different
capabilities. 471 But Gasper raises the question whether the ambiguities in capability
approach, and how it interacts with other disciplines, really matter and notes that
“underdefinition” gives space to everyone representing different backgrounds to
contribute to the discourse with their interests and skills.472 In the meantime, he also
outlines the disadvantage of the “underdefinition” that it makes it “hard to communicate,
to teach, to use with at least some potential cooperators and to assess and therefore
improve.”473 The lack of specificity “on which capabilities matter, which ones more than
others, and why” is seen as weakening “a strong philosophical foundation … at the
practical level.”474
In contrast to Sen’s approach, Nussbaum puts forward a list of ten central
capabilities, which serve as a philosophical framework for some basic constitutional

469

Sen, “Human Rights and Capabilities,” 160.
Srinivasan, “No Democracy without Justice: Political Freedom in Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach,”
463.
471
Sen, “Human Rights and Capabilities,” 158.
472
Gasper, “What Is the Capability Approach? Its Core, Rationale, Partners and Dangers,” 336.
473
Ibid., 337.
474
Srinivasan, “No Democracy without Justice: Political Freedom in Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach,”
460.
470

140

principles implementation by each nation,475 thus laying a universalistic applicability
claim.476 Nussbaum’s rationale is that
… Sen sometimes speaks as if all capabilities were valuable zones of freedom and
as if the overall social task might be to maximize freedom. He speaks of a
“perspective of freedoms”- as if freedom were a general, all-purpose social good
of which the valued capabilities were simply instances. The Nussbaum version of
the approach does not proceed in this way. It makes commitments as to content,
using the list of ten Central Capabilities as a basis for the idea of fundamental
political entitlements and constitutional law. This task of selection is crucial if the
approach is to have anything to say about justice.477
She affirms that her version of the approach “focuses on the protection of areas of
freedom so central that their removal makes a life not worthy of human dignity.” The
freedom which is not as central is left to “ordinary workings of the political process.”478
In addressing Sen’s position that the list of capabilities should be left to the
democratic process in each nation,479 Nussbaum notes that her “proposal is intended for
persuasion, and the issue of implementation is distinct one.”480 Ten central capabilities
proposed by Nussbaum are: (1) life – not dying prematurely; (2) bodily health – good
health, adequate nourishment and shelter; (3) bodily integrity – freedom of movement,
security against assault, freedom in a matter of reproduction, etc.; (4) sense, imagination
and thought (e.g. education, literacy, etc.), “[b]eing able to use one’s mind in ways
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protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and
artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise”; (5) emotions; (6) political reason –
“[b]eing able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about
the planning of one’s life”; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) play; and (10) control
over one’s environment – ability “to participate effectively in political choices that
govern one’s life” and having property rights, employment, freedom from unwarranted
search and seizure, etc.481
Central capabilities are conceptually connected with government482 and “one of
the major avenues of implementation of the Central Capabilities is a nation’s system of
constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights” 483 and richer nations owe duties
of aid to poorer nations because without that aid “poor nations cannot meet all their
capability obligations.”484 Nelson and Dorsey, commenting on Nussbaum’s position, note
that “[b]y emphasizing government’s obligation to create conditions that preserve human
functioning above minimum levels, Nussbaum, although preferring “capabilities” to
rights, provides an intellectual framework for an approach to development that starts
from the inalienable rights of individuals and obligations of governments.”485
Sen identifies instrumental freedoms which impact the overall freedoms that an
individual has “to live the way they would like to live,” and directly enhance capabilities:
political freedoms (e.g. right to decide who should govern and how, opportunity to
scrutinize and criticize authorities, freedom of expression and press, etc); economic
facilities (“opportunities … to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption,
481
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or production, or exchange”); social opportunities (“arrangements that society makes for
education, health care and so on”); transparency guarantees (“the freedom to deal with
one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity”); and protective security (“social
safety net”).486 Morsink’s comment on five instrumental freedoms is that they
...cover the entire range of the Declaration [UDHR], but (disappointingly) Sen
does not say that people have a human right to any of these freedoms, nor does he
say that people have a right to “live the way they would like to live.” … Of
course, we can easily surmise that Sen must think (though he does not say it) that
people have a right to the flourishing life that results when these instrumental
freedoms are in place.487
Even if not framed through the language of rights, the arrangements which establish and
sustain a favourable environment for individuals to flourish can still be structured and
regulated through diverse legal instruments and secure available options from which
individuals can choose to enhance their lives.
8.2

POVERTY
Though Sen refused to support a set list of capabilities, he acknowledges that

certain functionings and corresponding basic capabilities are key when examining
poverty and that poor people face very limited opportunities to pursue their well-being.488
Within the framework of capabilities as “the substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to
lead kind of like he and she has reason to value,” poverty is viewed as the deprivation of
basic capabilities rather than only being the manifestation of low income, 489 thus
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challenging “overconcentration on means (such as incomes and primary goods).”490
Nevertheless, as noted by UN OHCHR, “not all kinds of capability failure would count as
poverty.” Since poverty is “an extreme form of deprivation,” failure in those capabilities
which are considered to be basic in a given society are regarded as poverty. Because each
society has different views on what constitutes a basic capability, there is an inherent
variation in what the definition of poverty is. While that variation exists, there are
“certain basic capabilities that would be common to all - for example, being adequately
nourished, being adequately clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity,
taking part in the life of a community, and being able to appear in public with dignity.”491
CIDA in the Departmental Performance Report also viewed poverty beyond low income
and contended that “[r]educing poverty means addressing the various challenges … such
as lack of education, … poor health, access to food and water, economic opportunities, as
well as concerns of safety and security.” 492
Osmani argues that “when the failure of only basic capabilities is considered, not
every case of such failure may be characterised as poverty.” His position is that the
“origin of failure is relevant for this purpose.” 493 The consideration is that the “lack of
command over economic resources must play a role in the causal chain leading to a low
level of well-being” for that to be regarded as poverty.494 In the meantime, it is stressed
that while poverty generally is associated with “a low level of well-being, not every case
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of a low level of well-being can be regarded as poverty.”495As an illustrative example for
such a case, the publication UN OHCHR differentiates between “a low level of wellbeing” due to the ill-health as a result of a genetic disorder and “ill-health caused by lack
of access to basic health-care resources.”496 In the former case it is argued that ill-health
“will not in itself be recognised as a case of poverty,” while in the latter it will be.497
It is a fact that each person has different genetically conditioned abilities,
including learning abilities and physical strength. If this position on poverty were to be
accepted, it would mean that less endowed individuals with the same set of failure of
basic capabilities as more endowed ones would be treated as not being “poor,” while the
latter ones would be considered “poor.” This also raises the question about which level
and types of “genetic disadvantage” warrant consideration of being relevant for the
purposes of defining poverty as a capability failure. Does this mean that ill-health which
results from a “freak accident” which leads to the same level of disability as one born
with the genetic defect and results in similar failures “to lead the kind of lives they valeand have reason to value”498 should be treated differently just because it is an acquired
disability? Does it mean if a person who cannot earn and have minimum required
conditions for the life due to ill health as a result of genetic defect dies, his/her death
should be attributed to the unfortunate inborn ill-health rather than poverty because
his/her “low level of well-being”499 was not the result of “ill-health caused by lack of
access to basic health-care resources” ?500
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Nussbaum cautions against over-emphasizing the inborn traits of individuals
when discussing capabilities. She calls not to “hold that people’s political and social
entitlements should be proportional to their innate intelligence or skill.” On the contrary,
she argues that the approach requires that all individuals in a nation should obtain “above
a certain threshold level of combined capability” and that functionings should not be an
outcome of duress but of a real freedom to choose. The equal treatment of people
suggests that an approach to “people’s basic capabilities is not a meritocratic one” where
more gifted people receive better treatment, but rather the opposite, providing more
assistance to those who need it more to move above the threshold.
In the case of people with cognitive disabilities, the goal should be for them to
have the same capabilities as “normal” people, even though some of those
opportunities may have to be exercised through a surrogate, and the surrogate
may in some cases supply part of the internal capability if the person is unable to
develop sufficient choice of capability on her own…501
It can be argued that if the person had “some kind of a guarantee of basic healthcare …
concerned with giving people the capability to enhance … [his/her] state of health”502 illhealth due to whatever a reason can be addressed and in the meantime deprivations
leading to poverty can be removed. However, “[i]f a person has the opportunity for
socially supported healthcare but still decides, with full knowledge, not to make use of
that opportunity”, even if the outcome is the same as it “would be [with] the failure to
provide the person with the opportunity for healthcare,”503 in the former scenario the
person has a freedom choose with the latter there is no opportunity for that.
In regards to the connection between individual capabilities and low income, CA
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sees the relationship as two-way (e.g. “low income can be a major reason for illiteracy
and ill health as well as hunger and undernourishment”).504 But income is also “an
important means to capabilities” and improved capabilities can in turn contribute to an
increase in earning potential and the eradication of income poverty.505 Viewing poverty as
deprivation of basic capabilities, (“the freedom to do some basic things that are necessary
for survival and to avoid or escape poverty”506) such as “leading[ing] a healthy life, …
tak[ing] part in the life of the community,”507 rather than low income puts focus on
poverty being associated with developing countries but also in richer countries. For
example, unemployment in developed countries where there are social security
protections still focuses mostly on income and state transfers to compensate income
shortfalls. However, unemployment is not only a “deficiency of income,” but “it is also a
source of far-reaching debilitating effects on individual freedom, initiative, and skills.”
Unemployment can lead to “social exclusion,” “loss of self-reliance, self-confidence and
psychological and physical health.”508 The analysis of the focus group discussion on wellbeing in Belgium by Van Ootegem and Spillemaeckers showed that the most
dissatisfaction expressed by the participants with their achievements was an inability to
change the situation even when trying hard.
A lack of capabilities makes people feel trapped. Suffering from long-term
unemployment with a low social status, and trying to improve one’s situation
without succeeding, causes deep dissatisfaction. Things get worse when
comparison is made with a better, former situation and when one cannot accept
the current status.509
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The CA questions poverty beyond “a low level of income or the inability to obtain goods
and services deemed necessary for a decent living.” 510 Poverty as capability deprivation
focuses on “deprivations that are intrinsically important.” The relation between low
income and low capability is “instrumentally significant” 511 and it varies between
communities, families and individuals. The differences arise due to age, gender, social
roles, location, etc. 512 Poverty can also be a result of the “coupling” of different
deprivations. For example, ill and disabled people have fewer opportunities to earn; but it
is also harder for them “to convert income into capability,” because they may need more
income “to achieve the same functionings.” Therefore, as Sen contends, “‘real poverty’
(in terms of capability deprivation) may be, in a significant sense, more intense that what
appears in the income space.” This argument refocuses public actions to groups affected.
Disadvantages and differences among family members add another layer of challenge to
the income explanation of poverty. Family income cannot fully explain intra-family
distribution of money. It also obscures disadvantages that family members experience
due to biases, including gender ones.513 Or the decision maker on income allocation might
choose to spend money, not on basic needs of the family members, but on non-essential
items like tobacco and alcohol. Though the family might not be regarded as poor, in
reality some members of the family do not have their basic needs met due to income
allocation decisions within a family.514 Similar considerations affect the conversion of
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goods and services into capabilities.515
By focusing on “ends that people have reason to pursue,” rather than the means,
the capability approach to analyzing poverty shifts the discourse on “the freedoms to be
able to satisfy these ends.” 516 In Osmani’s opinion, the advantage of the capability
approach in analyzing poverty is that it distinguishes between “[t]he foundational
question of what constitutes poverty” and “the operational question of what causes
poverty, which should be answered in terms of the ends that people value but are unable
to achieve, not in terms of the means of achieving them.”517 The approach highlights that,
while means are important, even their availability is not sufficient to escape poverty if
there are obstacles to utilizing them and making choices about which ones to utilize in
order to live the life an individual wants.
8.3

HUMAN RIGHTS
Both CA and human rights have a common concern - “dignity and freedom of an

individual.” 518 On the value that the capability approach can add to human rights
discourse, Vizard et al. note that “[t]he idea of capabilities can help to clarify the nature
and scope of the idea of human rights, by providing an understanding of what it means to
secure human rights, as well as a framework for elucidating economic and social rights,
and for thinking about the grounds of human rights.”519 Nussbaum argues that “the best
way of thinking about rights is to see them as combined capabilities” - the right to
515
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political participation, free speech, etc., “all best thought of as capacities to function.”
The guarantee of these rights enables people to have the combined capability to function.
By defining rights in terms of combined capabilities, we make it clear that a
people in country C don’t really have the right to political participation just
because such language exists on paper: they really have this right only if there are
effective measure to make people truly capable of political exercise. …thinking in
terms of capability gives us a benchmark as we think about what it is to secure a
right to someone.520
In the areas of economic rights, Nussbaum argues, CA allows to distinguish between
differently positioned people and the need for diverse resource allocation decisions to
enable them the same level of functioning. CA, in analyzing economic rights, provides a
framework for rationalizing why more resources should be allocated to certain
disadvantaged groups or creating “special programs to assist their transition to full
capability.”
If we think of these economic rights while asking the question, “What are people
actually able to do and to be?” then I think we have a better way of understanding
what it is really to put people securely in possession of those rights, to make them
able really to function in those ways, not just to have the right on.521
Nussbaum stresses that the capabilities approach adds to human rights by
expanding the considerations from “merely ‘negative liberty’ or the absence of
interfering state action” to “the full ability of people to be and to choose these very
important things.” It also highlights the economic aspect of capabilities–“even the
freedom of speech requires education, adequate nutrition, etc.”522 It contrasts with the
approach where rights are perceived to shield from state interference: “if the state just
520
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keeps its hands off, rights are taken to have been secured.” CA argues for affirmative
actions of the state and active reinforcement of people’s capabilities, not just abstaining
from setting obstacles.523
Sen, from his side, emphasizes the importance of civil and political freedoms in
meeting the economic needs of people. Civil and political freedoms are directly
connected to basic human capabilities (“including that of political and social
participation”), instrumentally important enhancing capabilities of people being heard
and their claims be politically supported, including on economic needs, and play a
“constructive role in the conceptualization of ‘needs.’”524 However, their importance is
not only conditioned by their impact on economic opportunities. Even if the restrictions
on those freedoms do not lead to other adversities, “such as economic disasters,” because
they are an integral part of human freedom “their denial is handicap itself.”525 Political
freedoms and civil rights can also play an important role in the formulation of what
“economic needs” are through open and public debates and which are essential for the
“formation of values and priorities.”526 But public discussions connote “not just in the
‘thin’ sense of having leadership succession determined by a regular electoral process,
but in the ‘thick’ sense of messy and continuous involvement of the citizenry in the
setting of economic priorities.”527
Sen argues human rights and capabilities compliment each other provided that
that one does not subsume another and he highlights that while for many human rights
the capability approach can offer much for analysis, in spite of this approach “human
523
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rights to important process freedoms cannot be adequately analysed within the capability
approach.”528 On the importance of human rights, Sen contends that human rights are
“ethical affirmations of the need to pay appropriate attention to the signiﬁcance of
freedoms incorporated in the formulation of human rights.”529
Proclamations of human rights, even though stated in the form of recognizing the
existence of things that are called human rights, are really strong ethical
pronouncements as to what should be done. They demand acknowledgement of
imperatives and indicate that something needs to be done for the realization of
these recognized freedoms that are identified through these rights. One thing they
are not are claims that these human rights are already established legal rights,
enshrined through legislation and common law…530
Such an approach does not see human rights as either legal claims or being “basically
grounds for law, almost ‘laws in waiting.’”531
Acceptance of the link between moral rights and laws is not equivalent to
anchoring human rights into “coercive legal rules,” but rather treating human rights as
“powerful moral claims” that open other venues in promoting those claims.532 Although
the pre-legal moral claims may not be considered as “justiciable rights in court and other
institutions of enforcement,” this cannot be viewed as a basis for rejecting them.533
Legislating human rights should not be considered as the only way of promoting and
implementing human rights.534 They can be promoted also through “public discussion,
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appraisal and advocacy.”535 Freedoms which are integrated in the formulation of rights are
determined by how essential their integration is in those rights.536 For freedoms to be
considered as the foundations of human rights it should meet “‘threshold conditions’ of
(i) special importance and (ii) social influenceability.” 537 It is through public discussions
that it will be determined whether the freedom has “any ethical importance whatsoever.”
They are also conditioned by “the extent to which they can be inﬂuenced by social
help.”538
For a freedom to count as a part of the evaluative system of human rights, it
clearly must be important enough to justify requiring that others should be ready
to pay substantial attention to decide what they can reasonably do to advance it. It
also has to satisfy a condition of plausibility that others could make a material
difference through taking such an interest.539
Human rights, which include economic and social freedoms, even “if they cannot be
realized because of inadequate institutionalization,” still can trigger obligations through
their recognition. 540 Referring to Twining on this point, “[h]uman rights exist
independently of whether responsibility for realising these rights has been allocated. For
example, everybody has a right to food, even though it is unclear who has primary
responsibility for its provision.”541 The position in the UN OHCHR’s publication on
human rights and poverty reduction is that “there [is]… a natural transition from
capabilities to rights.”
Most human rights are concerned with the human person’s rights to certain
fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms from hunger, disease and
535
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illiteracy. The capability approach requires that the goodness of social
arrangements be judged in terms of the ﬂourishing of human freedoms. The focus
on human freedom is thus the common element that links the two approaches.542
CA accentuates that rights are not mere a list of entitlements to choose from to justify
claims, but rather, when these rights are enjoyed by people, they are able to achieve their
desired level of the functioning in the society. For example, the right to education, if
enjoyed, enables literacy and that in turn enhance the opportunities to be employed, have
more income which can expand people’s choices of how to be better nourished.
Nussbaum elaborates on relations between capabilities and human rights by
rationalizing it through UDHR, “I shall understand a human right, in the same way was
the Universal Declaration, namely as involving an especially urgent and morally justified
claim that a person has, simply in virtue of being a human adult, and independently of
membership in a particular nation, class, sex, or ethnic, religious, or sexual group.”543 The
rights are seen as combined capabilities (e.g. right to political participation, freedom of
speech, freedom to seek employment outside the home, etc.). There is an internal and
external aspect. To illustrate the former, Nussbaum notes that if an individual
systematically lacks access to information about religion, even when state does not
actively put obstacles to “religious choice,” the individual lacks religious freedom. The
external aspect is highlighted by an example of a woman who wishes to seek employment
outside home; if she faces systematic denial of employment or physical constraint
preventing her from going outside, she is not able to enjoy the right to seek employment.
Therefore, “to secure a right to a citizen in these areas is to put them in a position of
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capability to go ahead with choosing that function if they should so desire.” Another way
of looking at rights from a perspective where they are not identified with capabilities.
When it is said that an individual has a right to seek employment outside home, even
when there are no conditions which enable the person to enjoy that right, a person puts a
justified claim to secure the capability. In this way, human rights become the basis for
securing the capability and are close to “‘basic capabilities,’ since typically human rights
are thought to derive from some actual feature of human persons, some untrained power
in them that demands or calls for support from the world.” The rationale of expressing
rights as capabilities, according to Nussbaum, is to underscore that it takes much more to
secure rights than simply writing them down. This approach also provides a criterion for
understanding “what it is really to secure a right to someone.”544
Nussbaum ranks the language of capabilities above the language of rights as there
is no strong association with a “particular cultural and historical tradition.” In
comparison, the language of human rights is associated mostly with the European
Enlightenment.545 Nussbaum asserts that capabilities approach is “fully universal” and it
is “similar to the international human rights approach.” While the approach stands against
cultural relativism, it also respects pluralism. The list of capabilities is open to revisions
(both addition and deletion) reflecting a “society’s account of its most fundamental
entitlements.” The reason for leaving the list of capabilities “somehow abstract and
general way” is so citizens, legislatures and courts in a society are part of refining the
language reflecting different historical and development patterns. But implementation
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and justification of the list shall be separated.546
… we can justify this list as a good basis for political principles all around the
world. But this does not mean that we thereby license intervention with the affairs
of a state that does not recognize them. It is a basis for persuasion… military and
economic sanctions are justified only in certain very grave circumstances,
involving traditionally recognize crimes against humanity.547
Sen’s position is that “[t]he viability and universality of human rights are dependent on
their ability to survive open critical scrutiny in public reasoning.”548 It is driven by the
discussion “across national boundaries” conditioned with “a reasonably free flow of
information and uncurbed opportunity to discuss differing points of view.”549
The shift from an income driven definition of poverty to a recognition of the
multidimensional nature of poverty – with the need to tackle various societal, structural
and political aspects affecting both poverty and development – has gained also
prominence in policy making.550 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their
precursor, International Development Goals (IDGs), reflect the growing consensus of the
multidimensional nature of poverty and development, looking beyond income.551 MDGs
have become the guiding and mobilizing vision of development and how to tackle the
issues of poverty in developing countries, including for rallying the donor funding
support in the areas not explicitly mentioned in MDGs such as human rights and
governance.
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9

WHAT WOULD HAVE DARWIN SAID ABOUT MDGs OR IS THERE A
MISSING LINK?552
Everything was affected. People did not have access to enough and
healthy nutrition and in combination with the stress to fend for basic need
of the families, their health was affected too. It was really cold at homes
during the winters and, if they were sick, there was not much income to
allocate for health. Education previously funded by the state, especially
tertiary education, had gradually become fee based and the privilege of
those who could afford it. Those from poor families who were enrolled
with the stipend as an echo of the socialist education, still needed their
parents to seek manual labour jobs to pay for their living expenses and
transportation, even if it meant working at nights under the candle light.
Though donor aid was trickling, there was a long way still to go to reach
what had been before and lift people from deprivation they faced.
2000 marked the year when countries and donors set a new development agenda

to lead their efforts in addressing pressing development challenges faced by countries and
raise people from the deprivation they experienced. The Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), which were the culmination of the international development agenda setting
process, became a guide in framing and implementing donor programs and projects.
MDGs marked the formalized global recognition that development challenges faced by
developing countries were interdependent and propagating each other, so the
interventions to resolve them had to address various dimensions. Such a formal
recognition was strengthened by formal commitments to implement MDGs in donor
government policy priorities and government policies of aid recipient countries. While
MDGs signalled the launch a “new” stage in international development efforts, they
developed out of political, intellectual and policy background and the legacy of previous
decades. Therefore, this chapter illustrates the contribution of the antecedents of MDGs,
particularly of the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD) and OECD’s
552
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International Development Goals (IDGs), in creating the development framework and the
bases for negotiating MDGs.
In the meantime, MDGs as an outcome of political negotiations and a balancing
process suffered from gaps created by compromises. While human rights and rule of law
were part of the Millennium Declaration, they were not explicitly referenced in MDGs.
This absence of human rights language was among the main criticism of MDGs, but it
also rekindled the arguments about a rights-based language in framing social-economic
aspirations, or whether MDGs showed other avenues for the promotion and guaranteeing
the relevant human rights. Even if there is no explicit reference to human rights, or goals
are not framed in the language of rights, it is undeniable that MDG targets and their
indicators – which were connected to poverty reduction, access to primary education,
gender equality, improving child and maternal health, and fighting contagious diseases –
are the intentions of the rights listed in ratified international human rights treaties. For
example, commitment to poverty reduction implies that states undertake efforts to ensure
opportunities for people to generate income that would allow them to have an “adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food” (ICESCR Art.
11).553 This also includes ensuring that people are rewarded for work they perform and are
not kept in slavery and servitude (ICCPR Art.8).554 This chapter examines these differing
assessments of the juncture between human rights and MDGs, as well as the role that
human rights can play in advancing them.
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9.1

THE ANTECEDENTS
The MDGs are not the first global pledge to address and solve the issue of human

deprivations and its antecedent can be traced back to the “Four Freedoms” speech by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (January 1941), where he stated, “The third freedom is
freedom from want—which translated into universal terms, means economic
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its
inhabitants—everywhere in the world.”555 Despite the fact hunger, education, and child
survival had been the issues of concern for many years, they had not been a main focus of
international development during the first decades of UN activities. It was economic
transformation, industrialisation and growth which were the primary concerns of the
UN’s First, Second, and Third Development Decades (1960s, 1970s, and 1980s).556
Furthermore, until the 1990s, UN goal-setting exercises mostly remained as an aspiration
and, as Hulme argues, around the 1980s the idea of multilateral actions in global poverty
reduction was stalled. The reason for this deceleration was the dominance of neoliberal
ideas under Reagan and Thatcher. In the 1990s, there were UN summits which can be
regarded as precursors to MDGs, such as 1990 “Children’s Summit” by UNICEF, 1995
World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen and the Beijing World
Conference on Women.557
In the early 1990s, the notion of human development entered the international
development discourse and it “posit[ed] that human beings are the ends as well as the
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means of development, challenging the focus of many economists and policymakers on
per capita economic growth.”558 The concept of human development had at its core Sen’s
concept of human capabilities, with the main purpose of development being to increase
human choices and enhance human capabilities.559 The first UNDP Human Development
Report,560 published in 1990, not only introduced the idea of human development to a
wider group of professionals, scholars, and the media; it also provided an alternative,
non-socialist, framework for social activists to argue for policy changes; “[r]ather than
simply criticising the Washington Consensus... the UN increasingly began to articulate an
alternative approach.”561 Human development represented the process of widening the
choices of people and “the level of well-being they had achieved.”
558
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What gave the concept of human development such appeal was the quantification
of the concept. The HDR [UNDP Human Development Report] focused on three
essential elements of human life: longevity, knowledge, and “decent” standards of
living. For the first component, life expectancy at birth was chosen as indicator;
for the second, literacy figures; and for the third, command over resources needed
for a decent living, the logarithm of real GDP per capita.562
Human and social aspects of development were also advanced through UN global
conferences. The World Summit for Social Development (WSSD), held in Copenhagen,
March 6–12, 1995, was an important step in placing the “social dimension firmly on the
agenda.”563 The Declaration adopted at the WSSD contained ten commitments. Among
the commitments was the creation of an economic, political, social, cultural, and legal
environment that would enable people to achieve social development. The markers of
such achievement included the eradication of poverty, full employment as a basic priority
of economic and social policies, the attainment of universal and equitable access to
education and primary health care and improving and strengthening the framework for
international, regional, and sub-regional cooperation for social development. 564 The
WSSD also adopted a Program of Action which consisted of four components: an
enabling environment for social development; eradication of poverty; expansion of
productive employment and reduction of unemployment; and social integration.565 As
former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali highlighted:
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The World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen...stressed the
interconnectedness of the entire continuum of conferences. It is obvious that
economic problems have social consequences and the social deterioration in turn
undermines economies. The ills that societies feel most acutely all have social
origins and social consequences, and the Copenhagen summit focused on these:
the urgent and universal need to eradicate poverty, expand productive
employment, reduce unemployment and enhance social integration.566
The WSSD marked a crucial step towards the MDGs because the outcome was a global
political commitment that prioritized the eradication of poverty.567 The attendance of 117
heads of states provided a particular legitimacy to the agreement reached at the summit.568
The summit also approved the target to eradicate extreme poverty (less than $1 per day)
by 2015.569
Many NGOs welcomed that the summit adopted a multi-sectoral approach and
prioritized the issues of poverty. However, there were also NGOs that argued that the
summit did not succeed in addressing the effects of economic globalization. They
contested that the summit dealt with symptoms rather than consequences. However, the
summit provided impetus for the initiatives to address the issue of poverty.570 The UNDP
realigned its programs so poverty became their principal goal and the UN announced
1996 as an International Year for the Eradication of Poverty, which become the Decade
for the Eradication of Poverty the following year. Although the summit did not result in
“binding goals for poverty eradication, it clearly had a profound impact on multilateral
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and some bilateral programmes, which increasingly began to define their developmental
role as poverty eradication or reduction.”571 The WSSD also endorsed the 20/20 principle
where by twenty percent of the donor development aid was spent on basic social services
and developing countries allocated twenty percent of national state budgets to similar
programs.572 The principle particularly focused on health and education, which were
considered very important to achieving development and combatting poverty. This focus
tried to address the concern that when governments met conditions requested by
structural adjustment programs funding of those sectors was reduced. This in turn had a
social impact and in some countries accomplishments in health and education during the
1960s and 1970s were stalled and in the 1980s even declined.573
In the mid-1990s, most bilateral aid agencies experienced the reduction of their
total budget allocations for official development assistance. The development assistance
was not regarded favourably. Those on the political right considered aid “a waste of
time” and those on the left did not treat aid sympathetically due to the consequences of
structural adjustment programs.574 Hulme notes that, “[t]he atmosphere at the Chateau de
la Muette where the DAC was holding its high level meeting (HLM) on 3–4 May 1995
was gloomy, with many delegates talking about ‘aid fatigue’ and lack of public support
for long-term development.” The meeting participants approved Development
Partnership in the New Global Context, which had been produced over the previous year,
and it viewed development cooperation as an investment rather than an expenditure. It
571
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called for an increase in aid, also making it more effective and coherent. However,
despite acknowledging the merits of the document, “many [delegates] also offered their
support to the European Union’s proposal (under the French Presidency) ‘…to set up a
Groupe de Réflexion with a view to review the future of development aid and the role of
the DAC’[OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)].”575
Three weeks after the meeting, the Groupe de Réflexion was initiated at the
OECD ministerial event.576 It was tasked with assessing past experiences and suggesting
policies for development aid. Early in the process the DAC staff was mandated to draft a
list of UN summit declarations.577 The members of the Groupe intended to argue a
credible case for aid, which could mobilize actors with diverse views about the role of aid
after end of the Cold War.578 The listing exercise within Groupe led to discussions about
which goals should be included. The UK and Japanese delegations wanted to solely
“focus on income poverty reduction (through economic growth).” Their preference was a
single goal rather than a multi-goal list. The US delegation was not keen of having focus
solely on poverty as it “was not a popular concept for politicians or the public in the US”
and they needed specified goals. Furthermore, for the US “[g]oing for a broad set of goals
would give the list a form of democratic legitimacy, as it was derived from numerous UN
summits.”579 This would allow for the support of NGOs, because NGOs could see their
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organisations’ mandates fitting one of the goals. 580 Human development ideas also
provided a sound claim that tackling the issue of poverty requires a framework with
several goals. As a balancing act between these positions was that the “document would
be a listing but it would be headed by ‘economic wellbeing’ to ensure that the importance
of economic growth was clear. This goal would focus on a global goal for income
poverty reduction, the ‘social development’ goals would be subsumed under a single
heading and environmental sustainability came third.”581
The result of the year-long work of the Groupe was the final document Shaping
the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, which was launched at
the OECD High Level Meeting of Ministers of Development Cooperation on 6–7 May,
1996.582 In the introductory part of the documented it was highlighted:
In the year 2000, four-fifths of the people of the world will be living in the
developing countries, most with improving conditions. But the number in absolute
poverty and despair will still be growing. Those of us in the industrialised
countries have a strong moral imperative to respond to the extreme poverty and
human suffering that still afflict more than one billion people ... All people are
made less secure by the poverty and misery that exist in the world. Development
matters.583
The document emphasised the need for the international community to keep the
momentum of official development assistance and expand its volume to turn around “the
growing marginalisation of poor” and reach “realistic goals of human development.” It
also stated, “[t]oday’s investments in development co-operation will yield a very high
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return over the coming years.”584 In the chapter “The Vital Interests at Stake,” three main
motivations for official development assistance by OECD members were provided:
humanitarian, enlightened self-interest, and solidarity of all people with one another. The
humanitarian motive meant supporting development as “a compassionate response to
extreme poverty and human suffering” because depravation was “unnecessary and its
continuation intolerable.” Enlightened self-interest as a reason to support development
implied that development benefits people in both poor and developed countries. Increase
in prosperity in developing countries would expand markets for goods and services of
developed countries. Solidarity in development would allow people from all nations to
cooperate to address “common problems and pursue common aspirations.” 585 The
document set three targets. The first goal of economic well-being aimed at halving the
proportion of people in developing countries who lived in extreme poverty by 2015. The
goal of social development was concerned with primary education, access to reproductive
health care, as well as the reduction of infant and child mortality rates. The third goal
focused on environmental sustainability.586
Media covered the IDGs for only a few days. According to Hulme, the document
did not have much practical impact and it did not come as a surprise because the
document “did not have a plan of action and it was a collective document that belonged
to a set of minor ministries or agencies in the rich.” He notes that “[f]or example John
Vereker, the UK’s lead bureaucrat on international development, [was] reported [to have
been] engaged in the drafting process primarily to ensure that the proposal did no damage
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to the UK aid programme.” When this goal was achieved, the document was put aside.
On the approach by other OECD countries, he provides the insight:
USAID took it back to Washington DC, but with Jesse Helms chairing the
Foreign Relations Committee it was unlikely to have much immediate influence
on policy. As far as one can judge, the ‘like minded’ group of developmentally
progressive donors (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) took the
agreement seriously. But they were already pursuing IDG-type policies and had
limited leverage over the larger donors (US, Japan, UK, France) and the
multilateral institutions.587
There was little or no resonance on the IDGs in developing countries, because they were
the outcomes of negotiations among rich countries and the call for partnership resembled
“standard aid agency rhetoric.” Goals and the ideological orientation of NGOs affected
their response to the IDGs. Broad-based development NGOs expressed some satisfaction
with the “social development” approach in IDGs, while radical NGOs viewed IDGs as an
attempt “to mask its dependence on the exploitation of labour and the environment.” The
response from multi-lateral institutions varied. The IDGs were reflected in UNDP Human
Development Reports and they pressed the World Bank to see poverty as a multidimensional issue. The IDGs did not have much impact on IMF.588
9.2

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
The MDGs signified an important normative shift in the international development

discourse by making poverty eradication and human well being the fundamental
objectives of development.589 They not only set the agenda for international development,
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but also provided strong impetus for mobilization around globally agreed commitments
and issues they aimed to address.590 MDGs may not have been perfect, but they served as
a blueprint for donors and developing countries to strategize their efforts in addressing
salient issues in developing countries and to accumulate more targeted knowledge about
failures and achievements to develop and proceed with the new development goals.
On December 17, 1998, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 53/202
which called to convene the Millennium Summit as a part of the General Assembly
(Millennium Assembly) to be held in 2000. The preparatory process for the Summit was
important in a goal setting process and the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, was eager
to put global poverty eradication in the centre of the UN agenda.591 In March 2000, a
report of the UN Secretary General titled We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations
in the 21st Century (A/54/2000), was released. In its introduction the document noted,
There is much to be grateful for. Most people today can expect to live longer than
their parents, let alone their more remote ancestors. They are better nourished,
enjoy better health, are better educated...There are also many things to deplore,
and to correct ... Grinding poverty and striking inequality persist within and
among countries even amidst unprecedented wealth. Diseases, old and new,
threaten to undo painstaking progress. Nature’s life-sustaining services, on which
our species depends for its survival, are being seriously disrupted and degraded by
our own everyday activities.592
The document highlighted some basic priorities which aimed at reaching global equity
and greater solidarity. The set priorities were poverty reduction, providing children at
least with primary education, sustainable development, and employment generation,
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combating HIV/AIDs, upgrading slums, and bridging the digital divide.593 The report also
indicated priorities for ensuring global security. Among the priorities were prevention of
conflicts, protection of individuals from the gross violations of human rights, and
addressing the dilemma of intervention when gross violation of human rights are
committed by sovereign states.594
Civil society organizations also became involved in the process of defining
international development priorities595 based on the particular focus of their interest and
“welcomed the broader approach … expanding the area of concern away from merely
extreme income poverty to include a range of social development issues.” 596 1,350 NGO
representatives participated in the Millennium Forum organized at the UN headquarters
in May, 2000. The result of the Forum was the publication of the Millennium Forum
Declaration. The Forum put pressure on governments and the United Nations to fully
implement pledges made at the 1995 World Summit for Social Development, oversee
debt cancellation, and introduce “binding codes of conduct for transnational
corporations.” 597 The civil society organisations saw their role in monitoring and
pressuring governments to fulfil commitments they had undertaken and engaging “the
poor in real partnership in eradicating poverty and exert their best efforts to implement
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”598
During the Millennium Summit preparatory process, UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan needed to show that the UN was coordinating its initiatives in global poverty
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reduction with the World Bank, IMF, and OECD members. The result was the launch of
Better World for All: Progress Towards the International Development Goals in June
2000, which almost exactly repeated the IDGs.599 The joint press release issued by four
multilateral organisations indicated, “[t]he report focuses on seven interrelated
development goals, set during world conferences in the 1990s, which, if achieved in the
next 15 years, will improve the lives of millions of people.” The goals aimed at halving
the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day, enrolling all children in primary
school, empowering women by eliminating gender disparities in education; reducing
infant and child mortality rates, reducing maternal mortality ratios; promoting access to
reproductive health services and promoting environmentally sustainable development.600
As Hulme noted, the Better World for All revealed that the process of global poverty
reduction was a “twin-track process,” when “[t]he OECD... was continuing with its IDGs,
while the UN, a multilateral institution with greater legitimacy but few resources, was
mounting a similar exercise to produce a list from the Millennium Summit.”601 Civil
society responded to the document with harsh criticism and they viewed such a position
of the UN Secretary General as a “betrayal.” The anti-globalisation stance of NGOs was
“often framed in anti-market ideology and portrayed the World Bank and the IMF as the
enemy.”602
The fifty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly, the Millennium Assembly,
took place from 6–8 September, 2000. The Millennium Summit, organized as a part of
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the Millennium Assembly, gathered together representatives of 191 nations, which
included 147 heads of state and government.603 The result of the Millennium Summit was
the adoption of the UN General Assembly Millennium Declaration (Resolution
A/RES/55/2)604 by 189 world leaders. The declaration asserted “a collective responsibility
to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level” and
called for the assistance for the most vulnerable ones.605 But it should be noted that the
Millennium Declaration and MDGs are two distinct entities. The former was “like most
UN summit declarations before it” and the latter was an outcome of a political process
involving negotiations between OECD member states, UN agencies and World Bank.606
In December 2010, the General Assembly tasked the UN Secretary-General to
draft a road-map for the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and to prepare an
annual progress report on its implementation. In September 2001, Annan produced the
Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration
“which proposed eight Millennium Development Goals with special targets for each (in
all eighteen targets) and a total of forty-eight indicators to measure performance against
the baseline year 1990.” 607 Part three of the Road Map “Development and Poverty
eradication: the millennium development goals” underlined the multidimensional nature
of development issues and interconnectedness of MDGs requiring a multi-sectoral
program approach. It also urged to put human rights “at the centre of peace, security and
development programmes” and mobilize diverse stakeholders, including civil society and
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private sector around MDGs. 608 The declared eight MDGs were the eradication of
extreme poverty and hunger; achievement of universal primary education; promotion of
gender equality and empowerment of women; reduction of child mortality; improvement
of maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring
environmental sustainability; and development of a global partnership for development.609
However, as Hulme and Scott remark, the existence of two sets of goals—one by
the UN and another by DAC—“operating side by side looked messy” and could have
been used by the opponents of aid to point out the inability of “the world’s development
agencies …. to agree on a single set of objectives.”610 They note that, while an option
could have been to merge the two, the issue was that the Millennium Declaration, which
was endorsed unanimously, was not likely to be altered and IDGs were viewed as
“simpler, monitorable and achievable” by donor agencies and Bretton Woods Institutions
and more suitable for soliciting increase in ODA spending.611 Months before the Road
Map, there were extensive negotiations to address the issue of “twin-track” when OECD
was moving with IDGs and the UN with the goals proclaimed in the Millennium
Declaration. The negotiations were sparked by a speech by Mark Malloch Brown at the
meeting organized by the World Bank in Washington DC, on 19–21 March 2001. At the
meeting he proposed that the UN would accept the Breton Woods institutions’ oversight
of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) of developing countries, if the institutions
would commit to targets which would be developed based on the Millennium
Declaration. On the results of the negations, Hulmes provides, “it is clear that agreements
608
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were reached. Malloch Brown’s proposal that there be a clear division of labour between
the IFIs (PRSPs) and the UN (Millennium Goals) was carried forward.”612 The result of
negotiations was that IDGs were amended. The reproductive health goal, which was a
part of IDGs, was not included in MDGs as it was a contentious issue for some UN
members. The UN Millennium Declaration contributed to amended IDGs by adding a
goal on global partnership,613 and, as Fukuda-Parr notes, “[i]t commit[ed] rich countries to
do more in the areas of access to trade, aid, debt relief, and technology transfer. If this
goal had not been included, developing countries would not have agreed to the MDG
package.”614
While being a succinct “what-to-do” list, MDGs still resonated global aspirations
of working on ending deprivations faced by people and improving their well-being. Yet,
they were framed as the criteria of advancement of development objectives rather
entitlements triggering duties to be satisfied. As Nelson comments, MDGs became “a
careful restatement of poverty-related development challenges, in language that avoids
reference to rights; they are a donor country interpretation of the key issues for a donorcountry audience.” 615 The MDGs, as a short list of development goals, were better
positioned than a lengthy list to receive the support of the public and mobilize political
actions around them.616 As Sachs mentions, “[t]hese eight goals were what stuck in the
public’s mind, not the 18 targets and 48 indicators. Simplicity has worked eﬀectively in
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this case from the point of view of public awareness, mobilisation, advocacy, and
continuity.” 617 MDGs marked “a major departure from previous efforts to set
development objectives.” They were “limited and selective,” enabling the prioritization
of specific development objectives among the many declared during the previous decades
of international development efforts. They included measureable indicators and had set a
time-frame. In addition, broad-range institutions were established to promote and
implement MDGs such as the Millennium Project, a network of policy-makers,
practitioners, and experts; the Millennium Campaign which mobilized civil society; and
the process of producing national MDG reports and being a key focus of major
international agencies.618 MGDs also revitalized fulfilment of pledges made during the
previous world conferences. As little had been achieved with the previous efforts “in
concrete terms for the poorest members of society and the MDGs were designed to
remedy that failure.”619
But foreign aid to support the implementation of MDGs still depended on
voluntary ﬁnancing mechanisms and there was no clear plan to finance them.620 The first
attempt to address the issue was the International Conference on the Financing of
Development, held in Monterrey in March 2002.621 The final document declared the need
for “a new partnership between developed and developing countries” to achieve MDGs
and pledged “to mobilizing domestic resources, attracting international flows, promoting
international trade as an engine for development, increasing international financial and
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technical cooperation for development.” 622 The Monterrey Consensus accentuated the
responsibility of developing countries in addressing development challenges with
external assistance being dependent on their initiatives;623 “[e]ach country has primary
responsibility for its own economic and social development, and the role of national
policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasized.” 624 The Monterrey
Consensus also recognized the role of good governance, democratic institutions, “respect
for human rights, including the right to development, and the rule of law, gender
equality…, and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies” in sustainable
development.625
Human rights and democracy, while being a part of the Millennium Declaration,
were not included in MDGs. Fukuda-Parr explains that this was partially due to “the
difficulty in finding quantitative goals” for them, but also because they were not regarded
as a part of the development agenda. But during the course of the last decade there has
been growing recognition of connections between them and that “[t]he aim of
development is not just economic growth but also democracy and human rights.”626 Even
though they are not framed as entitlements, MDGs provided a strong impetus for the
promotion of human rights and revitalized debates on the role human rights can, and
should, play in lifting people from destitution. The added value of MDGs to human rights
was that they “provided a framework for mobilizing resources to help realize a small but
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significant number of socio-economic rights.”627 Human rights also contributed to MDGs
by advancing human rights commitments undertaken by states through accession to
treaties, focusing on discrimination which contributes to deprivations,628 and “direct[ed]
MDG interventions to those with the greatest need.”629 The inclusion of the language of
rights in the MDG implementation process “necessitate[d] greater consideration of the
structural causes of poverty among, and impact of MDG projects on, vulnerable groups
such as minorities and indigenous peoples.” It also contributed to the mobilization of the
civil society,630 public and governments in support of MDGs and around issues of the
poor.631 Nelson, however, is critical of the mobilization factor of human rights. He argues
that if “human rights have been an important mobilizing resource and source of leverage
for social movements and local citizen organizations in demanding government action to
protect, respect, and fulﬁll their rights” in case of the MDGs they “have not proven to be
a motivating force or source of political leverage for such citizen action.”632
In countering the criticism towards MDGs, Alston observes that critics see the
human rights framework “through rose-colored glasses” instead of noticing that both
human rights and MDGs have “a number of weaknesses, as well as strengths.”
In many cases the effort required is to strengthen both rather than to sing the
praises of the former and then reject the latter as being inadequate. Several
627
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examples are pertinent in this regard. The suggestion that the MDG process is a
top-down rather than a grassroots one is true in some respects, but equally it is
true of the human rights that were first proclaimed in 1948 by the UN General
Assembly in the UDHR … Finally the allegation that the MDG project reflects a
one-size fits all approach can be levelled equally well against the aspirations of a
universalist human rights regime.633
However, there is still a difference between goals and rights. Rights invoke
corresponding duties—particularly on states, which are the primary-duty bearers—to
ensure the enjoyment of rights. Goals do not raise similar claims that the rights-holders
can put on governments and “[t]he MDGs … [were] not any individual citizen’s goals in
the same sense that the right to food or to information is that individual’s right.”634
Though, not being legally binding, however, MDGs served as “moral and practical
commitments.”635 As Sachs indicated, because they were not designed to be legally
binding “[l]ittle time was lost negotiating the exact words of the MDGs.” He rationalized
that “[l]egally binding commitments are almost universally regarded as the gold standard
of international diplomacy, but the number of years that are often invested in reaching
legally binding treaties on sustainable development are unlikely to counterbalance the
heavy transaction costs and delays.”636
MDGs reflected the multidimensional perspective of development and
“consider[ed] people not only as the beneficiaries of progress but also as the key agents
of change.”637 From their launch, MDGs became a catalyst for international development
activities. International development projects and national strategies were realigned to
633
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meet the MDGs locally and globally. The design and implementation of projects led to
closer involvement with national actors, and this in turn has contributed to the capacity
building of national counterparts in government or civil society. Human rights were not
explicitly referenced in MDGs, however, they were an integral part of development
discourse, including programing of donor agencies. Despite criticism of MDGs as
declaratory goals with no firm commitments and lack of human rights vocabulary in its
implementation, both mutually reinforced the ambition to resolve the challenges of
destitution and underdevelopment. While MDGs provided a multifaceted approach to
development policies, human rights principles and standards—including through the
adoption of HRBA—sets the expectations not only about the outcomes but also about the
processes of development.
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10 KNITTING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STRANDS INTO THE
DEVELOPMENT POLICY TAPESTRY638
With international development efforts focusing on bringing economic prosperity,
building infrastructures and institutions, human rights were seen as either a separate
domain of activities, or as a prop to “humanize” development efforts, rather than binding
commitments to be factored into those efforts. It was assumed that improvements in the
economy and institutions would lead to the reduction of poverty, betterment of
livelihood, and improved quality of life by creating environment where people could
thrive and providing opportunities they could benefit from, thus also satisfying people’s
needs. The goal was to boost the overall economic development and establish institutions
conducive to development rather looking into entrenched inequalities and discrimination
causing deprivations. Those deprivations were regarded as unsatisfied needs, not as
failures to guarantee the entitlements people had – claims that raise corresponding duties
to ensure the enjoyment of those entitlements.
However, as development efforts were deficient in specifically addressing
challenges faced by those in need and vulnerable, but also in some instances they even
negatively impacted the livelihood of people. Consequently, there was a push to
incorporate human rights standards and principles as a yardstick for both outcomes and
processes of development. It has been argued that the human rights framework has been a
way to reformulate the essence of development and poverty when destitution is not just a
failure of meeting basic needs but also a denial of basic human rights and a
nonfulfillment of obligations to guarantee those rights. The chapter presents the role
HRBA plays as a conceptual framework in development and poverty reduction processes.
638
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It emphasizes the principle of indivisibility and interdependence of human rights in
addressing the issue of poverty, as well as the role human rights play in empowering
rights-holders to claim their entitlements and establishing obligations of duty-bearers to
meet those claims.
Since the 1990s, governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in
development have used the term human rights-based approach.639 During the last decades,
bilateral and multilateral donors adopted policies incorporating HRBA. Some of those
policies include binding requirements, while others included more general guidance.
Even if the donor does not have a specific policy, human rights considerations are
streamlined and implemented through projects in the areas of good governance and
access to justice.640 But Kindornay et al., while addressing the question on the emergence
of HRBA, note that “there is no scholarly consensus yet on how and why the new
paradigm emerged.” 641 The Human Rights Council of Australia was among the first
NGOs advocating for interlinkage between human rights and development with the
publication of The Rights Way to Development in 1995.642 The premise of the document
was that human rights and development should not be viewed merely through areas they
intersect, but rather the development should be seen “as a subset of human right where,
for practical purposes, ‘human rights’ are accepted as those standards, norms and
requirements elaborated in the International Bill of Rights and in associated instruments
639
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and decisions of the United Nations.”643 Until the 1990s, Western-based NGOs were
generally not involved with SERs. During the WSSD at Copenhagen in 1995,
humanitarian NGOs and groups from developing countries were active in promoting a
rights-based approach, while “the campaign was not spearheaded by the mainstream
international human rights movement, as one would expect.”644 However, by the turn of
the millennium, major NGOs such as CARE645 and ActionAid646 adopted HRBA.647
UNDP has been among the leaders of mainstreaming HRBA. In its 1998 policy
paper it asserted the connection between the promotion of human rights and sustainable
human development. The adopted approach was “holistic and multidimensional,
recognizing the mutual dependency and complementarity of sustainable human
development and social, economic, cultural, civil and political rights.”648 As Schmitz
notes when referring to the emergence of HRBA the narrative is about the top-down
process; nevertheless, it “was primarily driven from the bottom up and emerged as a
result of broader shifts, including the progressive indigenization of development nongovernmental organizations (NGO) staff and the increasing profile of social
643
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movements”.649 Different development organizations have adopted “their own ‘brand’ of
HRBA, shaped by pre-existing understandings of the core development challenges.”650
However, as Darrow and Tomas rightly argue, “[a] rights based approach has come to
mean different things to different people, depending upon thematic focus, disciplinary
bias, agency profile, and the external political, social, and cultural environment.”651
HRBA includes diverse techniques and institutional mechanisms. It can involve
advocating to ratify international human rights instruments and implement commitments
set in them. In other cases, HRBA aims to strengthen accountability of institutions – such
as human rights commissions or ombudsmen – or mobilize citizens as rights-holders,
including through civil society engagement. Depending on the country, the approach
may vary and use different HRBA elements.652
The UN OHCHR defines HRBA as “a conceptual framework for the process of
human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards
and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights.”653 HRBA puts the
focus on both development outcomes and processes. It requires that they are in
compliance with human rights standards 654 and raises “corresponding obligations
established by international law.”655 The approach reformulates development issues and
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actors into rights-holders and duty-bearers, as well as “into claims, duties, and
mechanisms that can promote respect and adjudicate the violation of rights.”656 It moves
the focus from needs to rights and from charity to duty and operationalizes “development
by incorporating norms, standards and principles of human rights.” 657 It aims at
examining inequalities that cause development problems and remedy discriminatory
practices and power imbalances that are obstacles to development. The approach sees the
empowerment of people, especially those who are vulnerable and marginalized, to be a
part in the policy making and hold those with “a duty to act” accountable.658
The UN OHCHR acknowledges that there is no one fits-all approach, but it lists
several components that are utilized by the UN agencies:
§
§
§
§

Even at the design stage of development policies and programs, “the main objective
should be to fulfill human rights”;
“[R]ights-holders and their entitlements” and duty-bearers with correlating
obligations are specified;
Capacities of rights-holders to claim their rights and “duty-bearers to meet their
obligations” strengthened;
Programing in all sectors and at all stages is guided by principles and standards
“derived from international human rights treaties.”659

Special attention is paid to treaties which are ratified by states and which represent
“country ownership” of the relevant principles and standards enshrined in those treaties.
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They are also becoming legally binding for all branches of government.660
The concern of HRBA is about all human rights and it sees them as
interdependent, with “special attention to economic and social rights as the authentic
concern of development policy.”661 Human rights also serve as a normative underpinning
in drafting national and international policies, including those aimed at poverty reduction,
to ensure that such principles as non-discrimination and equality are reflected. 662
Development organizations have been using “human rights instruments in their
arguments for eradication of poverty in general and extreme poverty in particular.”663 On
the role of the HRBA in poverty reduction, Banik indicates that “it is an important tool
not only for poverty reduction but also in efforts to combat poverty production since it
entails comprehensive re-definition of the aims and approaches to development.” 664
HRBA regards poverty as a multi-dimensional phenomenon and focuses on how poverty
is affected by civil and political freedoms. Deprivations are examined and addressed
through diverse avenues, including economic and social factors, such as stigma,
discrimination, insecurity, and social exclusion. The approach looks into manifestations
of discrimination in laws, polices and acts of institutions and seeks to rectify the
discrimination of individuals and groups.665 HRBA assesses poverty through international
human rights norms and treats aid recipients as rights-holders rather than those who
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merely receive aid.666 HRBA “recognises poor people as having inherent rights essential
to livelihood security— rights that are validated by international standards and laws.”667
Though poverty is predominantly viewed and treated through the lenses of
economic and social deprivations, the human rights framework accentuates that
enjoyment of social and economic rights “may be crucially dependent on the enjoyment
of civil and political rights.” Such a focus underlines that civil and political rights are not
“luxuries relevant only to relatively affluent societies” and that economic and social
rights are not just ambitious goals, rather, they are rather interconnected and relevant
parts in the poverty reduction process. The human rights framework conveys the message
that “economic, social and cultural rights are binding international human rights, not just
programmatic aspirations.”668 There is also an intersection between HRBA and capability
approach in addressing the issue of poverty. Poverty can be characterized as “the failure
of basic freedoms - from the perspective of capabilities.” The UN OHCHR argues that
poverty can be regarded as non-fulﬁlment of human rights if those human rights are
associated with capabilities that are presumed basic in a society and that non-fulfilment is
a result of “[i]nadequate command over economic resources.”669 Among the common
basic capabilities are “being adequately nourished, avoiding preventable diseases and
premature mortality, being adequately sheltered, having basic education, being able to
ensure personal security, having equitable access to justice, being able to live in dignity,
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being able to earn a livelihood and being able to take part in the life of a community.”670
Although HRBA is similar to the capability approach, it frames poverty as a
multi-dimensional concept and as a deprivation of basic human rights required for a
dignified life, there are differences too. If within the capability approach there is no
consensus on either the list of capabilities pertaining to poverty or methods of defining it,
HRBA anchors it in international human rights norms and treaties. International human
rights treaties set legal obligations upon states and the HRBA definition of human rights
transposes those legal obligations on to government institutions.671 The report of the UN
Secretary-General summarizes these considerations,
A rights-based approach to development describes situations not simply in terms
of human needs, or developmental requirements, but in terms of society’s
obligations to respond to the inalienable rights of individuals, empowers people to
demand justice as a right, not as charity, and gives communities a moral basis
from which to claim international assistance where needed. 672
Within the HRBA framework, “the political dimensions of poverty and power dynamics”
that contribute to exclusion and discrimination are among the central considerations.673
The HRBA provides a framework to analyse inequalities that contribute to disparities in
development. It also aims to remedy practices which lead to discrimination “and unjust
distributions of power that impede development progress.”674 HRBA places addressing
power imbalances and elite capture at the centre of the development process and poverty
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reduction by setting minimal human rights protection standards to those who are
adversely affected.675 Individuals, civil society, and legal systems are mobilized to hold
primary duty-bearers accountable for the fulfillment of their obligations.676 Obligations of
duty-bearers are both positive – protection, promotion and provision – and negative –
abstaining from violations.677 Assigning responsibility is central in HRBA. When it is
asserted that somebody has a right to something, it is “interpreted in terms of the
corresponding obligations and duties of counter-parties to ensure” that the right is upheld.
678

States are considered the primary duty-bearers. They are responsible for creating
conditions for people to enjoy their rights, “security and well-being, for ensuring their
just and adequate access to social services and other public goods,” 679 and equal access to
justice. In access to justice initiatives, HRBA focuses on enhancing capacities of state
institutions as a “supply side” of the justice system to provide remedies demanded by
rights-holders. In the meantime, the efforts also target rights holders as the “demand” side
of the justice system aiming to “enhance the ability of poor and disadvantaged people to
access” justice institutions.680 People living in poverty face obstacles in accessing justice
and remedying wrongs. Therefore, it is the obligation of states to ensure individuals have
access to remedies if the poor are discriminated based on their socio-economic status.
States should provide redress possibilities for human rights, including socio-economic
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rights, stipulated in international human rights instruments. They should “[i]nvest in
training judges, lawyers, prosecutors and law enforcement officials” and build their
capacity to respond without discriminating against the poor. States should also facilitate
the availability of legal information for the poor in an accessible format.681 It should be
noted that while judicial enforcement of rights and ensuring access to justice is essential,
for people living in poverty litigation can be expensive, and consume both time and
effort.682 Thus it can be said, HRBA “means listening to and respectfully working with
marginalized groups, not hiring more lawyers.”683
While relationships between rights-holders and duty-bearers are at the core of
HRBA, conventionally it is states which are viewed, especially by international law
scholars, as prime duty-bearers.684 However, in practical terms, the HRBA language
introduces a dimension of accountability into development—accountability of both states
and non-state actors. Because states are not the only duty-bearers, individuals,
international organizations, and other non-governmental actors also have human rights
obligations. For example, “individuals have general responsibilities towards the
community at large and, at a minimum, must respect the human rights of others.”685 These
responsibilities include not only the positive aspect of protecting human rights, but also
the negative aspect of abstaining from actions which could lead to a violation of human
rights. Therefore, as Jonson argues, there is a need to expand “claim-duty relationships to
include all relevant subjects and objects at subnational, community and household
681
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levels.” Rights-holders and duty-bearers are not fixed to specific individuals because one
can be both duty-bearer and rights-holder depending on “relation to actors at different
levels of society.”
It is equally important to realize that an individual very often cannot meet his/her
duties, because he/she has some of his/her own rights violated. Parents, for
example, have a duty to provide food for their children, but may fail to do so due
to lack of a job or cultivable land. In such cases parents cannot be held
accountable for not providing food for their children.686
But the responsibilities of the state as a primary duty-bearer remain. States are to
guarantee the rights of and assist the vulnerable members of society even if individual
duty-bearers are not able to meet their obligations. The HRBA framework emphasizes
not only the duties to guarantee the enjoyment of rights, but it also to tailor the efforts
with a specific consideration to the needs of indigent and marginalized. HRBA places “an
important check against tendencies to neglect the poorest and most marginalized in
development efforts.”687
The Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena
Sepúlveda Carmona, emphasized that HRBA “respects the dignity and autonomy of
persons living in poverty and empowers them to meaningfully and effectively participate
in public life, including in the design of public policy.”688 The participation should be
“‘active, free, and meaningful,’ which implies that mere formal or ‘ceremonial’ contacts
with beneficiaries are not sufficient.”689 Participation is not regarded as discretion to be
granted when needed by the right itself. It entails provision of specific arrangements to
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overcome obstacles that the poor and marginalized face in partaking in processes and
decisions that affect their life and “play[ing] an effective part in the life of the
community” 690 Participation is valuable not only as a means of mobilization for
individuals to demand satisfaction of their claims by different levels of governments, but
also for better programing.691 The human rights-based approach to development requires
that the development assistance leads to enjoyment of human rights and that development
is “participatory, accountable and transparent with equity in decision-making and sharing
of the fruits or outcome of the process.” 692 It aims to assist “in the participatory
formulation of the needed policy and legislative framework” and to incorporate the
participatory process into national and local policy making.693
The rights-based discourse also brings rights to the forefront, instead of needs and
charity, and puts a spotlight on duties, as duties imply the responsibility to act.694 Boesen
and Martin emphasize, “[r]ights always trigger obligations and responsibilities, whereas
needs do not” and rights evoke the accountability of duty-bearers. If a needs-based
approach is concerned with meeting needs, HRAB advances the realization of human
rights and puts “claims toward legal and moral duty-bearers.” The needs-based approach
treats individuals as mere recipients of development activities while HRBA empowers
people individually and as a group to assert their rights.695 By moving from needs-based
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to rights-based, the main issue under consideration becomes not how to increase the
available resources, but rather how to assure equality in benefiting from them.696 If the
needs-based approach is concerned with guaranteeing “additional resources for delivery
of services to particular groups, a rights-based approach calls for existing resources to be
shared more equally and for assisting the marginalised people to assert their rights to
those resources.”697 Marginalized and excluded populations are the groups that face the
most discrimination, be it in civil and political or socio-economic rights. Therefore, they
are the main focus of the HRBA, the framework which also puts human rights principles
at the center of governance.”698 Human rights have an impact on governance through the
introduction of interrelations between duty-bearers and rights-holders, thus emphasising
the “importance of state-citizens linkages.”699 Capacity development of both ordinary
people (to claim their entitlements) and duty-bearers (to deliver on state commitments) is
among the tools of the HRBA to facilitate the governance process.700
However, HRBA implementation can face conflicts between rights-holders and
duty-bearers as a result of the shift of power and there can be “resistance to the
empowerment of marginalized people through donor-supported programmes” at different
levels.701 HRBA may exacerbate social and economic inequalities and polarize politically
different groups.702 As Uvin cautions, “[t]here is no neutrality” in the HRBA process.703
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HRBA emphasizes that good governance establishes and maintains conditions that are
also advantageous for those “who are impoverished, oppressed and socially vulnerable
and excluded.” 704 Another issue with HRBA programs is the apparent contradiction of
work done by donors in enhancing accountability of state institutions at different levels,
while the accountability of donors is rather weak. Organizations that advance anticorruption efforts in national governments, may be prone to similar failings when it
comes to identifying partners to work with, hiring of experts, and planning project
activities. While they proclaim adherence to human rights principles, they might not
provide efficient and accessible means for people to be informed about inner workings of
the development assistance, about “potential negative impact of development projects, or
to get adequate remedies when they occur.”705
On the operational level, the challenge faced by the HRBA programs is the
growing expectations of delivering “results,” which are mostly understood as “financial
delivery targets and the production of tangible, quantitatively measurable outputs.”
Because human rights and empowerment projects are long-term commitments with
societal and financial risks involved, the challenge of how to define and account for
“results” is highly accentuated.706 UN OHCHR, in its publication, asserts that there is no
inconsistency between results-based management (RBM) and HRBA because HRBA
also aims at reaching results—even if those results can change and reflect the
participatory programming while RBM strategizes how to achieve those results.707 But, as
703
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Vandenhole rightly indicates, there is a tendency within RBM to “assume a direct causal
chain between interventions and results" despite no evidence for such simple causality
linkages in human rights. As a result, the multidimensionality and complexity of human
rights interventions are overlooked.708 Munro highlights another issue with programing in
the human rights field, because within the HRBA framework rights are viewed as
interdependent and indivisible. He asks “if there can be no hierarchy of rights, can a
rights-based organization choose its strategic priorities?” The answer is illustrated
through a position by a UNICEF staff member that the planning document of the agency
should have been “one line long: Implement the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.”709
In its 2008 report on governance programing, CIDA’s report also indicated “a
poor fit between RBM frameworks, as … implemented by CIDA, and the realities with
which governance programming seeks to engage.” It acknowledged that “[s]ocio-political
and institutional changes are long-term, multi-dimensional and uneven processes, making
it difficult to define outcomes achievable within a five-year term.” 710 The report argued
that it was not so much that the design of projects was faulty, but rather that results
frameworks were unrealistic.711 These concerns are similar to ones faced by judicial
reform projects. The final report of the Canada-Ukraine Judicial Cooperation Project
highlights the challenges experienced when framing judicial reform projects within the
RBM framework. The report acknowledges that “RBM is a very useful tool that keeps
the project team focused.” But it goes on to emphasize that “judicial reform projects
708
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aimed at changing people’s attitudes and mindset, achieving anything deeper and broader
than an output – a shorter-term development result that is the logical consequence of
project activities – is a major struggle and, if successful, a major accomplishment.” When
reflecting on “CIDA-type projects,” the report draws attention to the fact “there is not
enough time to arrive at true outcomes, let alone impacts. It is not that these outcomes are
not necessarily there; it is just that they may only manifest themselves long after the
project has been completed.”712 In its 1996 publication CIDA already recognized the
challenges in “measure[ing] results in human rights and democratic development.”
Among the challenges highlighted are the absence of “comprehensive or ‘objective’
theory/model of democracy or human rights … against which to measure progress”;
culturally and context specific framing of notions such as justice, freedom, etc.; the
complexity of human and institutional development cannot be fully captured by a few
indicators in donor programs.713
Despite the challenges faced in HRBA programing, there is still an argument that
the human rights framework serves not only as a philosophical basis for development
activities, but also that human rights are accounted for in development activities during
their design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.714 The framework accentuates
that enjoyment of human rights are not only the end goal of programming and project
activities. It puts a requirement that human rights are also guiding the process of drafting
and executing projects with beneficiaries being active participants rather than passive
712
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recipients of project outputs. The broader impact is that the human rights discourse also
galvanizes main stakeholders in donor countries to advance the reassessment of
governmental official policy documents and positions to reflect the urgent development
issues and priorities of the day.
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11 SKATING ON THE RIDEAU CANAL OR CHANNELLING CANADA’s
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID: HUMAN RIGHTS, MDGs AND
POVERTY
Poverty reduction and support to economic and social development have been
among the primary concerns of the Canadian international development assistance since
the 1970s. In the early years of development aid, however, human rights were not
explicitly referenced in development aid, but from the 1990s they have been occupying
an increasingly prominent place in the policies of Canadian governments and CIDA.
Nevertheless, poverty reduction has remained a fundamental underpinning of the
Canadian aid programming and MDGs became the overarching goal of CIDA’s program
architecture from the first years after they were launched. While governance, human
rights, and rule of law were not a part of UN MDGs, they were CIDA’s key programming
elements aiming to contribute to reaching MDGs. This chapter sets the context for the
analysis of the Canadian development aid by a brief introduction of Canada’s aid efforts
and government policy documents before 2000 and refers to public opinions towards the
Canadian foreign aid. The analysis of CIDA’s policy documents and reports to
parliament indicates the place and role assigned to human rights, poverty reduction, and
MDGs within CIDA’s program architecture. The chapter also examines the Auditor
General of Canada’s reports on Canadian aid and the review by the parliament on the
Canada’s role in democratic assistance.
In its 2013 budget, Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2013, the Conservative
Government announced the merger of CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada (DFAIT). The new department, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), undertook the mandates of the amalgamated
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departments. 715 Expressing the sentiments around the merger, Brown wrote, “MANY
LOVED TO HATE the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). It is barely
gone, but it's already missed.” 716
The history of the Canadian official development assistance (ODA) can be traced
back to 1950 and Canada’s membership in the Colombo Plan.717 The early focus of aid
distribution was on Asia and the Pacific, “disbursed through a variety of transitory
arrangements and eventually solidified in the External Aid Office (EAO) under the
Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA).” In 1968, under Trudeau’s Liberal
government, EAO was transformed into CIDA.718 In addressing the legal basis of CIDA,
Morrison notes that it “could hardly been vaguer.” 719 A cabinet memorandum dated
August 29, 1968, also mentioned 1960 and 1962 orders-in-council establishing EAO and
stated: “that is now considered that the name ‘External Aid Office’ implies Canada is
primarily concerned with aid as such rather that will all aspects of co-operative
international development.”720 The September 1968 order-in-council did not provide more
specificity and “merely substituted new titles for old ones.”721 Steeves notes that “[f]rom
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its inception in 1968 CIDA [was] … the subject of intense interest and debate, both as an
institutional actor and in its management of the Canadian aid programme.” He holds that
“[i]n general CIDA and Canadian aid … [did] not featured in major public debates” far
from the focus put on Canada’s peacekeeping and military efforts;722 however,
…[that did] not mean… that CIDA … [was] immune to the ‘bureaucratic politics’
which … [took] place within the Ottawa public service environment. Indeed,
given CIDA’s budget and staﬃng levels, the agency … [was] embroiled in
institutional struggle over the course of its history.723
In the 1970 policy document, International Development: Foreign Policy for Canadians,
commitment to ODA was already among key considerations.724 The document’s part, the
Government’s Development Assistance Programme, indicated that the purpose of
development assistance was to advance the progress of “social, educational, industrial,
commercial and administrative systems of the developing countries” with the primary
goal of poverty elimination. The expected impact of the progress was that people in
developing countries could improve their ability “to produce, distribute and consume
goods and services” and contribute to raising their standard of living. The document
emphasized that the intent of the development assistance was “to improve the quality of
life and social justice within the total domestic and foreign environment in which
Canadians … [would] have to live and work.”725 In addressing why poverty eradication
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was the primary goal for Canada,726 the document interconnects the poverty reduction
efforts in developing countries and Canada.727 The argument was that a society’s attitude
to poverty is determined by the way it addresses the same issue in other countries. A
society which is indifferent to poverty in other countries would likely have a similar
attitude towards domestic poverty and, vice-versa, that a society which is involved in
addressing poverty overseas would be concerned about poverty among its population.
Therefore, Canadians “could not create a truly just society within Canada if … [they]
were not prepared to play … [their] part in the creation of a more just world society.”728
The 1970 policy document, International Development: Foreign Policy for Canadians,
explicitly connected development assistance programs with Canada’s national objectives.
It stressed that the development assistance would be “concentrated in countries whose
governments pursue[d] external and internal policies that … [were] broadly consistent
with Canadian values and attitudes.” 729 In its 1987 new strategy,730 Sharing Our Future,
CIDA reasserted that the primary purpose of Canadian ODA was “putting poverty first.”
Mirroring the arguments within the capability approach, the strategy defined “poverty
[as] … lack of choice.” It elaborated that poverty is about,
…lack of access- access to education, to jobs, to income, to services, and to
decision making power. Poverty is inequality in opportunities, in the distribution
of benefits of growth, and in social justice. Poverty is underdevelopment of
human potential.731
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While the government was expressing its commitments to ODA and addressing the issue
of poverty, there was less consistency in the levels of ODA. By 1975, Canada contributed
0.54 percent of GNI (gross national income) to aid. After 1975, however, the aid levels
stagnated and then rapidly declined under Chrétien’s Liberal government.732 In 1993,
Chrétien’s newly elected government began the budget deficit reduction process and one
of the major areas suffering from cuts was foreign aid.733 Steeves explains that “[l]acking
a strong political constituency of support following years of trade emphasis, CIDA was
an easy and ripe target for budget cuts. When the Liberals took oﬃce in 1993, Canadian
aid stood at 0.44 per cent of GNP whereas by 2003 it had leveled out at 0.25 per cent of
GNP.”734 Tomlinson indicates that, due to cuts, Canada’s position dropped from the 7th
position among 21 OECD DAC countries in the beginning of 1990s to 17th by 1999.735
Only Italy and Finland introduced more cuts in the 1990s.736 The public opinion in
Canada similarly reflected the policy context of the 1990s. The surveys in the early the
1990s showed higher public support to development assistance, but those levels had
lowered by the mid-1990s. During 1993–95, when the balancing budget was the top
government priority, “the proportion of Canadians who thought that the government
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spent the right amount or not enough to assist developing countries dropped to around 50
percent (from 76 percent in 1989).”737
In 1995, the Chrétien government produced a white paper, Canada in the World,
which was the outcome of the 1993–1995 foreign policy review and treated the human
rights as “a core Canadian value and central pillar of Canadian foreign policy.”738 Lui
mentions that before Canada in the Word, the promotion of human rights and their status
in “Canadian foreign policy was by no means firmly entrenched.” 739 The document
declared three key objectives:
•

The advancement of prosperity and employment;

•

The defense of Canada’s security, “within a stable global framework; and

•

The projection of Canadian values and culture.”740

It acknowledged that development is an intricate phenomenon and “that many conditions
must be met before it takes permanent root.” The paper stated that “[i]ndividuals must
have equitable access to basic social services, to productive assets and to employment
opportunities” and affirmed gender equality in the process. It also underlined the
importance of respecting human rights, as well as “healthy civil society and political
systems that inspire confidence and trust.”741
Addressing poverty was considered “vital,” but by recognizing that there was no
single way of reducing poverty it called to focus Canada’s efforts to help the poor to
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include an “array of programs and policies working together in an integrated fashion.”742
Poverty reduction through support to sustainable development was declared a purpose of
the Canadian ODA. Human rights, democracy and good governance were mentioned as
one of six program priorities to achieve the declared purpose. The priority included an
increase in respect for human rights, including children’s rights; promotion of democracy
and better governance; and strengthening civil society and the security of the
individual.743 The promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law were
presented as “the projection of Canadian values.” It was tied with the “contribution to
international security in the face of new threats and stability.”744 It was also supposed to
serve Canada’s “economic and security interests”, together with free markets and respect
for environment. If the respect to human rights, rule of law and participatory
government—as well as the free market and the environment—were to be observed,
“there … [would] a greater prospect of stability and prosperity- where they … [would]
not, of uncertainty and poverty. Their observance, therefore, … [was] both an end in
itself and a means to achieving other priority objectives.”745 It was a statement of belief in
Canadian values and “in the contribution these values make to the international
community.” These are values of tolerance, democracy, equity, and human rights, the
peaceful resolution of difference, social justice, and sustainable development.746 Universal
respect for human rights was declared to be in Canada’s interest. Human rights were
considered not only “a fundamental value, but also as a crucial element in the
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development of stable democratic and prosperous societies at peace with each other.”747
The paper proclaimed the importance of democratic culture and civil society,
...one that is pluralistic and participatory, that allows for the expression of diverse
views and that offers its members the opportunities and resources to participate in
the life of their community and country. Essential is a legal and institutional
framework, which includes the rule of law, an independent judiciary, honest and
open government, respect for human rights and the subordination of military force
to civil authority.748
In its Sustainable Development Strategy 2001-2003, CIDA affirmed that “CIDA's
fundamental mandate set out in Canada in the World remain[ed] relevant” and that
Canadian values of "social justice and of helping those who are poor, set in a context
which recognizes that Canadian interests are also served by measures that serve our
global interdependence.”749
Reflecting on the comments in the white paper, Oliver notes that they viewed the
document “as advance justification for an ‘on-the-cheap’ foreign policy, one that made a
political virtue of alleged fiscal necessity by cloaking real-world problems in a mix of
wishful new age thinking and artfully contrived self-interest.”750 Another consideration
was that the document had a strong business and prosperity focus, despite the appeal to
national and cultural values, which was perceived as “to resemble a policy frontispiece
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more immoral than moral.”751
At best, it might be argued, the white paper’s authors assumed confidently that
economic contact and global integration could be deployed, gradually and with
great subtlety, as the engine of social change for the world’s less privileged. The
empirical grounds for such optimism were shaky…752
Sanger in, his article in the Toronto Star, described three key objectives outlined in the
document as a “triangle”: the promotion of Canadian jobs and prosperity, ensuring
Canada’s security, and sharing Canadian values with the world. Trade was placed in the
middle of the triangle “for culture …[was] to be used to sell our [Canadian] goods … and
security depend[ed] more on a prosperous economy than on any military muscle.” 753 He
expanded,
If Lester Pearson, Canada's greatest foreign minister, had been asked to describe
his policies in a nutshell, he might well have said, “Doing good in a dangerous
world.” His Liberal descendants, who produced their own policy statement,
“Canada in the World,” on Feb. 7, have altered the thrust with a small adverbial
change. The slogan today is “Doing well in a changing world.” Let's hope we can
live up to this slogan. The modern image of a Canadian abroad is no longer the
CUSO teacher in rural Tanzania but a hawk-eyed businessman flying off to Asia,
occasionally twisting his neck round to check on Europe.754
While concern for addressing poverty in developing countries was given a central place
in Canadian foreign policy and CIDA’s development approaches, the place of human
rights in the discourse was less prominent. The connection between the provision of
development aid being conditional on the human rights record of recipient countries was
less explicit. Keenleyside points out that until the late 1970s Canadian governments
avoided making clear references to human rights in development aid. He notes that
“[w]hen confronted with suggestions from Parliament or elsewhere that aid be made
751
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conditional on satisfactory observance of human rights, the government tended to react
negatively.”755 However, pressed with the increased concerned of interest groups and
media, the Canadian government adopted a more accepting approach towards human
rights.756 In October 1978, in his address the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don
Jamieson noted that “[h]uman-rights considerations are … a factor in determining levels
of aid and the orientation of programs. … on a few occasions when the human-rights
situation in a country has deteriorated to a stage where the effective implementation of
the aid program is made extremely difficult, Canadian assistance has been suspended or
not renewed.”757
With growing sensitivity in the 1980s to human rights conditions in recipient
countries, NGOs and churches were advancing the argument that human rights concerns
needed to be taken into account. In 1983, Canada stopped assistance to Suriname due to
human rights violations.758 Government-to-government aid was suspended after cancelled
elections in Haiti in 1987, leaving poverty centred activities channelled through NGOs.759
Keenleyside, in describing Canada’s approach notes, that “in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America where Canada … [took] punitive action, aid and other relationships were limited
… the role of rights violations was ambiguous, and Ottawa was inconsistent in treating
different states.”760 In 1987, the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on
External Affairs and International Trade chaired by Winegard produced a report
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reviewing Canada’s foreign aid.761 Under the subchapter “The Uneasy Context for Human
Rights Policy,” the report acknowledged that the issue of making aid conditional to the
human rights situation in recipient countries received prominence in the 1980s, but also
mentioned that this consideration raised uneasiness among “governments, bureaucracies,
and business.” Even with the recognition of controversies human rights considerations
could bring, the report argued that “the fear of controversy should not dictate policy.”762
However, the report cautioned that human rights conditionality must not be used
to punish and was not to be applied differently in different conditions depending whether
it was emergency humanitarian aid or longer-term commitment. But even in the latter
case when there were violations of human rights in recipient countries, a careful
consideration must be taken to avoid re-victimizing the citizens of those countries by
denying the aid. It is important to note that the report specifically underscored that, when
dealing with human rights, both CP and ESC rights had to be taken into account. It noted
that “human rights standards should not be defined too narrowly or in isolation from the
conditions for development. In keeping with the international obligations …. human
rights should encompass individual, civil and political, as well as socio-economic and
cultural rights.” Then subsequently elaborated: “[h]owever, in the broadest sense,
development itself is a human right.”763 To assess the situation with human rights in
recipient countries, the report recommended “developing a classification grid” and
suggested several criteria: (1) “human rights negative”; (2) “human rights watch”; (3)
“human rights satisfactory”; and (4) “human rights positive.” In first two instances
761
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development assistance was to be carefully weighted. The first instance of “gross and
systematic” violations of human rights in a recipient country would make it ineligible for
government-to-government aid, although NGOs working with those in need might be
able to deliver basic aid. In the second case of alleged serious violations, countries would
be eligible for aid but it would be “carefully targeted and monitored.”764
It its response to the report, the Government of Canada765 treated poverty as a
“lack of choice.”
It is lack of access – access to education, to jobs, to income, to services and to
decision-making power. Poverty is inequity of opportunities, in the distribution of
benefits of growth and in social justice.766
…
Deeply entrenched poverty and denied access to adequate shelter, health,
nutrition, education and employment prevent the attainment of these rights.
Development assistance, therefore, serves as a means for the realization of human
rights.767
Similar to the Winegard report, the response of the government asserted that
“fundamental human rights – social, political, [and] economic … [are] prerequisites for
global well-being.” 768 However, at the level of bureaucratic implementation there was
discomfort and concern that tying ODA eligibility with the human rights record could
lead to diplomatic embarrassment. There were also doubts about whether it was feasible
to operationalize human rights standards, that are general in nature, for assessment
purposes, especially to be applied in countries where CIDA operated and which had
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different legal systems, societal values, and traditions.769 The response of the government
was that,
… the establishment of a grid, and especially the classification of countries
according to such a grid, would not serve the overall interests of Canadian
development assistance or of Canadian foreign policy. The judgments implicit in
the use of such a grid are too subjective. The grid would not adequately take into
account the vast number of situations where violations of human rights are
worrisome, but where they are at the same time unequal, applying only to some
aspects of civil and political rights or to selected areas of economic, social and
cultural rights. Moreover, the impact of such a grid would be essentially punitive
and judgmental rather than positive and developmental.770
Instead of classifying countries, the preference was given to less formal and more
diplomatic means of addressing human rights violations. Though, CIDA still expressed
its commitment “to make respect for human rights a ‘top priority’ in ODA policy.”771
In CIDA’s strategy, Sharing Our Future, which followed the Wineguard report,
the title of the chapter on human rights is indicative of that tension, “Hard Choices:
Eligibility and Human Rights.” In the chapter the new approach to eligibility focused on
such concerns as “attack [on] global poverty” and “respect [of] the importance of human
rights in deciding which countries to work with.”772 While all developing countries were
declared eligible to receive development assistance,773 the strategy document indicated
that Ministers would determine five-year plans. These plans would consider, among other
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criteria, “the country’s human rights record” and “the quality of the country’s economic
and social policies, or commitment to improve its policies.”774
Significantly, the strategy document still highlighted the challenges of linking
human rights consideration with the provision of the development aid. It argued that that
Canada was “committed to integrating human rights fully into the broad sweep of
Canada’s external relations,” but emphasized that “the problems of promoting human
rights are deceptively difficult.” The strategy document called for a balanced approach
while weighing on the provision of aid to repressive regimes and the necessity of
reaching populations in those countries who were in need of assistance. It acknowledged
that,
… the Government intends to ensure that Canadian development assistance does
not lend legitimacy to repressive regimes, [but] it must also ensure that victims of
human rights violations are not doubly penalized by being deprived of needed
help in addition to being deprived of their fundamental rights.775
The strategy document proposed annual review by the Cabinet of human rights situation
in countries to determine the level and channels of the development assistance. In cases
of “violations of human rights … [were] systematic, gross and continuous” and there
were risks that the Canadian aid would not reach those in need, the approach was that
bilateral assistance would “be reduced or denied.” But the aid could still be provided
through NGOs and multilateral organizations could deliver aid to the intended recipients.
During “massive famine, epidemics or civil war,” even countries with oppressive regimes
that were not eligible for any aid would still qualify for emergency humanitarian aid.776
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But, due to expectations to apply human rights conditionality, the tension
remained. When, in 1995, Minister of Foreign Affairs André Ouellet at the meeting of
ASEAN foreign ministers asserted “that Canada would pursue trade links with
developing countries without regard to their human rights records,” his statement met
criticism from human rights activists.777 In her 2008 published study of CIDA documents,
Barrat states, “[i]n the thousands of pages of documentary evidence I examined from
CIDA, I found no instances in which a bilateral aid program was terminated solely on the
basis of human rights violations.”778 Even after the adoption of ODAAA, which made
human rights as one of eligibility criteria for ODA, the 2013 Auditor General’s report
raised the concern that spending proposals of CIDA funded projects “lack[ed] …
consideration of consistency with international human rights standards.”779
Despite challenges in bringing human rights to the forefront of Canada’s ODA
considerations, human rights were gradually mainstreamed into CIDA’s activities and
became one of its policy and programing concerns. Establishment of a human rights unit
in 1987 was among the steps to increase human rights considerations in development
assistance. In 1992, the unit was transformed into the Good Governance and Human
Rights Policy Division responsible for good governance, human rights, and democratic
development.780 In 1996, CIDA issued a Policy on Human Rights, Democratization and
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Good Governance (HRDGG).781 The policy affirmed that “Canada's interest in a more
just, more stable and more prosperous world requires that the Canadian government,
through the development assistance program, addresses rights, democracy and
governance concerns in the context of promoting sustainable development.” CIDA’s
programs are placed as essential means to ascertain Canadian values and reach the
proclaimed policy intentions. 782 The declared objectives of HRDGG policy are to
strengthen:
•

“the role and capacity of civil society in developing countries in order to increase
popular participation in decision making;

•

democratic institutions in order to develop and sustain responsible government;

•

the competence of the public sector in order to promote the effective, honest and
accountable exercise of power;”

•

the capacity of organizations that protect and promote human rights;

•

“the will of leaders to respect rights, rule democratically and govern effectively.”783

The objectives were positioned as supporting “Canadian foreign policy priorities: peace
and security, employment and prosperity, and Canadian values.” 784
However, the 2008 review of HRDGG policy conducted by CIDA’s Performance
and Knowledge Management Branch found that the interviewed staff did not see the
781
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policy as “as a useful document to guide the work of staff” and several staff members
were surprised that the policy was still in effect. Among the concerns expressed was that
there were “so many policies that … [were] associated with various governance themes
that they [staff] pay attention to none of them - thus in reality there … [was] ‘a policy
vacuum in the Agency.’” 785 Another finding was that, because governance was under the
jurisdiction of several branches within CIDA – Policy Branch, Geographic Branches,
Multilateral Branch, Canadian Partnership Branch, and the Executive Committee – the
roles and responsibilities for it were not clear. The Review highlighted that “[s]ince
governance so proliferates throughout the Agency, roles and responsibilities for it …
[were] unclear. Given that no single, central authority … [was] identified as having
responsibility for governance within CIDA, by default it seem[ed] many decisions …
[were] left to the individual and his or her branch supervisor.”786 The additional policy
strain was put on by “CIDA’s expansive policy suite.” The HRDGG policy was “one of 7
policies, 5 strategies, 2 results-chains, and numerous working papers that refer either
fully or partially to governance.” The multiplicity of policy related documents “led to
confusion of operationalizing governance policy.” The interviewed staff referred to
CIDA’s policy process “as constantly in flux whereby the focus of attention move[ed]
from theme to theme and sometimes seem[ed] more intended to solve specific
problems.”787 Due to “a disconnect between policy and practice,” there were challenges to
translating HRDGG policy language into action.788 The changes in the senior leadership
of CIDA also had a negative impact and “[t]here … [was] little technical guidance
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(people and tools) available to guide the planning of institutional and country
programming in governance.”789
The initially limited approach to human rights in Canadian international
development policies was justified mostly with claim that the primary aim of Canadian
aid was to end poverty, and the withdrawal of aid due to human rights considerations
could punish the victims of oppressive regimes.790 The same year as CIDA adopted
HRDGG policy it released its policy on poverty reduction. The policy advocates to
“address the root causes and structural factors of poverty” as a way to achieve “sustained
poverty reduction” through “improving the poor’s human and productive capacities, and
on removing barriers to their participation in society.”791 Policy interventions to remove
systemic hindrances, which included promotion and guaranteeing “property rights which
are equitable to women,” are considered as the means to address root causes of poverty.792
Among declared program strategies should be programs with the focus on poverty
reduction activities directly involving the poor. It set two criteria for a project to fall
under the declared program category: “the poor must be the specified target group (e.g.,
destitute women, rural landless); and key interventions must be designed to lead to
poverty reduction through the promotion of sustainable livelihoods and the broader
participation of the poor in society.”793
The policy acknowledges that “[t]here is no automatic link between economic
growth and poverty reduction”; nevertheless, the policy’s approach is for economic
789
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growth to contribute to poverty reduction and there should be match between the
productive capacities of the poor and labour needs in sectors which contribute to growth.
Investments into “in social sectors to meet basic needs” are vital in making economic
growth more conducive for poverty reduction efforts.794 CIDA’s Sustainable Development
Strategy 2001-2003 indicted that “CIDA's raison d'être is sustainable development” 795
and highlighted “the firm belief that poverty reduction should lie at the heart” of
Canada’s efforts.796 The document also declared poverty-reduction to be “a key element
of each … six ODA program priorities” among which were “human rights, democracy,
and good governance, … increase respect for human rights, including children's rights, …
support [of] democracy and responsible government, and … strengthen[ing of] civil
society.”797
In his speech at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien, affirmed that “[a]lleviating world poverty … [was a] common cause,”798 and in
2002 expressed Canada’s support to the Monterey Consensus as a global partnership to
contribute to commitments undertaken during the UN Millennium Summit. At the
Monterey Conference on Financing for Development he called for “[l]eaders of
developing nations … to follow policies that create a framework for sustainable
economic growth and productive private sector investment. Including a commitment to
good governance and the rule of law.”799 However, the Canadian Council for International
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Co-operation (CCIC)800 was far less supportive of the Monterey Consensus. In its letter to
the Prime Minster, CCIC expressed frustration with the outcomes of the Monterey
Consensus because of the negative impact of the policies on privatization, financial and
trade liberalization on developing countries, and their contribution to worsening the
situation with poverty and inequality. 801 CIDA’s 2002 policy statement on aid
effectiveness expressed its commitment to the Monterey Conesus. The policy statement
declared that it was going to consider several criteria in selecting the countries with
which it was going to work. Among the criteria were “[a] high level of poverty as
measured by income per capita … a commitment to development effectiveness, as
demonstrated through efforts to improve governance, ensure local ownership of poverty
reduction strategies, end corruption and make effective use of aid monies.” 802 The
countries with which CIDA was planning to be engaged under Canada Fund for Africa803
needed to “demonstrate a commitment to democracy, good governance and human
rights.”804
After the Millennium Summit, poverty reduction remained the main concern of
Canada’s development aid. In her 2001 Speech from the Throne, the Governor General of
Canada, Adrienne Clarkson, outlined that Canada’s development assistance was going to
800
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focus on poverty reduction, “strengthen[ing] democracy, justice and social stability
worldwide.”805 And as early as its 2001–2002 Departmental Performance Report (DPR)
CIDA stated its support to MDGs and four core areas—economic well-being, social
development, environmental sustainability and governance, were planned to contribute to
MDGs. 806 CIDA’s 2002 policy statement on aid effectiveness recognized that the agency
“moved to align its results framework with the … MDGs and new approaches for aid
effectiveness.” The policy statement indicated that CIDA that MDGs and “related targets
… [were] the overarching development results the Agency … [sought] to achieve.”807
CIDA’s Key Agency Results808
Millennium Development Goals

Development Results
Gender is a crosscutting theme across all development results
Economic WellBeing
Equitable
economic growth
and improved
standards of living
of the poor.

Social Development

Environmental
Sustainability and
Regeneration

Improved quality of
life of the poor
through enhanced
social services;
management of the
social impact of
reform; and progress
towards gender
equality.

Improved environmental
sustainability, through
the protection,
conservation and
management of the
diversity and the
integrity of the
environment.

805

Governance
Improved governance
structures and
institutional capacity
in partner countries;
strengthen civil
society; and enhanced
respect for rights and
democratic principles.
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Within the governance pillar, the report indicated the legal reform efforts as “a
key feature of governance programming” and among the types of initiatives mentioned
were strengthening legislature, “establishment of the rule of law,” judicial reform, human
rights, gender equality and enhancing participatory approaches to governance.809 DPR
2002–2003 highlighted that, “[s]ustainable development cannot occur if people are not
physically safe or if they do not have the resources or the access to participate in decision
making in the community” and human rights serve as “the foundation of equitable and
sustainable development.” 810 While DPR 2001–2002 put MDGs as an overarching goal,
the DPR 2002–2003 chart on CIDA’s strategic outcomes segregated poverty reduction
from MDGs and made it the ultimate goal to which MDGs would contribute with the
input from development results contributing in turn to MDGs.811
CIDA’s 2003–2004 Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) acknowledged that
many MDG targets followed international human rights obligations and commitments set
in international human rights instruments. The report also declared the intent of CIDA to
increase “integration of human rights principles in development programming” through:
•
•
•
•
•

“more clearly defined” human rights-based approaches;
“increase[d] understanding of the links between human rights and development
throughout” CIDA and with partners;
“ensur[ing] that human rights considerations continue to feature in programming and
policy documents”;
“develop new policy instruments on human rights, democracy and good governance,
which will assist CIDA to further incorporate human rights into its programming”;…
advancement of “legal and judicial reform.” 812
CIDA’s DPR 2003–2004 positioned itself as an overview of Canada’s “early
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efforts to contribute toward … [MDGs] and an accounting of Canada's contribution to the
new vision for human development” (emphasis added). It stressed that “CIDA's
development results reflect the MDG commitments, as well as Canadian contributions to
development not explicit in the MDGs, such as in governance.” The ultimate goal of
CIDA development efforts was the contribution to reaching MDGs, poverty reduction
and sustainable development.813
Poverty Reduction/Sustainable Development814

MDGs

Development Results
Economic Well-being

Social Development
Environmental Sustainability

Governance

Within DPR 2003–2004, among the initiatives in the governance area, CIDA
highlighted its support to UNDP’s activities including human rights, access to justice, as
well as “Human Rights Strengthening Programme (HURIST), a joint project of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the
UNDP aimed at implementing the UNDP's Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable
Development policy.”815 The report also expressed CIDA’s support to national human
rights institutions and contribution to strengthening institutional capacities in juvenile
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justice. As a part of the contribution to human rights, the report indicated CIDA was one
of three donors of a conference where UNDG adopted the Statement on a Common
Understanding of a Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation.816 The
report credited CIDA as a lead in the creation of a task team on human rights and
development in the OECD-DAC's Network on Governance.817
In Sustainable Development Strategy 2004–2006, CIDA reiterated MDGs “as
development targets that CIDA work[ed] to support” and its commitment to contribute to
areas not explicitly referred in MDGs – such as human rights, democracy, and good
governance – which it argued were fundamental to reaching MDGs. 818 Within the
agency’s governance priority, the following development outcomes were envisioned:
•
•
•
•
•

“Governing structures and institutions are increasingly stable, accountable,
transparent, and bound by the rule of law”;
“Transparent and representative lawmaking processes and fair, accessible and
independent legal systems that conform to internationally accepted standards”;
“Transparency and equality in the resolution of disputes, conflicts, complaints,
appeals, and redresses”;
“Strengthened legal and judicial systems that are accessible to all and that are based
on human rights’ norms and standards”;
“Strengthened promotion and protection of the human rights of women and girls in
law and in the actions of police, prosecutors, judges, and courts.” 819
CIDA’s RPP 2005–2006 based the role of governance in poverty reduction “on

the existence of sound governance structures.” It acknowledged that democratic societies
based on the rule of law not only further respect for human rights, “they also encourage
governments as well as local men, women, girls, and boys to take ownership of their
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country's development—a critical factor for both economic growth and social
development.” 820 In CIDA’s DPR 2005–2006, the declared goal of “poverty reduction,
promotion of human rights, and increased sustainable development” 821 were described as
being achieved through programing in “human rights, democratic development, the rule
of law … and public sector capacity building.”822 Canada’s role in promoting MDGs with
poverty reduction as a special focus was also seen through participation in multilateral
organizations as outlined in CIDA’s RPP 2006–2007.
As a member of the Boards of Directors and various management and policy
committees of most multilateral institutions, Canada also contributes to the MDGs
by advocating for the implementation of policies such as gender equality,
environmental sustainability, and aid effectiveness, with special emphasis on
poverty reduction mandates…823
CIDA’s DPR 2006–2007 presented the revised Program Activity Architecture (PAA)
approved by the Treasury Board in 2006, which “was developed to articulate the
Agency’s contribution to developing countries’ achievement of their development results
and, ultimately, to poverty reduction.” 824 It aimed at “[s]ustainable development to reduce
poverty in the poorest countries, measured through progress on the development goals,”
including goals related to freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, accountable
public institutions. This focus was a direct support to “Government of Canada’s strategic
outcome of global poverty reduction through sustainable development” (note: figure
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below replicates a part of the figure in the report).825
CIDA’s Program Activity Architecture

Strategic Outcomes

2006-2007
Sustainable
development to reduce
poverty in the poorest
countries, measured
through progress on the
development goals of
economic well being…
and governance

2007-2008
Increased
achievement of
development
goals consistent
with Canadian
foreign policy
objectives.

Sustained
support and
informed
action by
Canadians in
international
development.

CIDA’s approach to democratic governance was articulated as “essential for
poverty reduction” and aimed at “mak[ing] states more effective in tackling poverty by
enhancing the degree to which all people, particularly the poor and the marginalized, can
influence policy and improve their livelihoods.” Among the proposed interventions were
support to formal human rights institutions and informal legal practices that respect
human rights, promotion of impartial and effective legal systems, non-discriminatory
judicial systems.826
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CIDA and Democratic Governance 827
Elements of Democratic Governance
• Improve financial and economic
management
• Strengthen audit, statistical capacity and
human resource management
• Promote policy coordination
• Enhance transparency and anti-corruption.
• Improve service delivery, e.g. health,
energy, basic needs

• Strengthen formal human rights
institutions and mechanisms
• Support civil society, education and
accountability roles
• Realize human rights of women,
children and marginalized groups
(emphasis added)
Human Rights

• Build open and accountable political
systems: Electoral and legislative
assistance, decentralization, federalism
and local government, political parties,
and competition
• Create a democratic environment:
Media and transparency, development
of civil society, education for
democratic culture, building inclusive
societies

Freedom and
Democracy

Accountable
Public Institutions

Rule of Law

• Promote predictable, impartial, accessible,
timely, and effective legal systems
• Support independent and nondiscriminatory judicial systems
• Advance public legal education and
engagement
• Support informal legal practices that
respect human rights

In 2008, the Parliament of Canada adopted the Official Development Assistance
Accountability Act (ODAAA). ODAAA stipulated that ODA may be disbursed only if it
meets three conditions: “(a) contributes to poverty reduction; (b) takes into account the
perspectives of the poor; and (c) is consistent with international human rights
standards.”828 For years stockholders appealed to stipulate a legislative mandate of the
Canadian ODA with the hope that the act would serve as one.829 This legislation was
imperfect, as Gulrajani notes, because ODAAA does not provide a strong legal mandate
for CIDA as applied to all its activities. Not all CIDA’s activities were considered as
ODA, thus non-ODA spending part of International Assistance Envelope fell outside of
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the mandate of the Act. 830 In addition, spending under ODAAA covered activities
conducted not only by CIDA but also by other federal departments.831 The Act sets a
requirement for a relevant minister (currently the Minister of International Development)
to report on behalf of the government to Parliament on Canadian ODA spending. The
2011–2012 report on the Government of Canada's Official Development Assistance
asserted that for CIDA the promotion of democracy “is seen as a means of reducing
poverty, by enabling people to realize their own capacities and goals, and by reducing
barriers that limit people’s political participation in decision-making that affects them.” It
put poverty reduction within the frameworks of “[f]reedom, democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law” which empower people to life ‘a life of dignity’, to be engaged in
making decisions that impact their lives and to hold governments answerable for their
decisions.”832
However, the 2013 report of the Auditor General of Canada, “Report of the
Auditor General of Canada. Official Development Assistance through Multilateral
Organizations” revealed issues with the consistency of funded projects and proposals
with human rights standards.833 His assessment showed that they did not include any
“assertions about specific rights along the broad spectrum of international human rights
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standards, with the exception of gender equality.” Although it was noted that human
rights analysis was undertaken at the country program strategy development level, the
Auditor General’s finding was that “the project proposals did not address how the funded
projects would be delivered in a manner consistent with international human rights
standards.”834 But in regards to compliance with the requirement of poverty reduction, the
report found that “all project spending proposals …. examined demonstrated a clear focus
on reducing poverty as described in CIDA’s Policy on Poverty Reduction and the
Millennium Development Goals.”835 While addressing the issue whether the perspectives
of the poor were taken into account for core funding proposals,836 CIDA responded to the
Auditor General that an indicator used in assessing multilateral organizations was the
program strategy’s degree of the alignment with the development strategy of that
country’s government. In this regard, the Auditor General’s report noted that “while this
assessment provides important information at the strategic level, it provides little
information at the operational level to demonstrate how perspectives of the poor have
been considered.”837 However, the report also notes that the review of project proposals
showed that there were consultations conducted with local communities in more than half
of those projects and that “[m]ost proposals also indicated that the recipient government
had been involved.”838 The findings by the Auditor General on poverty reduction, which
834
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had occupied a central position in Canadian aid, remained the main concern despite the
challenges of involving the poor in programming.
In the 2005 publication Canada's International Policy Statement: a Role of Pride
and Influence in the World, the government declared that Canada’s efforts in governance
were going to be focused on their contribution to the MDGs, as well as to
democratization, human rights, and rule of law.839 It declared Canada’s commitment “to
extending human rights and human security throughout the world” as a foundation for
Canada’s approach to good governance. By recognizing that governance structures differ
depending on political and cultural context, the document asserted that “Canada’s
ultimate goal is to foster commitment on human rights, democracy and the rule of law
that places individual citizens at the heart of society and creates a state committed to
protecting their welfare.” 840 The policy document was short lived and after the
Conservative government assumed the office in 2006, it “lost much of its relevance.”841 In
2006, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Development undertook the analysis of Canada’s role in democracy assistance. In July
2007, it produced the report Advancing Canada’s Role in International Support for
Democratic Development. Reflecting on the report, Schmitz writes,
[t]aking into account familiar concerns about association with discredited US
ideological rhetoric on democracy promotion - mainly aversion to the muchcriticized “freedom agenda” of President George W. Bush - the Committee report
took pains to elaborate a distinctively independent Canadian approach and to
acknowledge the complexities of the enterprise (including a focus on contextspecific analysis, learning from the lessons of comparative experience, local
839
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ownership, better implementation and evaluation).842
The first recommendation of the report called for support of democracy with a focus on
“the system of governance as a whole,” on international human rights – including socioeconomic and cultural rights – as well as on “the full participation of citizens, including
the most disadvantaged, in the processes of democracy.”843 Among the cited opinions in
support of a broader conception of democracy building were ones that evoked Sen’s
approach to development. The report highlighted that the position among development
organizations and practitioners was to integrate advancement of democracy with “the
overall development and poverty reduction process.” It evoked the speech by Hilary
Benn, the UK’s Secretary of State for International Development, who acknowledged
that,
Development, if it is to mean anything has also to be about what Sen calls the
“freedoms to”: the freedom to choose- to choose people to represent your views;
the freedom to make your views heard; to associate freely with others; to join a
political party or a trade union; the freedom to worship and practice your own
religion. If you ask poor people, they’ll tell you how much these things mean to
them.844
Roel von Meijenfeldt, from the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, brought
up similar points while speaking in Canada in January 2007:
Amartya Sen was one of the first to challenge the old paradigm that countries
have to develop economically first before they become fit for democracy with a
new paradigm that countries become fit (economically speaking) through
842
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democracy.845
However, among the witnesses who expressed scepticism on the possibilities of
democratization in low-income countries, Professor Diane Éthier argued,
For more than 50 years now, all theories on democracy have supported the view
that democracy cannot flourish in a poor and underdeveloped country. This means
that socioeconomic development and democratization cannot be achieved
simultaneously, as democratization is born of socio-economic development. I
believe experts would say that if you want to help countries become democracies,
first help them achieve economic and social development, and later you will be
able to focus on establishing democratic political institutions.846
Contribution to judicial reform was recommended by the witnesses as one of the areas
where Canada’s experience could be an added value in democracy building. In their
submission to the Committee, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) recommended that
Canada’s contribution to the promotion of the rule of law involve “all elements of a legal
system.” 847 But in its recommendation on strategic engagement, CBA’s submission
cautioned against legal transplantation “[a]s the failed law and development movement of
the 1960s proved.” The submission rightly pointed out that, while in many countries the
majority of ordinary people—if they even utilized the formal system—accessed the
justice system at the lower court levels, “the majority of justice system aid goes into
Supreme Courts, law ministries and other places which have little or no impact on the
lives of the poor and disadvantaged.”848 In the submission, however, it was also noted that
Canada’s expertise in the following areas could be valuable in building democracy and
845
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rule of law: “bi-juridical legal system (common law and civil law)[,] … participatory
civil and criminal justice reform, land registry and aboriginal title issues, and restorative
justice.”849 In her testimony, Professor Mahoney stressed the role the judiciary could play
in democracy building. She shared,
I think we’re seeing that the recipient countries are far more aware of how
critically important the judiciary is, not just in the courtroom to dispense justice,
but in developing public confidence in democracy. They’re seeing the judiciary as
an arm of it that must be developed along with governance structures in the
mainstream.850
In its “dissenting report”, included in the overall report by the House of Commons
Standing Committee, the opinion of the Bloc Québécois was that, when involved in
promoting democracy, the democratic countries needed to show that they did not “control
another country, or defend their own interests.” Rather, the efforts should be to assist
people to control “their own destiny and creat[e] the institutions that will, little by little,
ensure them democratic governance

through justice, police, human rights, free

elections.” Among the questions raised were “What intervention has been useful, in what
conditions? [and] Are such conditions exportable?” In responding to the US experts’
opinion that Canada could play a role in democracy promotion, especially taking into
account failures of the US efforts, the Bloc’s response was,
Would it not be timely to point out that the success of Canadian intervention
appears to hinge on respect for the democratic approach adopted by the people of
the country being helped, which is very unlike the American and British invasion
of Iraq?851
849
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Within the democracy building framework, the Bloc’s position was to exercise caution
when deciding on which activities to focus the development assistance and be conscious
of history, including the history of political and economic colonization. They reminded
parliament that,
[i]t is often the case for the people in Arab/Muslim countries: they associate
democracies with the countries that supported and still support authoritarian
leaders who remain in power thanks to force, to torture and to corruption. Before
the invasion of Iraq, American leaders were certain that Iraqis would thank them
for rescuing them from Saddam Hussein. The Iranians recall that their own
authentic democratic revolution, under the leadership of Mossadegh, was brought
to a halt in 1953 by the coup d’état fomented by the CIA and the British secret
services, who joined forces to prevent Iran from controlling its own oil.852
The Bloc also brought up the experience of African countries, where “charismatic
postcolonial leaders eliminated by the former colony’s military” and where Western
corporations exploited natural resources “with impunity and support authoritarian
leaders.” As they summarized, “[t]he governments of emerging democracies have often
tried to exert control over their resources, only to run.”853
The New Democratic Party’s (NDP) dissenting opinion on the report was critical
that “no concrete recommendations” were provided on how to meet “Canada’s
international commitments to provide for the basic economic and social rights of the
world’s poorest populations.” It argued that,
[t]he development of healthy democracies cannot be separated from a
comprehensive human rights framework. The Standing Committee report largely
ignores this critical link between the social and economic rights of the poor and
democratic development, and does not offer a single recommendation to the
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government to address these issues in its woefully deficient current development
aid policy.854
When elaborating on link between deprivation of basic economic and social rights
and deficiencies in effective governance and civic engagement, the NDP emphasized that
“[s]ecurity of the person, poverty reduction, sanitation, basic health services,

and

educational opportunity, are fundamental human rights that must be met if communities
and individuals are to engage constructively in democratic processes.”
While acknowledged in the report with reference to “the full range of
international human rights - including socio-economic and cultural rights,”
(Recommendation 1), the subsequent recommendations are unacceptably silent on
this critical interrelationship. The Standing Committee report fails to provide
concrete guidance for how these related issues should be incorporated into the
heart of Canadian development policy practice. The report acknowledges that
democratic development cannot be effectively pursued in the absence of these
social and economic rights. Yet, the NDP’s repeated attempts to amend the report
to include these key considerations were rejected.855
And as Forsythe and Heinze point out, although Canada views itself “as playing a
constrictive role” in development and identifying social and economic roots of “of
various problems such as political instability,” those issues have seldom been “framed in
the discourse of internationally recognize welfare rights.”856
The Committee’s report also addressed programing concerns, such as a lack of
coherence in democratic assistance, including within the donor countries. Weighing on
the issue of policy coherence, Ian Smillie, of Partnership Africa-Canada called for a
balanced approach.
Some critics of Canada’s approach to governance lament the absence of coherent
854
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policies tying all aspects of the agenda together. A patchy, project-by-project
approach with no obvious central policy and no central management, they say, is
unlikely to yield coherent results. This may be true, but given the overwhelming
size of the governance agenda, and the limited track record in its promotion by
any donor, healthy doses of humility and caution are warranted… Given the
complexity of the challenge, a case can be made for selective interventions in
concert with other donors, aimed at learning what works and what does not.857
Programing and operational concerns were also among the issues raised in the 2009
report by Canada’s Auditor General on aid effectiveness. It indicated that the “lack of
clear direction and action plans, coupled with broadly defined and shifting priority
sectors” hindered CIDA in “making a more meaningful Canadian contribution in a
country or region by focusing its aid more narrowly.”858 The report further specified,
“CIDA has been operating in an ever-shifting environment for many years, with changes
to government policy objectives, emphasis on geographic orientation, priority sectors,
and budget allocations.”859 Carin and Smith called CIDA a “victim of a system that has
too many ‘masters’” being pulled by different interests groups that wanted issues of their
concern to be prioritized. In addition, the government imposed “multi-dimensional
operational constraints on CIDA’s freedom of action.” Their description of the latter
point written in the article was,
The minister responsible for CIDA [was] an oft-shuffled “junior” minister,
usually with relatively little influence in cabinet. Until recently, the Finance and
Foreign Affairs departments dictated policy with respect to the bulk of our
multilateral funding. Today the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy Council
Office appear to have great influence. The Finance Department still holds the
whip hand over Canadian contributions and policy advice to the multilateral
857
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development banks.860
The 2009 Auditor General’s report also underscored that among the issues CIDA faced
was the high turnover of its senior managers. It noted that, “[i]n its Geographic Programs
Branch, since 2002, the average … [was] about 30 percent per year, and, in the Policy
Branch (which develops policy for the Agency), it has been about 45 percent.”861 In
addition, “[s]ince 2000, five different ministers of International Cooperation and four
different Agency presidents … led CIDA” and the “significant turnover” in senior
management became a “challenge to providing a stable operating environment.” 862
Frequent changes in CIDA’s senior management had a negative effect, as did what
Brown describes as “pet priorities” and micromanagement of aid programs imposed by
different CIDA ministers. Among the other issues that strained CIDA’s operations Brown
indicates that “[t]he Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office overruled
decisions made by development experts at CIDA, including which Canadian NGOs to
fund - and which to punish for being critical of the government.” This in turn led to
challenges “for CIDA officials to fulfill CIDA's poverty reduction mandate.”863 By 2006,
in their study of Canadian foreign aid, Goldfarb and Tapp also state that, despite CIDA’s
declared mandate of poverty reduction, CIDA was not fair in its efforts and was
“criticized for ineffective policies and a lack of leadership.”864
The 2013 Conservative government budget announced the merger of CIDA with
860
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DFAIT. The justification presented was that “enhanced alignment of … foreign,
development, trade and commercial policies and programs will allow the Government to
have greater policy coherence on priority issues and will result in greater overall impact
of our efforts.” Poverty alleviation remained a goal of international development.865
Proponents of the merger felt it better met the interests of Canada and offered more
policy

coherence.

Yet

in

2004,

Canadian

Council

for

International

Co-

operation/Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty acknowledged in a briefing paper
that the merger of CIDA with the Department of Foreign Affairs might lead to policy
coherence in Canada’s relation with developing countries, but that “option would bring
coherence at the expense of Canada’s commitments to poverty eradication and the
MDGs.”866 Therefore, development experts and practitioners were wary of the change that
happened in 2013. As Brown points out,
Even as a semi-independent agency, CIDA had trouble maintaining policy
autonomy and a focus on poverty reduction. Former CIDA Minister Bev Oda and
her successor Julian Fantino saw their mandate as including the promotion of
Canadian commercial interests, especially those of mining companies. Assurances
that the merger will benefit developing countries are not credible. Diplomacy and
trade will continue to trump development, and the government will find it easier
to hijack aid funds, especially now that the new legislation requires that aidrelated decisions obtain more explicitly the "concurrence" of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs … As long as the Canadian government lacks the will to set aside
short-term, narrowly defined self-interest and to prioritize fighting poverty and
inequality in developing countries, no amount of administrative fiddling will
make much of a difference.867
It should, however, be noted that though Canada’s international development activities
were marred by programing and operational challenges and issues were raised on its
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priorities, the Canadian public has generally been supportive of foreign aid. Silvio
acknowledges that the public opinion reflected the policy contexts, as for example lower
levels of support in mid-1990s, but he also argues that “[o]ver time, Canadian attitudes
towards development assistance have not varied, especially when compared to Canadian
aid policy.”868 The 2004 survey conducted by Environics Research Group found that the
majority of Canadians—78%—were supportive of Canada’s aid program.869 In the 2007
survey by Innovative Research Group, 70% respondents expressed that Canada had an
obligation to help poor countries. And the 2006 poll by the North–South Institute which
asked “should Canada increase its official development assistance (ODA) to 0.7 percent
of GNI by 2015?” showed that 53% responded positively and only 5% were against,
while 42% wanted the government to commit to achieving this goal before 2015.870 The
2013 report from Canada’s Auditor General, responding to “Why it’s important”,
elaborates that “Canadian aid is important to people living in poverty around the world. It
plays a key role in the future of Canadian security and prosperity. It also makes a
significant contribution to establishing Canada’s place internationally and promoting
Canadian values.”871
Canada’s ODAAA also put forth the purpose of ensuring “all Canadian official
development assistance abroad” provided “is consistent with Canadian values.”872 The
promotion of Canadian values had been centrally positioned in the Government’s policy
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documents and was also frequently referenced in CIDA’s reports. The 1995 foreign
policy statement, Canada in the World, indicated the “projection of Canadian values and
culture” as a key objective, important for Canada’s success in the world. The values of
“respect for democracy, the rule of law, [and] human rights” were stated to be important
not only in “the struggle for international security” but also because their adaptation was
“essential to ensuring that they … [were] viable” in Canada. It continued,
[v]itality of our [Canadian] culture is also essential to our [Canada’s] economic
success. In the new knowledge-based world economy, the skills of people, their
education, ingenuity and social adaptability, will become key elements of
international advantage. Our educational system, cultural diversity and continued
dynamic growth in exports of cultural products and services will contribute
significantly to our achievement internationally.873
CIDA’s Departmental Performance Reports affirmed that “Canada’s aid program …
provides a concrete expression of values that Canadians cherish: compassion for the less
fortunate, democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.”874 DPR 2003–2004
stated that through development assistance Canada, in cooperation with governments in
developing countries, other donors, and multilateral organizations took a leadership role
in the “development of policies, programs, and activities that reflect Canadian values.”875
Canada's International Policy Statement (2005) had numerous references to Canadian
values.
Commenting on the key focus on Canadian values, Brown writes that it
“reinforce[s] the idea that Canadians have a special contribution to make, even an
inherent moral superiority, and it seeks to use Canadians’ national pride to assure their
873
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support.” However, what was referred to as Canadian values was not based on
“consensus that the drafters of the IPS would have readers believe. Even if Canadians
agree on the desirability of the goals of global citizenship, equity, and environmental
sustainability, they often disagree on the means to achieve them.”876 Therefore, I agree
with Liebich who indicated that “[i]n governance, in human rights and justice sector
reform … [the] starting point [should be] international human rights principles.” Human
rights instruments that are signed and ratified can serve as entry points.877 Nevertheless,
Member of Parliament Andrew Saxton, in his 2010 speech, asserted that human rights are
“a core Canadian value.”
We cannot talk about international development without thinking about the
context of human rights. …We recognize that Canadians expect their government
876
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to be a leader in the field of human rights by reflecting and promoting Canadian
values, including democracy and the rule of law on the international stage.878
Poverty reduction remained the foundational focus of Canada’s international
development agenda from the inception of CIDA’s activities. With the adoption of
MDGs, poverty reduction was singled out and placed as an ultimate goal towards which
CIDA’s development results were programmed to contribute. Furthermore, in 2008,
ODAAA made contribution to poverty reduction a legally mandated requirement for the
provision of the Canadian official development assistance. CIDA’s programing
architecture adopted a multidimensional view of poverty reduction intervention areas;
among these areas were rule of law and human rights. Although human rights were not
among the main concerns of CIDA’s initial activities, from the late 1990s they featured
more prominently in policy documents by the government of Canada and CIDA. Even
with the acknowledgment that MDGs did not implicitly refer to human rights, human
rights and rule of law under governance development were presented as integral
components in CIDA’s policy documents, reports, and program architecture; leading to
the achievement of MDGs in general and poverty reduction specifically.
The promotion of human rights and democratic principles were also seen as a
reflection of Canadian values and a means of advancing social justice for the poor in
developing countries. There might be a divergence in defining Canadian values and
whether and how they have to be advanced; however, even with the drawbacks that exist
in Canada, the promoted concept of “Canadian values” still conveys the image of Canada
as a state with functioning democratic processes, rule of law, and mechanisms available
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to protect human rights. These are regarded as principles essential in contributing to the
prosperity of a country and providing opportunities for people to thrive. If promoted and
adapted, these principles can contribute to the establishment and development of societies
and institutions that provide similar outcomes for its people as Canada provides for its
citizens.
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12 JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES SUPPORT PROJECT (JURIS)879
While being designed as a judicial reform support project, JURIS positioned itself
as an actor in efforts to reduce poverty and contribute to sustainable development in the
Philippines. Within its expected project impact, JURIS put a strong emphasis on
improving access to justice for the poor. It was envisioned that this improvement be
achieved by focusing on both the supply side of justice (duty-bearers) through the
provision of socially responsive judicial education, and the demand side (rights-holders)
by building the capacities of non-governmental organizations to facilitate access by the
poor; including by sharing information with the poor to empower them. Access to justice
was the primary aim of the project, however, the analyzed documents show that either the
organization that implemented the project or the evaluators were trying to grapple with
the concept. The issues raised were greater than the physical access to courts, costs and
timeliness of decisions, and were instead concerned with the capacities of justice sector
actors to deliver justice, power imbalance between litigants, and the fairness of decisions
reached.
JURIS was a CIDA supported project (2003–2010) aimed at supporting the
Action Program for Judicial Reform (APJR) of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in
response to the Court’s appeal “to aid … in its reform agenda.”880 Although CIDA viewed
the project being focused on the judicial sector, “the APJR provided entry points to
advancing its poverty reduction mandate.” It also saw the project “as a “vehicle for
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pursuing broader development goals while responding to a specific request from the
GOP.”881 Moreover, the reform initiatives of the Supreme Court were regarded “as timely,
relevant and uncommonly progressive given the judiciary’s institutional culture and
history.”882 According to the end of project evaluation report, the broad goal of the reform
initiative to which the project intended to contribute was “a judiciary that is independent,
effective, efficient and worthy of public trust and confidence”. The APJR focused on:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

“Improving judicial systems … [and] procedures
Institutional development
Human resource development, including legal ... [and] judicial education
Enhancing reform support systems
Developing institutional integrity
Improving access to justice by the poor”883
The APRJ project planned to achieve: “1. [i]mproved access to timely,

convenient, affordable and fair judicial services, specially to the poor and marginalized
groups; 2. [i]mproved knowledge of available judicial services and legal remedies,
especially by the poor and marginalized groups; and 3. [i]mproved public confidence in
the judicial system.”884 The project aimed at “contributing to poverty reduction in the
Philippines through equitable, sustainable development”885 and its objective was “[t]o
foster efficient, fair, responsive, transparent and accountable governance at all levels.”886
The expected impact was “[a] strengthened and gendered-responsive justice system with
improved access to justice by the poor and marginalized.” 887 In Mendoza’s words,888 “the
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project afford[ed] CIDA a significant platform in addressing poverty reduction and
gender equality.”889
Project Goal, Objective Impact and Indicators (final approved version 21 November,
2005)890
The JURIS Project Goals
To contribute to poverty reduction in the Philippines through equitable, sustainable
development
Strategic Objective
To foster efficient, fair, responsive, transparent and accountable governance at all levels
Impact level
It seeks to achieve a strengthened and gender-responsive justice system with improved
access to justice by the poor and marginalized
Impact indicators
•
•
•
•

Increasingly positive evaluation by stakeholders of the quality, effectiveness and
gender responsiveness of justice reforms
General awareness of the varieties of avenues for redress of grievances, whether
individual or against the justice system
Replication of successful ADR Model Court processes in other courts
Approval by the Supreme Court of a change in the Rules of Court making ADR
mandatory in all courts
JURIS consisted of three components: 1) judicial education and training; 2)

alternative dispute resolution (ADR); and 3) reform advocacy. The first component on
judicial education and training was intended to “improve capacity of the … Philippine
Judicial Academy [PHILJA] to deliver effective, gender-sensitive and socially responsive
judicial education and training in support of judicial reform and access to justice
888
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including court- annexed mediation (CAM) and judicial dispute resolution (JDR) on a
sustainable basis.” The second component on ADR focused on enhancing the capacity of
courts in model sites to provide “effective court-annexed mediation and judicial dispute
resolution services on sustainable basis.” The third component on reform advocacy on
improving the capacity of the ALG coalition to “effectively manage and coordinate legal
reform advocacy for improving the quality of judicial services and access to justice by
poor and marginalized groups.”891
In the final evaluation report of the research on the access to justice component,
Social Weather Stations noted that in APJR “access to justice by the poor … [was]
understood to include: physical access to the courts, as well as speedy and fair
adjudication of cases for all; protection of the poor from abuse by those who claim to
influence judicial decisions; improvement of the affordability of judicial services to the
poor.” But it further notes that “since access to justice is not only limited to access to the
courts, these factors apply to other channels for obtaining justice” (e.g. “adjudication
bodies of executing agencies”), Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
National Labour Relations Commission, Environmental Management Bureau. 892 The
research framework, Access to Justice and Effectiveness of ADR Approaches, from the
National Judicial Institute’s (NJI) 2006–2007 Annual Report,893 tried to operationalize
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both “access” and “justice” of the term. 894 It specified the access availability of
mechanisms and in terms of time and cost effectiveness utilizing CAM/JDR by litigants
in settling disputes.895 It was concerned with whether the mediation was conducted “in an
open and informal setting” and with “the capability of judges, mediators and court
personnel in CAM/JDR contributed to the litigants’ attainment of justice.” Justice as
applied in the project denoted,
… ‘justness’ of the settlement, i.e., whether the agreement reflect a ‘moral’ or fair
(?) resolution of the case in the light of neutralizing power imbalance inherent in
cases that involve men/women, landlord/tenant, employer/employee,
corporate/individual; the differential impact of the mediation on women and small
business; and, the compliance on settled cases. Justness/fairness is also manifested
in the mediation process particularly in relation to neutralizing power imbalance
between two parties.896
ACCESS

Time and
Cost of
Mediation

TO

Mechanisms that
facilitate one’s pursuit
for justice (CAM/JDR)

JUSTICE

Outcome of Mediation
Justness/Fairness

Stern in his comment on the objective of the project to improve the quality of judicial
services and access to justice by the poor and marginalized raised the question “[W]hat
exactly … [was] meant by reference to ‘access and quality of justice’”. He argued that
both terms were interconnected and “relate to fairness of outcomes.”
That is, it is not enough that the poor and marginalized should have their “day in
court”, so to speak, but the procedures should render a just outcome. If a decision
is not just, it would be hard to argue that the mere presence of an individual at a
894
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hearing constituted access to justice.897
While reflecting on the project’s intention to address access to justice, Mendoza points
out “[a]ccess to justice is not a concept that is commonly understood.” If all partners in
the project agreed on a common understanding of the concept it would mitigate the
ambiguity. However, because it was not done at the inception stage of the project, it led
to
…a less well-defined PIP [Project Implementation Plan], and consequently, a
deficient LFA [Logical Framework Analysis]. As a result, access to justice wasn’t
given primary importance in the early stages of the project. Instead much of the
thinking, strategizing, operationalization and monitoring was focused on
declogging of the court dockets.898
The project’s final narrative report indicated that the poor and marginalized were
the direct beneficiaries and that the project focused on their needs “for better access to
justice.” 899 The report further elaborated that “[t]he poor and marginalized …[were]
directly impacted both by the reforms advocated by the ALGs, as well as the mediation
and JDR programs installed by the Court.”900 As the project’s evaluation report assessed
the “welfare of the poor vis a vis the law and the judicial system … [was] preeminent
throughout the project.”901 The report (research) by Social Weather Stations on the access
to justice by the poor, reflecting on the focus group discussions, noted that the most
frequently referenced impacts of ALGs’ activities in empowering the poor and
marginalized through education were ones aimed “directly to poor and marginalized
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groups” and also involving “the capacity building of paralegals, police, social workers …
through information dissemination and training, and transfer of technical expertise.” The
report recapped that “[a]lmost all participants commended the ALGs in their efforts to
empower the poor and marginalized groups in accessing justice by educating them of
their rights, and of key substantive laws and legal procedures that affect their access to
justice.”902
The duty-bearers – “justice actors” – targeted by the project were judges, court
personnel, prosecutors, lawyers, and mediators. By employing the HRBA language, the
project’s final narrative report describes these groups as “the duty bearers, the carriers of
the seeds of hope in … justice system.”903 Under Project Rationale and Justification, the
narrative report states:
The Supreme Court, PHILJA and the courts are all providers of the justice
system. Their main task is the speedy, impartial and efficient dispensation or
administration of justice, and they belong to the supply side of the justice
equation.
The ALGs on the other hand, together with their constituencies, which are
organizations of poor and marginalized communities, like peasants, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous communities and the like, are seen more as claimants to
the justice system. They belong to the demand side of the justice system. They
propose reforms and expect continuous improvements in the … so that the public
good of justice would be accessible to all.904
The report (research) by Social Weather Stations on the access to justice by the poor
brought up the point by the focus group participants that, in order to enhance access to
justice, the improvements in substantive laws should be accompanied by “improvements
in procedural aspects so that these laws could be properly and effectively enforced.”
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Among the issues shared by the focus group participants that hindered the access to
justice for the poor and marginalized were expenses. Court fees and transportation costs,
challenges for “pauper litigants to provide sufficient documentary evidence that they …
[were] really poor” or the requirement for the litigants to have proper clothing and
identification were all barriers to access to justice. As a participant noted on the latter
point, “It is totally unacceptable to expect people from rural areas to wear shoes, or to
have IDs, so that they could go inside the Hall of Justice.”905
At the same time, the research revealed that participants perceived ADR as
improving justice for poor “because it equalizes the access to justice to the poor and the
rich” and JDR was viewed as “a more effective way of dispute resolution because the
judge acts as the mediator, and decides on the case primarily on the cause of conflict and
not solely on the merits of the case.”906 However, the project’s mid-term evaluation report
raised a concern that ADRs and JDRs were used also by the financial and lending
institutions in so called BP 22 cases to collect money with minimum time and lesser
costs. This in turn raised a question “How does this square with the project assumption
that ‘court-annexed mediation can neutralize the power imbalance between the
poor/marginalized and the more powerful litigants.’”907 In the first annual report 2003–
2004, NJI mentioned that,
One type of case that is fuelling the case load is BP 22 cases in which criminal
charges are laid for dishonoured cheques. The civil aspects of these cases (the
actual payment of the amount of the cheques) are within the scope of mediatable
cases. The criminal law is clearly being used as a ‘hammer’ to settlement of the
civil obligation. There is significant concern on the part of justice advocates about
905
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this law. It appears to have a disproportionate effect on the poor and women in
particular. This has created a risk in the project that mediation of these cases will
simply entrench the effects of a bad or unjust law and not result in substantively
better outcomes.908
The 2006 mid-term evaluation report highlighted that “Specific performance/Sum of
Money with Damages and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg 22 (the so called Bouncing
Check Law)” was widely perceived to harm women because of “the statistical evidence
that the majority of defendants …[were] women and while the majority of plaintiffs …
[were] men.” The report also noted that BP 22 constituted the “majority of cases referred
by the courts to mediation in … JURIS model projects sites.” It indicated that even the
report by the APJR of the Supreme Court of the Philippines recognized that the law was
contributing to the problems with the backlog of court cases. 909 Among Stern’s
recommendations to deal with the possible bias against the poor, especially women, was
to address the issue of fees for mediation and enforce an “additional penalty in BP 22
cases for the criminal charge.” 910 The reason being, according to Stern, that contingency
fees, which represented a “proportion of the contested amount … payable whether or not
the mediation … [was] successful,” affected the poor women’s ability to have
representation by counsel. In addition, the requirement by a court to present a brief before
the mediation – though it was examined only if the mediation failed – put a heavier
burden on the poor.911
The issue of the high court fees was also raised by the focus group participants for
the research conducted by Social Weather Stations and suggested “strengthen[ing] the
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modes of alternative resolution so that the poor and marginalized groups would have
easier access to justice.” 912 In the meantime, participants raised the importance of
financing the judiciary. As the research noted,
With limited budget, it would be impossible for the judiciary to cater to the justice
needs of the people, especially the poor and the marginalized groups. Due to
budget constraints, there is a shortage of PAO [Public Attorney Office] lawyers
(already swamped with many cases of poor litigants) and judges, and lack to
adequate court facilities. According to the … participants, this lack of adequate
budget for the judiciary partly contributes to the inability or difficulty of the poor
and marginalized groups to access justice.913
Furthermore, as Mendoza in the end of project evaluation report emphasized, “[t]he
judiciary has a role to play in poverty alleviation and it needs to better appreciate this
role,” while its impact can be stronger by a partnership that includes civil society.914
In its project vision, JURIS viewed the judiciary and justice sector actors as being
a part of the process that contributes to poverty reduction. By building the capacities of
duty-bearers to deliver justice the project aimed to make justice accessible to the poor and
responsive to their needs. The project interpreted justice as an outcome which neutralizes
power imbalances between litigants. As the research by Social Weather Stations showed,
focus group participants considered ADR a way of equalizing the power imbalance and
addressing the causes of the dispute – rather than adjudicating solely on the details of the
case.
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13 GHANA LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT
The project envisioned that improvements in land administration would contribute
to equitable registration of land rights. The rationale was that securing access to land and
land rights would promote investments in agriculture and contribute to income because, if
land rights were protected, that would make land a more attractive investment.
Additionally, secure land rights would increase the value of land to be used in diverse
financial transactions (e.g. collateral for loans). The outcome would be socio-economic
growth and a reduction in poverty. Among the strategies to achieve the project results
were the harmonization of the legal framework governing land administration and
creation of land courts, as well as making land administration services affordable.
However, in the project related document, there was an acknowledgement that the rate of
HIV/AIDS could negatively affect tenure rights and potential investments in land.
Widows and orphans from households affected by HIV/AIDS were at risk of losing
access to land to stronger relatives or due to inheritance passed through a male linage.
While not specifically addressing the issue of the HIV/AIDS impact on widows and
orphans, the project approval document particularly emphasized the importance of
securing land rights for women so they had access to land and were able use it for
production and income.
Ghana’s Land Administration Project (LAP) was a multi-year initiative (2003–
2009) to which CIDA contributed as one of the donors and World Bank being the
executing agency.915 The project aimed to address serious issues that existed in land
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activities indicated above are what is shown on CIDA’s official website http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/projen/A031898001 However, Project Performance Assessment Report (2013)
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administration in Ghana, especially in urban and peri-urban areas, which were the source
of conflict and created obstacles for “development and economic growth of the
economy.” The project also recognized the growth in uncertainties and issues with land
ownership of customary land holdings in rural areas.916 According to the World Bank’s
project appraisal document, farmers who tended the land outside their native area did it
under “various forms of [undocumented] tenancy arrangements with their hosts” which
were prone to unilateral changes by landlords or chiefs. Such arrangements were often
sources of conflicts and confrontations. Although a significant number of women were
involved in farming, their land rights were not “clearly defined and documented.” As a
result, changes in their family status or when the “land shortage … [became] acute” they
faced the possibility of being dispossessed. The project appraisal document also noted
that,
Land litigation and the threat of violence on disputed lands discourage[d]
domestic and international investors who … [sought] land for development. The
provision of secure titles to land would facilitate orderly and legal acquisition of
land for development either by outright purchase or long-term lease thus enabling
land to serve as collateral for credit to improve and develop land. 917
It specified that a focus should be on northern areas of the country where “the rural poor
constitute the larger percentage of the population.” 918 CIDA’s Project Approval
Document (PAD) stated that the project would “help promote new investment in
agricultural productivity and income, by reducing land conflicts and clarifying landstates, “the credit was approved on July 31, 2013 and became effective on October 13, 2003. The project
was restructured … on November 7, 2008. The operation closed on June 30, 2011, 30 months later than
initially expected.” Independent Evaluation Group/ World Bank, “Project Performance Assessment Report
Ghana Land Administration Project. (Credit No. 3817; Project ID P071157),” vii.
916
Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) # GH-A31898 Book, “Memorandum. Subject: Approval- Land Administration Project,” 4.
917
World Bank, “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 15.1 Million
(US$20.5 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Ghana for a Land Administration Project,” 11–12.
918
Ibid.
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ownership.” The PAD envisioned that the project would “enhance social and economic
growth” and aid poverty reduction by “improving access to land and improving land
tenure security.” The assumption was that it would lead to “an increased willingness to
invest in land due to improved land tenure security, an increase in household incomes and
reduction of poverty in pilot areas.” The PAD underlined that “women’s access and
control over resources,” through proper documentation, could facilitate their access to
formal crediting and lead to investment opportunities. The PAD asserted that the project
would help Ghana in achieving “equitable, sustainable poverty reduction.” As it noted,
By increasing security of land tenure for both rural and urban resident, the project
is a direct compliment to CIDA’s program for Food Security in Northern Ghana,
which is itself grounded in CIDA’s Social Development Priorities. Improved land
tenure supports CIDA’s Gender policy, which identifies women’s access to and
control over food production resources, of which land is of primary importance as
a strategic point for attaining gender equality. The LAP also contributed to
improved governance in Ghana’s land sector.919
The expected outcome of the project was the improvement in “governance of the
land administration system, the development of systematic land documentation,” as well
as a decrease in land conflicts “between individuals and between customary tenure
authorities.”920 Among the inputs to decrease poverty and increase income outlined in the
project logical framework were the harmonization of the legislative framework and
establishment of the land court system. It also dwells on participatory land administration
system with a focus on equal rights between men and women. The reduction in litigation
over land was proposed to contribute to “the fair, efficient… [and] cost effective” land
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Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) # GH-A31898 Book, “Memorandum. Subject: Approval- Land Administration Project,” 2.
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Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) # GH-A31898 ibid. see also Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project
(LAP) # GH-A-31898 ibid., 4.
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administration system and to land tenure security. It was expected that improvements in
land administration, tenure security, harmonized land laws, and the establishment of the
land court system would lead to a rise in land investments, as well as an increase in
incomes and decrease of poverty in areas of the project’s activities.921
Project Goal (Program
Objective)922

Impact

Enhance economic and social Increased willingness to
growth and reduce poverty by invest in land due to
improving access to land and land improved tenure security
tenure security

Performance
Indicators
… increase in
investment, leading to
more production and
employment

Increase in household
incomes and reduction in
poverty in pilot areas

… income increase

Project Purpose

Outcomes

Performance
Indicators

Development of a sustainable and
decentralized land administration
system which is fair, efficient,
cost effective … [and]
accountable, resulting in increase
in land tenure security

Improvement in
governance of the land
administration system,
leading to efficient and
equitable documentation
of land rights…

Reduction of
corruption in delivery
of land services
…
Traditional land
authorities adopt
participatory and
inclusive land
administration
systems in pilot areas,
respecting women’s

921

Annex D. LAP Logical Framework Analysis Book, “Memorandum. Subject: Approval- Land
Administration Project.”
922
Replicates most of the table in Annex D. LAP Logical Framework Analysis ibid. (Source: Global
Affairs Canada). Quotation marks are not used for the convenience of reading. According to the Project
Performance Assessment Report Ghana Land Administration Project by the World Bank, in 2008 there
were revisions in the results framework, however, in the absence of the relevant documents provided by
CIDA through the access to information request to corroborate the information, only LFA in the documents
provided by CIDA were analyzed. (Independent Evaluation Group/ World Bank, “Project Performance
Assessment Report Ghana Land Administration Project. (Credit No. 3817; Project ID P071157),” 14.)
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and men’s rights to
land
Systematic land
documentation in urban,
peri-urban and rural areas

Reduced conflict over land
between customary tenure
authorities in pilot areas

Sustainable, self-financing
system developed for land
administration
….

Outputs

Harmonized policy and
legislative framework
…
Creation of land court
system
…

Land documentation
that protects the
interests of all men
and women with a
legitimate claim to
land
Reduction in land
litigation cases in pilot
areas … [and]
increase in number of
customary areas with
secure boundary
demarcations
….
Cost of land services
accessible to public
…
Performance
Indicators
Laws passed and
regulations in place
and functional;
…
Functional land courts
in each region
…

The PAD paid special attention to the connection between HIV/AIDS and land
rights. It highlighted that “HIV/AIDS directly affects land rights.” While stating the
complexities involved in determining the causality between HIV/AIDS and poverty, the
document noted,
The presence and frequency of HIV/AIDS may make individuals and
communities reluctant to invest in conservation and preservation of natural capital
such as biodiversity, community water and land resources that require long term
253

investments. The land rights of widows and orphans tend to be lost where land is
registered in a man’s name, or is inherited through the male line. Holdings of
HIV/AIDS-affected households become depleted as land is grabbed by more ablebodied relatives or sold-off to cover hospital or funeral costs. 923
Additionally, the document acknowledged that this issue was not mentioned in either
government’s document or the executing agency document and committed CIDA to
ensure that the issue was continually raised during the annual review, monitoring, and
evaluation missions.924
As a benefit to Ghanaian society, changes in the legal system and institution of
the equitable ADR mechanisms were projected to decrease land conflicts. The other
anticipated benefits of the project for the Ghanaian society included an increase in land
value due to documenting land tenure security, formation of “a functional land market,
where land … [could] be purchased and sold with certainty,” and better access to
“mortgage and production credit, using land titles as collateral.” More investment in land
was viewed as a means of improving livelihoods and influencing production and the
“employment generation.” The project was also expected contribute to the recognition of
women’s tenure rights.925 In spite of the purported benefits, there was an acknowledgment
that the project activities could present risks to certain groups. It was recognized that
“project activities such as titling and registration may result in loss of land rights for
some people and the unintentional displacement of some families.” The secondary rights,
“such as the right of poor village women to harvest the fruits of certain trees or the right
of the community to use an established path across a property,” might also be lost.
923

Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) # GH-A31898 Book, “Memorandum. Subject: Approval- Land Administration Project,” 24.
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Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) # GH-A31898 ibid.
925
Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) # GH-A31898 ibid., 7.
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Another risk of titling was the possible demise of tenant and sharecropping agreements
due to the increase land prices and plots put up for sale. The migrants could be displaced
too.926
In regards to the proposed harmonization between customary and statutory tenure,
the critique by the Independent Evaluation Group in its assessment report was that the
project did not resolve what it called implicit contradictions. These contradictions were
due to both recognizing the land control by customary authorities and also suggesting
shifting rents away from the chiefs to strengthen the control of the state over the land. It
stressed,
This tension at the heart of the project’s design was not resolved during
implementation. The net effect was to leave the chief’s control over land
unchallenged, an outcome that may, on balance, have reduced tenure security for
many land users, particularly in those parts of Ghana where the traditional
authorities were seeking to profit from rising land values.927
The reason for the implicit contradiction was the lack of discussions about the role chiefs
played in land administration and/or how they could allocate land based on their own
interests rather the interest of the general society.928 Among the issues that also affected
the project were deficiencies in “public outreach on land laws, land rights and
procedures” which were confined to the “distribution of flyers, brochures and [a] few
public lectures.” While there were media and focus group debates, the approach was
effective only in some places because of illiteracy rates. As a result of those issues, it was
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World Bank, “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 15.1 Million
(US$20.5 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Ghana for a Land Administration Project,” 26–27.
927
Independent Evaluation Group/ World Bank, “Project Performance Assessment Report Ghana Land
Administration Project. (Credit No. 3817; Project ID P071157),” 16.
928
Wily and Hammond, “Land Security and the Poor in Ghana: Is There a Way Forward?” cited in
Independent Evaluation Group/ World Bank, “Project Performance Assessment Report Ghana Land
Administration Project. (Credit No. 3817; Project ID P071157),” 32.
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suggested that the outreach resulted in the public’s view that there were corrupt and nontransparent processes.929
In its project architecture, LAP conceptualized that poverty reduction and socioeconomic development can be reached through interventions in protecting property
rights, support to legal reforms, and functioning courts. By adopting a top-down approach
to protecting rights, the project presented a functioning legal and land administration
system which protected land tenancy as a way of decreasing land related conflicts,
boosting investment in land productivity and allowing land to be used an economic
commodity for business and financial transactions. While better protection of land rights
was said to contribute to poverty reduction, there was also recognition that in Ghana land
titling and registration might have adverse impact on rights people. Therefore, the same
reform efforts would have a negative impact on secondary rights for the vulnerable strata
of population, as well as lead to displacement of families, thus potentially affecting their
abilities to earn a livelihood; instead contributing to poverty reduction the reform could
contribute to more poverty.
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World Bank. Agriculture and Rural Development Unit. Sustainable Development Department. Country
Department/ AFCF2. Africa Region, “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of
SDR 32.1 Million (US$ 50 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Ghana for a Land Administration
Project- 2,” 5.
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14 THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL COOPERATION IN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT (SEARCH) PROJECT930
The project positioned itself as a rule of law project that, through legal reforms
and capacity building, would contribute to an international human rights compatible legal
framework and judicial practices to uphold human rights of disadvantaged groups such as
children, ethnic minorities and migrant workers. The project also intended to improve the
accessibility of legal services for disadvantaged groups and protect their rights. To raise
awareness among the project’s target groups about their entitlements and how to access
services, the project adopted a mediated approach that channelled the information
through capacity building of the project partners. Even with raising awareness and the
availability of services, it did not necessarily mean that the project target groups could
benefit from them. In the case of ethnic minorities in Thailand, their births were
registered as a step to their right to citizenship as a result of project support. But the
families of missing Lao migrants were less able to protect the rights of their family
members because of fear of government punishment due to the “illegal” status of their
family members in Thailand.
In the meantime, the documents under analysis highlighted tensions that law
reform and human rights projects raise at the project operationalization level when
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Because the analysis of the dissertation is mostly at the outcome level of the projects, I faced challenges
in the analysis of the progress reports by the Canadian executing agency similar to ones expressed by the
evaluators (see below),
• “Progress reports were largely activity-based with unclear links to results and indicators until the
Deputy Director assumed responsibility.
• Reports often fell short of ‘telling the [project]… story’ … The reports combined narrative reports
from the primary partners with charts filled with voluminous details on ‘progress toward results’
that were difficult to follow. The charts were based on the project LFA but rarely did they provide
a clear sense of how the activities and output level results contributed to expected higher level
results.” [emphasis added]
Bolger and Stiles, “End-of-Project Evaluation of the Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation in Human
Development Project (SEARCH). Project Number: A-031101,” 46.
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interacting with national authorities. The project was framed as a rule of law rather than a
“human rights” project in an effort to placate states that had concerns over foreign
governments backing human rights activism in their countries. In addition, the lack of
nationally driven law reform initiatives contributed to the decision by organization
implementing the project to focus on the facilitation of interactions between government
and civil society, instead of dealing directly with governments. There was also
recognition of the complexities associated with implementing law reform and human
rights, especially at the impact level when national governments are responsible for
acting on the change. The other consideration was the idea that law reform and human
rights projects in the development setting should not be concerned with mere technical
compliance or non-compliance with international human rights standards, but human
rights should be considered a development goal itself. It was argued that such an
approach would put the focus on advocacy rather than provision of services. Even with a
focus on human rights, there was an acknowledgment that programming in human rights
projects is political in nature, which makes engagement between those who oppose and
who are for the change difficult. But even to contribute to the change, have an impact,
and sustain it, human rights projects should have a longer timeline for implementation
and they require a longer period to manifest the impact.
The SEARCH (2004–2011) was a regional project covering Indonesia, the
Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Timor-Leste. The project focused
on “democratic governance, including legal and judicial development, democratic
participation and civil society and human rights” with gender equality being a crosscutting theme. Special attention was also given to children, ethnic minorities and migrant
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workers.931 In the evaluators’ assessment, the project was relevant to three priorities of
CIDA’s regional program among which were governance and rule of law, as well as
“Canada’s foreign policy, which include[d] reflecting Canadian values and, as a priority,
promoting and protecting human rights.”932 The project had built on the preceding CIDA
supported initiative, but, as the mid-term performance review elaborated, SEARCH
focused on human rights while also undertaking “more of an ‘upstream’ emphasis” with
attention to the rule of law “through improvements to the legal and institutional
mechanisms for the promotion and protection of the rights” for the project target
groups.933 At the project initiation stage, there was an identified gap in the capacities of
government and NGOs in promotion of human rights, which in turn impacted their ability
“to keep pace with social and economic trends.”934 The request for proposals specified
that the main focus was capacity building of civil society and government institutions,
with the concept of the rule of law placed at the centre. The term ‘rule of law’ referred to
“equality before the law, entitlement to equal protection of the law without
discrimination, due process, right to fair trail and other concepts contained in
international human rights conventions.”935 At the project initiation stage, CIDA and
human rights organizations in the region identified rule of law and legal reform as the
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Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 39.
933
Rawkins, “Mid-Term Performance Review South East Asia Regional Cooperation in Human
Development Program (SEARCH). Final Report (March 18, 2008),” 2–3. The same document indicates the
South East Asia Fund for Institutional and Legal Development (SEAFILD) as the project SEARCH was
built upon.
934
“Project Definition Mission Report: Defining a Successor Project to SEAFILD”, ASEAN, APEC and
SE Asia Regional Program, prepared for Asia Branch, CIDA, January 2002 citied in Ibid., 10.
935
GeoSpatial/SALSAN, in association with International Institute for Child Rights and Development, and
Four Directions International Inc., “Inception Phase Report. Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation in
Human Development (SEARCH),” 4.
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most effective ways of addressing human rights violations. 936 The project approval
document programmed the capacity development of government and non-government
institutions to be mutually engaged on issues relating to rule of law and human rights and
raise awareness of the rights people hold.937 The goal of the project was “to promote and
uphold rule of law as it applies to children, ethnic minorities and migrant workers in
Southeast Asia.” The stated purpose was “to improve legal and institutional mechanisms
for the promotion and protection of the rights of” the project’s three target groups. 938 The
logical framework (below) operationalizes how the intended project goals were to be
achieved.
NARRATIVE
SUMMARY939

EXPECTED
RESULTS

PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT

ASSUMPTION/
RISK
INDICATORS
Assumption/Risk
Indicators

Project Goals
(Program
Objectives)
To promote and
uphold rule of
law as it applies
to children,
ethnic minorities
and migrant
workers in
Southeast Asia

Impact

Performance Indicators

1. Rule of law
promoted to
create an
enabling
environment
for the respect
of human
rights

Project Purpose

2. Increased
transparency
and

1. Degree of enforcement 1. Concerns
of legislation in
about public
participating Southeast
security on the
Asian countries;
part of some of
2. Protection available for
the project’s
target populations
target country
governments
trump their
commitment to
the rule of law
2.
The ‘rights
1. Number of laws
deficit’
reformed that directly
between
or through

936

CIDA (2002), PAD signed cover sheet, p. 2, December 2002 in Bolger and Stiles, “End-of-Project
Evaluation of the Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation in Human Development Project (SEARCH).
Project Number: A-031101,” 18.
937
Ibid., 9.
938
GeoSpatial/SALSAN, in association with International Institute for Child Rights and Development, and
Four Directions International Inc., “Semi Annual Report. April 2008–September 2008. Southeast Asia
Regional Cooperation in Human Development (SEARCH),” 44 Appendix B, Logical Framework Analysis.
939
Replicates parts of the table in Ibid. Appendix B, Logical Framework Analysis. (Source: Global Affairs
Canada). Quotation marks are not used for the convenience of reading.
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To improve legal
and institutional
mechanisms for
the promotion
and protection of
the rights of
children, ethnic
minorities and
migrant workers
in the SEA
region

accountability
of government
in upholding
the rule of law
and the
respect of
human rights. 2.

3. Improved
judicial
practices and
legal services
in support of
human rights.

interpretation increase
commitments
government
to international
transparency and
HR
accountability,
conventions
especially … rule of
and adherence
law & HR
to those
Degree of access of
commitments
citizens to government
increases
records & processes;
3. Different
3. Degree citizens
national
participate in the
experiences
selection of
with legal
governments
reform and
human rights
issues means at
1. Changes to
the regional
legal/administrative
discourse
practices;
remains
2. Fairness of treatment;
focused on
3. Availability of legal
accommodatin
services for project’s
g differences
target groups
rather than on
searching for
rights
consensus

The project initiation stage also underscored the need for national and regional
human rights organizations to cooperate with governments and academic institutions “to
change the mind set and practices of various legal and judicial bodies that have an impact
on the lives of citizens.” Activities in this area were presented as “among the most
important initiatives to modify policy decisions and government or security force
practices in a cooperative manner.”940 The Project Definition Mission Report argued that
“Rule of Law issues are areas in which national and regional organizations are most
comfortable in collaborating, and therefore could be channels for the promotion and
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“Project Definition Mission Report: Defining a Successor Project to SEAFILD,” ASEAN, APEC and
SE Asia Regional Program, prepared for Asia Branch, CIDA, January 2002 citied in Rawkins, “Mid-Term
Performance Review South East Asia Regional Cooperation in Human Development Program (SEARCH).
Final Report (March 18, 2008),” 10.
261

protection of implementation of human rights.” Among the suggested methodology was
capacity development of partner institutions, “[e]ducation and training at national and
regional levels for government and law enforcement organizations and … [human rights]
organizations.”941 The expected outcomes of the project were:
1. “Improved capacity of selected institutions and partners to promote … [human rights]
of targeted disadvantaged grouped and influence policy makers” (outcome 100);
2. “Increased effectiveness and sustainability of regional networks and partnerships in
addressing … [human rights] issues related to” the target groups (outcome 200);
3. “Improved legislation and policy environment for the provision of legal/judicial
services as applied to” the target groups (outcome 300); and
4. “Increased access to services and protection by law for” the target groups.” (outcome
400)942
A representative of CIDA who was a part of the project initiation, explained to the
evaluation team that the project was designed around rule of law “to appease countries
such as Vietnam and Cambodia who were averse to foreign governments supporting
human rights advocacy in their countries.” However, as report continues,
In the end, SEARCH was not a rule-of-law project. It evolved into a human rights
advocacy project… It may have been more difficult to create a strong regional
project relevant to CIDA’s seven eligible countries within the framework of ruleof-law, since individual governments are responsible for legal and judicial matters
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“Project Definition Mission Report: Defining a Successor Project to SEAFILD”, ASEAN, APEC and
SE Asia Regional Program, prepared for Asia Branch, CIDA, January 2002 citied in Ibid., 11.
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Regional Cooperation in Human Development (SEARCH),” 44–45 Appendix B, Logical Framework
Analysis.; see also CIDA (2002), PAD signed cover sheet, p. 2, December 2002 in Bolger and Stiles, “Endof-Project Evaluation of the Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation in Human Development Project
(SEARCH). Project Number: A-031101,” 18; see also Ibid., 9–10.
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and few transboundary legal/judicial issues apply to all countries of the region.943
Initially, for the project’s intended outcomes three and four—improved legislation and
enhanced protection by law—it was expected that that the project would engage directly
with governments, judiciaries, local legal and civil society networks. However, the
Canadian executing agency (CEA) specified that it would not get directly involved with
governments, but rather “would support government-civil society dialogue and sharing of
lessons learned.” In the 2008 mid-term performance review it is noted,
The project retain[ed] the emphasis on an “upstream” focus on influencing policy,
legislative frameworks and strengthening institutions. However, the “Rule of
Law” emphasis has been modified and the business of its principal partners, at
least in part, continue[ed] to be human rights advocacy, dialogue and advice…
and documentation of the deficiencies of current levels of protection.944
The CEA rationalized its approach by indicating that “the conventional rule of law
approach that CIDA was pushing would have required SEARCH to work with
governments and CIDA had not negotiated a government role in the project during the
design phase.” Among the reasons outlined for why “the project got tilted in favor of
human rights and away from the rule of law” was the lack of law reform initiatives “at
the national level specific to ethnic minorities, children and migrant workers.”945 The
Summary Comments on the Project’s Risk Management Strategy, for the risk stated “[a]n
improved legislative and policy environment does not lead to an improvement in the
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provision of legal/judicial services.” The comments also noted that “[i]t … [was] true
that an improved … [human rights] policy environment at the regional level … [did] not
necessarily trickled down to improving the rights of vulnerable groups at the local
level.”946
Within the second outcome (outcome 200) the activities were piloted on the
establishment of “formal and informal mechanisms at the village and central level” for
reporting missing in Thailand Lao migrants. The goal of the activity was “to trace
missing cases of Lao migrants to Thailand … [to] uncover[…] cases of trafficked persons
and rescu[e] them, and break[…] the cycle of trafficking rings.” 947 The process of
gathering information about the missing people was planned at the village level from the
accounts of the villagers collected by the local focal groups.948 Among the challenges
faced, however, was a low number of reported cases, which was assumed to be due to
“the fear that they [villagers] …. [would] be subjected to fine or punishment because
their missing family member entered Thailand as an illegal immigrant.”949
Whether or not there would be compliance of national laws and practices with
international human rights standards and instruments was among the main concerns about
the third output (outcome 300). This output focused on “[n]ational legislation and legal
enforcement practices” that safeguarded “the rights of male and female children, ethnic
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minorities and migrant workers” aimed at aligning them with international standards.950
The project also focused on agreed “recommendations on core labour standards, terms
and employment and minimum working conditions … in line with international standards
(human rights, ILO, etc.) … [to be] submitted them to governments.” 951 Under the fourth
outcome (outcome 400), which was intended to increase access to services by the
project’s target groups, it was proposed to improve “[e]conomic and social support” and
“quality of support services provided to victims of human trafficking.” 952 The care and
support procedures were proposed to “standardize[…] regionally in line with
international norms and practices.”953 The project also proposed that the target group
participate in “initiatives aimed at articulating and promoting their rights to protection,
equality and access to services under the law.”954 Raising the target group’s awareness
about “rights to protection, equal treatment and access to services under the law” through
capacity building of the project partners was planned to contribute to the fourth output.955
Among the expected results of heightened awareness was “increased media attention” to
the issues of the project’s target groups, especially ethnic minorities.956
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In assessing the results achieved in regards to Outcome 300, however, the
evaluators emphasized the challenge of attributing them directly to CIDA funded
initiatives because the financed partners had other sources of funding. In the meantime,
they underlined that “it may have been unrealistic for CIDA to expect a great deal of
progress, particularly in relation to legal and judicial legislation, which are the
responsibility of national governments.”957 Due to the “scant and unreliable” data, the
evaluators “found little conclusive evidence of progress toward the achievement of”
Outcome 400, but did find “limited tangible” evidence a pilot project in northern
Thailand granted legal rights to social services through the provision of citizenship status
to ethnic minorities. 958 The End of Project Final Report indicates that the project
supported “a number of community based projects, in registering child births in a number
of Thai hill tribe communities as a prerequisite to accessing citizenship rights.” But the
report underscores that the project “was designed mainly as a macro level rather than a
micro level intervention”; therefore, its ability to impact service delivery which was “a
lower level activity, was limited.”959
The End of Project Final Report, in its lessons learned, provides a valuable
insight into the implementation of human rights projects in the field. In one of the
observations the report emphasizes that,
957
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[e]ffecting change in human rights requires moving beyond judgments concerning
countries compliance or non-compliance with international human rights
normative instruments to the adoption of a developmental rights-based approach
built on a perception of rights as a developmental goal to be achieved
independently of other goals and a recognition of the importance of advocacy as
opposed to service provision.960
Furthermore, as the report highlighted while addressing the project risk, “[t]he ‘rights
deficit’ between commitments to international … [human rights]

conventions and

adherence to those commitments diminish,” the adoption of “a developmental as opposed
to a legalistic approach to human rights development” also contributed to the
“establish[ment] and maintain[ance of] trusting relationship with both the governmental
and non-governmental” actors.961
Bolger and Stiles, in the project evaluation report, emphasised challenges faced
by human rights projects, including at the design stage “because of the volatile nature of
the political environment and the potential for rapid change.” They elaborated that due to
“[t]he nature of human rights programming … [being] fundamentally political and prone
to volatility” there is a risk associated with “pre-determining technical assistance when
needs and priorities are subject to change.”962 They stressed the risks of involvement in
human rights projects, thus making it “difficult and potentially dangerous to share
publicly lessons about lobbying activities.” Their advice was “[t]he “do-no-harm”
principle should prevail” and even the valuable information is communicated “given the
vulnerability of some groups and the individual who support change” it should be done
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with due care.963 In regards to programing human rights projects, they rightly argued that
“[l]ong timeframes are needed for human rights” because
…major improvements in human rights architecture and practices can take a long
time. Donors need to think in terms of decades for positive changes in policies,
laws and their implementation. Similarly, long time frames are needed for
effective institutional capacity development of human rights organizations
whether government or NGOs.964
The long timeframe of the human rights projects relates not only to programing, but also
to observing the outcomes of the activities and assessing whether those outcomes are
sustainable, because it “is typical of governance and human rights projects where results
or impacts are often not seen until years after the project has ended.”965
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15 SECURE TENURE AND SAFE SPACE FOR LESOTHO WIDOWS,
ORPHAN AND VULNERABLE CHILDREN
The project linked the protection of vulnerable groups’ property rights of with
their ability to live life with dignity and make decisions independently. It emphasized that
the enjoyment of property, which takes into account the safety and privacy of vulnerable
members of the family, contributes to their bodily security, integrity, and health. The
project also underscored that the security of property rights enables vulnerable groups to
reap economic benefits from property and alleviates poverty. The approach of the project
was that empowerment, public awareness about rights, and property ownership could
affect power dynamics and provide better standing for women, which would help
improve their socio-economic conditions. Securing women’s rights would enable women
to increase the economic output from agricultural activities, provide better nutrition to
their children, and reduce instances of exposure to abuse and HIV/AIDS.
To empower the project’s target group, the project adopted a mediated approach
which trained paralegals to conduct a public awareness campaign. However, it
accentuated the importance of professional competence in those who were tasked with
the conducting public awareness campaign for its success. Issues with professional
competence of paralegals and misunderstandings about the legal system were mentioned
among the factors that impacted the public awareness campaign. Another concern with
the expected outcomes was the anticipation of the behavioral change; because the issues
the project aimed to address were mostly conducted based on traditional practices, it was
challenging to convince people to change the behavior to adopt more formal arrangement
such as civil marriage contracts and wills. Awareness about rights was also perceived as a
challenge to perceptions held by community members and the belief that knowledge of
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human rights would make, for example, children more disrespectful to elders in their
families and community. The public awareness campaign aimed at behavioral change and
moving away from traditional practices that violated the target group’s rights, but there
was also recognition that behavioral change is a long process. It was highlighted that the
change to more formal arrangements is more than mere adoption of laws, but rather the
change in people’s way of thinking.
CIDA supported Secure Tenure and Safe Space for Lesotho Widows, Orphans
and Vulnerable Children project (2007–2010) “[i]n response to Lesotho’s increasing
number of widows and orphans and vulnerable children (OVC).” It was implemented by
Habitat for Humanity Lesotho (HFHL), which works on providing housing to lowincome and vulnerable groups “in addition to raising awareness about housing laws,
property ownership and inheritance rights.”966 According to the End-of-Project Report,
the issue that the project intended to address was the dependence of OVC children on
either extended families, particularly elderly and unemployed grandmothers, or living in
child-headed households, which made those children “an easy target of violence, abuse,
and exploitation.” Another concern was that orphans, as well as widows, who were
deprived of their parental and martial properties, frequently ended up living either in
overcrowded conditions with other relatives or became homeless. Overcrowding not
only curtailed the privacy of women who were forced to carry their “personal activities in
the presence of male housemates” but also, in conjunction with reliance “on male
relatives for food and shelter … [led] to sexual abuse, which further … [increased the]
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risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.” 967 Limited living space also compelled children of
different sexes to share sleeping space “regardless their age,” often putting children into
abusive situations and contributing to early pregnancies.968
The rationale presented for the project was,
With secured housing and property ownership, OVC and widows can live with
dignity and a sense of security. Inheritance rights and secure tenure make women
and children less vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, which lessens their
chancing of contracting HIV. Property rights cultivate the level of independence
which allows women and children to make their own decisions. They are able to
reap the economic benefits from land to curtail the cycle of poverty, resulting in
enhanced well-being, economic standing, and living standards. Security allows
vulnerable females to focus on other aspects of life, such as education,
livelihoods, and the future.969
Overcrowding was relevant not only sharing the living spaces, but also to hygiene
because “too many people shar[ing] one latrine” led to highly unsanitary conditions and
health problems.970 The purpose of the project was “1. To secure tenure and inheritance
rights of widows and children who have been orphaned and made vulnerable by
HIV/AIDS” and “2. To reduce incidents of abuse and sexual molestation of widows and
female orphans and vulnerable children.” The goals were: “1. Full recognition of tenure
and inheritance rights of widows and OVC in traditional systems that reflect the current
law” and “2. Adequate and safe living spaces for widows and female OVC separate from
male housemates.”971
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OUTPUTS972

OUTCOMES

IMPACTS

A document which provides
accurate information on
tenure
security
and
inheritance rights based upon
a correlation between the
written (established) law and
practiced
customary
(traditional) law in each of
the three districts.

Baseline established in
order to measure
changes over a three
year period.

A joint approach to deal with
relevant gaps between
traditional practice and
established law, how to
confront them, and to what
extent over the medium to
long-term.

… paralegals trained to
sensitize … groups via
[public awareness campaign]
…

… persons sensitized
through drama, lectures
and interactive
participation on the
rights of women and
children according to the
laws enacted by the
[Government of
Lesotho] …

A noticeable decline in land
grabbing from women and
OVC resulting in greater
property security and a
reduction of poverty for this
vulnerable group [emphasis
added].

… subsides for construction
of additional bedrooms and,
in some cases, rondevels
(small round, detached huts
which serve as sleeping
quarters in rural areas).973

… “safe spaces” created
for … females living
with extended relatives
or friends- i.e. a
bedroom addition
(urban) with both an
interior entry and an
exterior entry, or a
female only rondevel
(rural), allowing them to
come and go at will.

Significant and measurable
reduction in incidents of
female abuse, and
empowerment of assisted
females.

… latrines constructed,

Reduction in health

Reduced incidents of diarrhea

972

Replicates part of the table in Ibid., 3–4. (Source: Global Affairs Canada). Quotation marks are not used
for the convenience of reading
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mostly in rural areas, with
full involvement of
beneficiaries and
beneficiaries sensitized as to
the benefits of proper use
and maintenance.

related incidents
attributable to lack of
access to pit latrines…

and dehydration, resulting in
stronger bodies and increased
productivity for wage earners
and subsistence farmers.974
[emphasis added]

The indicators used to measure performance were the changes in the mindset
regarding the tenure of widows and OVC, “[f]ewer reported incidents of propertygrabbing,” safe spaces that would improve safety and security of females, fewer reported
incidents of abuse, “[f]ewer health complaints … related to sanitation,” and more
“consistency between Common Law (written) and Customary Law … with the Common
Law being accepted and recognized as predominant.”975
The public awareness campaign was considered central to securing tenure rights
and the participation of paralegals in the public awareness campaign was the cornerstone
of the activity.

Nevertheless, the report by HFHL raised the issue regarding their

professional knowledge, because their status in the community rather the familiarity with
laws was the factor in their selection. While acknowledging that the respect in the
community made them “a trusted source of information for villagers” who often turned to
the paralegals for advice, the lack of understanding among some trained paralegals of the
country’s dual legal system became an obstacle in reaching “project goals and awareness
raising efforts.” An example of such a negative outcome is the fact the project did not
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meet all targeted numbers for will registration.976 Cumbersome creation and registration
processes also had an impact on the will registration.977 The report stated that according to
the Wills Act of Lesotho, for the will as a legal document to “be defensible in the courts
of law,” it had to be “be written only by a practicing lawyer” and the cost of the services
was between the equivalent of $187 and $312 – a cost that was not affordable for many.
The customary law provided an alternative “to individuals to write an informal will, also
called ‘inheritance instructions’… administered by a local chief.” Although people could
choose this more affordable alternative, inheritance instructions were different from a
formal will and “the limitation … [was] that it … [might] not stand the test of time … [if
it was] contested in a court of law.” To address these issues, HFHL cooperated with
Legal Aid Services and the Master of the High Court,978 located in the Capital, Maseru
city. Legal Aid Services agreed to provide the destitute with discount prices, the
equivalent of $25, for services and the Master of the High Court would provide free
review and registration of wills.979 But in the End-of-Project Report, HFHL emphasized
that the “[w]ill creation and registration … [was] a lengthy process in Lesotho,” which
was also influenced by the fact the Office of the Master of the High Court was located in
the capital city, too far for many people to travel. Therefore, the process “was quite time
consuming” because paralegals needed to travel on public transport “to collect the wills,
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legally register the documents, and meet their contractual targets.”980
The sector strategy project review by CIDA specialists in their support for the
proposal to improve the effectiveness of the project in “the promotion of socio-economic
changes” advised “involving judicial and law enforcement agencies in the process” of
securing the tenure rights for widows and OVCs because neither customary practices or
formal laws protected their rights. It noted,
For example, the baseline study can record and documents to what extent or why
existing state laws fail to protect the rights of women and OVC. In doing so, it
involves judicial and law enforcement agencies in the process and this raises their
level of awareness of land tenure issues and what limits the application of state
laws to protect the rights of vulnerable groups. We strongly believe that the
awareness raising strategy targets government officials, judges, police,
schoolteachers, extension workers and politicians along with local and community
leaders. Livelihoods issues such as land rights cannot be compromised, as they are
critical to the very survival of households. What we should be seeking is not
necessarily a strategy that produces an incremental change, such as change of
attitude, but a strategy that delivers an immediate result such as easy and secured
access by vulnerable groups to resources. This is possible if advocacy efforts are
focused on influencing state policies so that politicians can introduce new laws
that protect the land rights of Lesotho women and VOC.981
But the End-of-Project Report by HFHL specifically highlights the “behavior change
aspect” of the advocacy campaign as “[o]ne of the cross-cutting challenges.” Among the
cited reasons was that many people were used “to a traditional way of life, which
include[d] customary marriages and traditional modes of property distribution.”
Therefore, for the change to happen and protections under the common law to be
guaranteed, there was a need for citizens to “adapt a non-customary lifestyle which
include[d] civil marriage contracts and written property wills.” But as the report notes,
980
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“[i]t was a difficult process to encourage people to change a mode of life in which they
practiced for generations.” Another challenge in the public awareness campaign was that
there were strongly held perceptions within communities that contradicted the
campaign’s messages. As an example, the report refers to a “myth” held in some
communities that,
… educating children about their rights encourage[d] them to disrespect their
parents and elders; therefore, … [those] communities … [were] less receptive to
the children’s rights component of the campaign (despite the paralegals’ efforts to
raise awareness on the issue). In other cases, some community chiefs simply
refuse[d] to allot paralegals time during their public meetings to discuss child
rights.982
The report also indicates a “lack of interest” among community members to participate in
public gatherings, which they “attributed to a … local government system, which
create[d] power struggles between local chiefs and local community council members.”
Influential people in communities would cooperate with the project implementing
organization and its partners to boost their authority in the community and “use[d] this
factor against the other local government official.” The outcome was “community
confusion and alliances, which hindered support for village gatherings.”983 Other reasons
indicated as causes for low community participation were,
… due to the substance farming lifestyle individuals often … [could not] spare
time away from their field to attend public gatherings. In other cases, community
members were resistant to the actual campaign content, claiming they already
knew about inheritance laws. Often, rural communities … [were] reluctant to let
go of traditional laws which have governed families and communities for
generations.984
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An expected impact of the public awareness campaign was the decline in land
grabbing, however, it was revealed that actually there was an “increase in the number of
reported property-related crimes.” But HFHL argued that it was still an indicator of
success because “there was an increase in acquired knowledge in all advocacy campaign
subject areas regarding crimes of this nature.” The conclusion was based on the
assumption that “an increase in knowledge leads to increased participation in the
protection of one’s rights.” Thus, the increase in the reported numbers of property
grabbing was due to “increased awareness of property rights and confidence among
communities to report such cases.”985 Awareness raising was also considered important
for advancing gender equality. Although it was recognized that “effects [of the project]
on gender equality in Lesotho cannot be fully recognized at this time,” it was asserted
that knowledge contributes to “the power to challenge unjust acts against women and
increase women’s property holdings.” The causality effect of awareness raising,
empowerment, and change in the power dynamic was presented as leading to an
improvement of social and economic conditions, and a protection of civil rights.
As a result, women have the potential to increase their agricultural productivity,
allowing their children to eat healthier and establishing security. Even more,
owing property can change the power dynamics between women and men; having
property gives women greater bargaining authority, which helps reduce their
vulnerability to domestic violence and HIV infection.986
However, the report acknowledges as a lesson learned that “[b]ehavior change is difficult
to institute, especially due to the influence of social norms and peer pressure.” It went on
to state that changes in behaviour happen through “seeking information, obtaining
remedies, and enacting solutions.” It underlined the need for the projects to be responsive
985
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to social and cultural issues which could hamper activities and a recognition that change
is gradual. As stated, “[m]oving away from cultural norms to a more Western lifestyle
involves more than just new legislation.” Concluding this lesson, the report also
recognizes the need for the change in perceptions about women in the society without
which “women will not have the courage to protect their rights and advocate on their own
behalf.”987
There was recognition of the importance of ensuring vulnerable family members
have and enjoy their rights to property as a way to improve their socio-economic
standing, but as was the case with SEARCH project, this project also underscored that the
anticipated impact of human rights projects takes a longer period to manifest. It was also
stressed that adoption of laws alone is not sufficient to ensure the protection of rights of
vulnerable groups. There was a need for change in behaviour within broader community.
But even if people chose to use the formal system to protect their rights, the costs and
complexities associated with dealing with the formal justice institutions remained an
obstacle for vulnerable groups.
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16 CONCLUSION
16.1 CIDA’s PROGRAM ARCHITECTURE
Addressing the issue of poverty as a part of Canada’s development assistance
efforts was a feature of both the Government of Canada’s policies and CIDA’s
documents, which presented the poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon. Efforts to
address poverty included not only tackling income related deprivations but rather
addressing it as an issue that required the input and changes in broader social institutions,
which could expand the freedoms people could have to live the life they choose. As early
as the 1970s, the government policy document, International Development: Foreign
Policy for Canadians, put poverty alleviation as an ultimate goal for development
programs and placed it within advances and improvements—including in social and
educational systems, which were viewed as contributing to the capacity of people to be
productively involved in enhancing the quality of their lives. CIDA’s 1987 strategy paper
Sharing Our Future, akin to the capability approach, interpreted poverty as “lack of
choice.” It viewed poverty through a lens of failings in accessing jobs and income as well
as a lack of access “to decision making.” Poverty was about unequal opportunities and
“underdevelopment of human potential.”988
Unlike the concerns about addressing poverty, in the early years of Canada’s
development efforts, human rights concerns were given less consideration. While there
were arguments among scholars that human rights initially were not centrally placed
within the Canadian development aid, as early as the late 1980s human rights and the
concern about poverty have been intertwined in the Government of Canada’s approaches.
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CIDAs Sharing our Future strategy document while declaring that Canadian ODA was
“putting poverty first,”989 also underscored the importance of taking into account human
rights considerations in dealing with recipient countries.990 Nevertheless, the strategy
document recognized the difficulties associated with promoting human rights.991 The
1995 Canada in the World white paper placed human rights at the centre of Canadian
foreign policy, which was projected to lead to meeting the goal of the “advancement of
prosperity and employment.” 992 The white paper recognized the importance of equal
access to opportunities and resources in society, specifically focusing on equal and full
participation in development.993 While poverty reduction was the declared goal of the
Canadian ODA, a broader institutional framework which included a focus on human
rights, democracy, and security of the person was considered necessary to support the
achievement of the goal. 994 The legal framework, rule of law, and judiciary were
presented as important components to the establishment of prosperous societies. 995
CIDA’s 1996 HRDGG policy also recognized that human rights are vital to development
and reaching a just and prosperous world. 996 Its 1996 policy on poverty reduction
reasserted the approach that poverty was a multidimensional phenomenon; therefore,
poverty reduction is linked to developing human and productive capacities of the poor,
and addressing structural barriers that hindered their involvement in society.997
The focus on addressing poverty continued with MDGs entering CIDA’s program
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architecture and report vocabulary in the early 2000s, though neither CIDA’s HRDGG
nor their poverty reduction polices were updated to reflect MDGs.998 The analysis of
CIDA’s reports to the Parliament and programing documents show that within the first
years of the launch of MDGs by the United Nations, MDGs were reflected and
incorporated in CIDA’s programing architecture and continued to feature prominently as
a macro-level goal. MDGs, with the focus on poverty reduction, were treated as the
overarching goal, including for the issues within the democratic governance portfolio.
While acknowledging that human rights were not explicitly mentioned in MDGs, CIDA’s
documents continuously recognized the connection between MDGs and human rights
considerations. CIDA’s programing envisioned the achievement of poverty reduction
through activities which focused on human rights, rule of law, and the legal and judicial
system.999
As early as 2001, CIDA integrated MDGs within its program architecture as an
overarching goal towards which human rights and a judiciary reformed under the
governance aimed to contribute.1000 The next year poverty reduction was added as an
ultimate goal to CIDA’s program architecture. CIDA’s Report on Plans and Priorities
(RPP) 2003-2004 is reflective of the human rights based approach as it declares CIDA’s
plans to mainstream human rights into policies and program instruments and recognizes
the need for well-defined approaches to the integration of human rights into

998

2008 CIDA’s report noted that “[t]he HRDGG Policy has not changed over the past decade to reflect the
evolution of knowledge and understanding that occurred outside the Agency”. (Canadian International
Development Agency, Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and
Good Governance, 6.
999
Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, Sustainable Development Strategy 2004–2006.
Enabling Change, 45–47.
1000
Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, “Departmental Performance Report 2001–
2002,” 41.
281

programing.1001 In its 2002 policy statement on aid effectiveness, CIDA declared that
MDGs were “the overarching development results the Agency … [sought] to achieve.”1002
CIDA’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2004–2006 incorporated MDGs as targets of
Canada’s development efforts to be attained within the institutional framework of
accountable governance institutions, functioning, and accessible legal and judicial system
based on human rights.1003
Within its program architecture, CIDA saw the enhancement of people’s abilities,
especially poor and marginalized individuals, to affect policies and advance their
livelihood as a means of addressing poverty.1004The Official Development Assistance
Accountability Act accentuated the focus on poverty reduction and the interests of the
poor, and CIDA reflected it by also situating the poverty reduction within the framework
of human rights and compliance with their standards. The Government of Canada’s 2005
policy paper, Canada's International Policy Statement: a Role of Pride and Influence in
the World, reasserted the contribution of human rights and rule of law to reaching MDGs.
The 2011–2012 report on the Government of Canada's Official Development Assistance
stated that, for CIDA, the promotion of democracy contributed to poverty reduction by
providing an environment for people to fulfil their abilities and aspirations, as well as to
live “a life of dignity,” participate in decision making, and to scrutinize decisions made
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by public authorities.1005 Similar to the capability approach, the report underscores the
importance of freedoms in poverty reduction. The enjoyment of civil and political rights
is conditional on those freedoms, including by the freedom to scrutinize the decisions of
public authorities.1006
16.2 ANALYZED PROJECTS
Before proceeding to the presentation of findings from the four CIDA financed
projects, it should be stressed that because some of the requested documents were not
released, there is an acknowledgment that there is a possibility that the conclusions might
be different if all requested documents were provided and pages were not withheld.
Despite MDGs being declared the overarching goals of CIDA towards which its
activities and projects were aimed, the documents related to the projects analyzed here
did not reference MDGs within their project architecture. Neither the projects’ goals nor
outcomes indicated that they were explicitly contributing to reaching MDGs. However, in
spite of the absence of the explicit reference to MDGs in the projects’ documents, some
projects explicitly stated their intent to contribute to poverty reduction and assistance to
the poor and marginalized. A project that had such an explicit reference was JURIS,
which was implemented in the Philippines. Although it was a judicial reform project, its
vision was to contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable development. The available
documents from the project, including progress reports and evaluation reports, reflected
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the concern about poor and marginalized groups, while the research by Social Weather
Stations provided the voice to those groups by raising their concerns and issues of
importance. The project’s primary anticipated impact was to improve access to justice for
the poor and marginalized. The empowerment of the poor was regarded as a means of
enhancing access to justice, but the adopted approach was to build the capacities of NGO
actors to educate the poor.1007 However, the analyzed documents show that there were
challenges in defining what constitutes access to justice,1008 which is reflective of similar
challenges faced by academics and practitioners. JURIS’s approach followed the human
rights-based approach. It targeted both the supply and demand side of justice, duty
bearers,1009 by aiming to improve the judiciary so it was accessible to the poor and
marginalized with a simultaneous focus on the demand side, rights holders, especially the
poor and marginalized, by furthering their knowledge about the judicial services and
remedies. Among the activities aimed at the supply side was building their capacities in
ADR to improve the quality of justice services and also better access to justice by rightsholders. The project architecture placed poverty reduction as an ultimate goal of the
project, with a strong justice system and accessible justice for poor and marginalized
being the elements of the strategy to reach the goal.
The project on secure tenure and safe space for widows and OVCs in Lesotho
focused on vulnerable groups within the family setting. The project acknowledged
heterogeneities between family members and looked at, what Sen indicated to,
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“distribution of … opportunities within the family.”1010 The project took note that within
an extended family there were members who experienced more deprivations than other
family members. The project rationalized its interventions by recognizing that
deprivations which were a result of the heterogeneities affected the capacities of the
vulnerable members of families to live a safe and healthy life as they were subjected to
abuse, violations of their privacy, and exposure to HIV/AIDS. Or, in other words, the
project recognized the cultural and inter-familial obstacles curtailing what Nassbaum
called central capabilities—control over one’s environment (property rights), bodily
health (good health and shelter) and bodily integrity of widows and OVCs.1011 The project
made a connection between the protection of rights to inheritance and property ownership
with widows and OVCs’ freedom to make independent decisions and live a life they
want; a healthier life, free from abuse, with fewer chances of being exposed to
HIV/AIDS. Security of property rights was also considered a leading in changing the
power balance with women acquiring more bargaining power to negotiate better living
conditions.
The project’s planned outcome was to build the knowledge and capacities of the
public through public awareness events resulting in better protection of rights for OVCs
and widows and poverty reduction among these vulnerable groups. The project noted the
importance of raising awareness and empowering the target groups in order to contribute
to the improvement of their socio-economic conditions because secure tenure could
increase their agricultural productivity and provide better nutrition to their children. As
was the case with JURIS, the project adopted a mediated approach to educate the poor
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through public awareness campaigns. The project considered building the capacities of
paralegals, however, it faced challenges surrounding the professional competence of
paralegals. Another issue was that that public awareness was perceived by some
community members as being a challenge to customs and traditional familial authorities.
In the meantime, the analyzed documents reiterated the familiar issue with human rights
projects; that it takes long time to achieve behavioural change. 1012 The project also
underscored the fact formal laws were not sufficient to protect the rights of the target
group and that it was also dependant on the behavioural change.1013
Creating safe spaces was presented as being among the means to protect the rights
of those vulnerable groups and enable them to live in safe housing conditions. Building
latrines was envisioned to provide opportunities for the target groups to reach the
functioning level required for health.1014 This in turn was anticipated as contributing to a
better ability to work and an associated increase in productivity. While the project
planned to work with both customary and formal duty bearers, including the Master of
the High Court, in reaching the project objectives, it also acknowledged that societal
obstacles (“myths” as they were called) contributed to the curtailment of freedoms of
OVCs and widows. These obstacles were persistent and it would take time to change the
attitudes.
The regional project in Southeast Asia, SEARCH, had a vision of promoting and
sustaining the rule of law through functioning legal and institutional mechanisms
conducive to the protection of human rights of the project’s target groups, but with no
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reference to poverty in its project architecture. The legal reform, improvement of law
enforcement, and availability of legal services were among the strategies to achieve the
declared project goal. The project was also concerned with improving the accessibility of
legal services for disadvantaged groups and guaranteeing their rights. The project focused
on the supply side of justice by identifying gaps in the capacities of the government and
NGOs, and planned to work on changing the practices of various relevant legal and
judicial bodies. It saw capacity development through education and training of justice
sector actors as a means of contributing to upholding the human rights of the project’s
target groups. Activities in the supply side of justice were programmed to impact the
provision of legal and judicial services. The project also employed the establishment of
formal and non-formal mechanisms to address the issues of vulnerable groups, such as
encouraging the reporting of missing people by affected families. SEARCH, through one
of its activities, was tying the provision of civil rights with the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights. By protecting the right to the legal personality of children through
registered births, the project aimed to give them citizenship rights which could allow
enjoyment of social and economic rights through access to social services. In one of its
outcomes, the project followed a human rights-based approach by calling to align
(anchor) national laws with international human rights. For example, aligning labour,
employment, and working condition standards with human rights and ILO standards.1015
The project also planned awareness raising among project’s target groups, but such
awareness was done through intermediaries—building the capacities of project partners
and mass media.
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As with the previous analayzed projects, SEARCH also adopted a mediated
approach in awareness raising among the project’s target groups by delivering the
relevant information to them through the capacity building of the project partners.
However, there was also an acknowledgment that awareness raising would not
necessarily mean that the target groups would use the acquired knowledge to defend their
rights. While ethnic minorities in Thailand were able to benefit from project activities and
register births on their path to citizenship, families of Lao migrants whose family
members illegally traveled to Thailand were more hesitant to assert their rights due to the
fear of government retaliation. The project also highlighted the tensions that human
rights and rule of law projects raise with national authorities when operationalized in the
field. The perception of national authorities is that human rights projects might meddle in
internal affairs and, to placate such concerns, the project was declared as a rule of law
project despite the fact it operated as a human rights one.1016 Even with a human rights
focus, there was an acknowledgment that human rights are political, thus causing
contention between proponents and opponents of change; for changes to manifest, human
rights projects should have a longer implementation period.
The Ghana land administration project connected land tenure security to general
development and economic activities, attracting investments, as well as the establishment
of a more secure setting for people to be involved in productive employment
opportunities, thus in turn contributing to poverty reduction. Its vision was that securing
and documenting land tenure would lead to the increase in income and socio-economic
growth. Among the strategies to reach the project’s vision was the improvement in the
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legislative framework by passing laws and regulations that would be functional and
establishing the land court system. Through a top-down approach (functioning legal and
land administration system), the project intended to decrease land related conflicts and
enhance agricultural productivity through investments.1017 It also proposed working with
both traditional and formal authorities—duty-bearers—involved in land administration.
CIDA’s project approval document suggests an interesting angle on how health issues
could affect land rights, such as HIV/AIDS and, as a result, contribute to less productive
usage of land and increase poverty. It also underlined the need to pay attention to the
issue. The project’s approach was that protection of land rights could address the issue of
gender equality with women benefiting from control over production, employment
opportunities, and improvement in their livelihood. But there was also recognition that
land rights titling could have an adverse impact on some vulnerable groups, which could
hinder secondary rights holders’ ability to harvest and result in families being displaced.
Thus, this could lead to more poverty instead of reaching the project goal of poverty
reduction.
Though three out of four analyzed projects were concerned with poverty
reduction and the interests of the poor and vulnerable groups, the silence towards the
MGDs shows a disconnect between CIDA’s declared development agenda and the
agenda of the projects implemented in the field. The references to poverty reduction
could be inferred to contribute an internationally agreed goal on poverty reduction;
however, the absence of an explicit reference to MDGs within the projects suggests that
at the stages of the project design and implementation MDGs, as globally agreed goals to

1017

See Annex A: Project Approval Document (PAD). Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) # GH-A31898 “Memorandum. Subject: Approval- Land Administration Project,” 2.
289

which Canada expressed its continuous commitment, were not regarded to be part of
these projects’ activities, though MDGs were clearly stated to be the overarching goals of
CIDA’s overall activities.
16.3 CONTRIBUTION TO THE INDIVISIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
During the first decades of Canada’s international aid activities, while the concern
for addressing the issue of poverty was paramount with support to economic and social
development, human rights considerations were not explicitly addressed. However, the
1987 Winegard report already emphasized that when human rights were concerned, both
CP and ESC rights had to be taken into account. It noted that “human rights should
encompass individual, civil and political, as well as socio-economic and cultural rights.”
1018

In its response to the report, the Government of Canada connected poverty,

deficiencies in access to education, employment opportunities and income with the lack
of the decision-making power and inequality. 1019 As in the Winegard report, the
government stressed that “fundamental human rights – social, political, [and] economic
… [are] prerequisites for global well-being.”1020 The 1995 Canada in the World white
paper emphasized promotion of democracy, strengthening civil society and security of
person together with efforts directed to poverty reduction.1021 It included the exercise of
rights to participate in the life of country1022 in the framework of leading to greater
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prosperity and addressing the issue of poverty.1023 A similar approach was echoed in
CIDA’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2001–2003.1024
DPR 2001–2002, in the program architecture included both economic well-being
(“improved standards of living of the poor”) and governance (democratic principles and
strong civil society) as key development results leading to MDGs.1025 DPR 2002–2003
signified the link between security of a person, participation in the decision making and
development. 1026 The democratic governance was declared as “essential for poverty
reduction” in DPR 2006-2007, especially underlining the ability of the poor and
marginalized to impact policies. It also highlighted the importance of equality while
dealing with judiciary.1027
The SEARCH project aimed to advance the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law for ethnic minorities, by registering births in order to acquire
citizenship rights and to be able to access social services.1028 The JURIS project was
concerned with providing the poor and marginalized with access to fair and competent
justice mechanisms and exercise fair trail rights as a means for poverty reduction and
equitable development. The Ghana land administration project made a link between the
failures in the enjoyment of the right of property ownership of women with economic
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opportunities, including access to financing instruments such as credits.1029,1030 However,
there was also a recognition that the land titling could have an adverse impact on
livelihood and economic activities of others, as well as disruption of other type of
agreements such as tenancy and sharecropping, thus also leading to the displacement of
more vulnerable people.1031
The project on secure tenure and safe space in Lesotho argued that the deprivation
of property rights of widows and orphans hampered their enjoyment of standards of
health, housing and living conditions. In turn, lack of proper housing and living
conditions was affecting their rights to privacy and security, such as being forced to carry
their “personal activities in the presence of male housemates” and being subjected to
sexual abuse. The project also maintained that property rights would allow women and
children to more independently form their opinions and receive more economic benefits
from their properties, increase their “economic standing”, put more emphasis on
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education and livelihood.1032 The project proposed awareness raising (the right to receive
information) to be important not only in advancement of gender equality, but also for
changing the power dynamics which could lead to the betterment of their socio-economic
conditions.1033
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17 AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE RESEARCH
As the findings of this dissertation showed, from the first years of the MDGs,
CIDA framed and conceptualized its contribution to the internationally agreed global
development goals as a raison d'être towards which addressing the issues and failures in
such areas as democratic governance and human rights — not mentioned in MDGs —
was also directed. However MDGs being the outcome of the international agenda setting
process, should have involved the participation of not only civil servants and the minister
responsible for international development, but also those responsible for Canadian
foreign policy. The analysis of the communication between civil servants in those
departments could contribute to understating whether Canada’s role in the international
norm setting such as MDGs and commitments to adopt those norms was conceptualized
as an actor whose position was driven by the primacy of sovereignty and pursuit of
national interests, or if instead it was a process driven by a perception of Canada as a
rational “principle” which constructed the norms together with the “agent” – international
organization (IO; in this case the United Nations).1034
If it were the former, would it be the manifestation of the persistency of
sovereignty in the governance of global goals coordinated by the IO? And even if Canada
committed and worked on global norms reflected in MDGs and which governed the
states’ conduct in areas of international development such arrangements were “neutral
mutants that have coexisted with rather than supplanted sovereignty.” 1035 Of the
particular interest would be the exchanges on MDGs as the outcomes of the norm
conceptualization and processes between CIDA’s staff and those stationed with the
1034
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Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, especially by taking into account the declared
mission of the Permanent Mission:
… negotiation and daily monitoring of UN activities, we work to advance
Canada’s interests, promote international development, security and human
rights, and keep our government informed of developments in multilateral
relations.1036 [emphasis added]
Or perhaps the staff in the Permanent Mission of Canada acted as a conduit of
norms developed together with the UN as an “agent” and transferred those norms to
CIDA? Such a framework treats “IOs as actors in their own right with independent
interests and capabilities” 1037 where the UN acted as the actor which developed the
roadmap from the Millennium Declaration and where MDGs were listed. As Barnett and
Finnemore emphasize “[a]utonomous action by IOs is to be expected.”1038 However, if
MDGs are viewed as “international regimes [which] are defined as principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a
given issue-area”,1039 the challenge is to explore to what extent there was a convergence in
expectations among bureaucrats in CIDA, the Permanent Mission of Canada and those in
the UN.
Research on bureaucracy in Canada involved not only in constructing the
narrative of MDGs in the international fora, but also within Canadian society as reflected
in the operationalization of MDGs in the program architecture, authority to advocate
certain priority countries Canada focused on, as well as selection of projects to be
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financed by CIDA, can contribute to understanding of Canadian civil servants as rational
and impersonal authority. This understanding of authority will examine CIDA’s staff as
“[the] … authority [that] is ‘‘rational’’ in that it deploys socially recognized relevant
knowledge to create rules that determine how goals will be pursued.” 1040 While
considering CIDA’s staff as impersonal rational authority, a special concern can be the
determination of which processes and rules within the department contributed to the fact
that the main policy documents such as CIDA’s HRDGG and on poverty, as this
dissertation findings showed, had not been adjusted to reflect CIDA’s declared
commitment to MDGs.
Another point of interest is whether CIDA’s staff as an impersonal rational
authority had the power to affect the choices of priority countries, and what issue areas of
projects to be financed based on the international development rationale and program
architecture, or if they were forced to adjust their decisions to accommodate Canada’s
foreign policy priorities. Could this be a possible reason why there was no MDG
reference in the analyzed projects? Was it a choice to use human rights, access to justice
and rule of law projects as a means of using Canada’s soft power through the projection
of “Canadian values” instead of a more formalized US approach implemented also
through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)1041?
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While no reference was made to MDGs — as the dissertation findings showed —
three out of four projects indicated their intent to contribute to poverty reduction. The
concern for the poor and human rights in developing countries had been articulated in the
overall Canadian development agenda as the projection of Canadian values with implied
notion of altruistic motives rather than accepting “egoistic” motives. But could this
approach be driven not by altruism or egoism but rather rational choice? As Keohane
posits, rejecting egoism,
… does [not] it imply altruism: People can empathize with others without being
self-sacrificing. What it does is demand that norms and values be brought back
into the picture. Committed individuals, seeking policy goals as well as office for
its own sake, and constrained by norms of fairness or even by more transcendental
values, can nevertheless calculate as rationally as the egoists of economic
theory.1042
Two of the cases analyzed in the dissertation projects (LAP and Secure Tenure and Safe
Spaces) were concerned with property ownership, and viewed it important not only in
rectifying the power imbalances experienced by the poor and marginalized, but also
important for economic well-being.1043 In developing countries, property, particularly land
distribution can be assessed through the lens of distributive justice. Nozick’s principles of
the just distribution – justice in acquisition, justice in transfer and “the rectification of
1042
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injustice in holdings” can frame the analysis of processes and impacts of the intended
outcomes of the projects. Of particular importance could be the questions raised by
Nozick in regards to the latter point,
If past injustice has shaped present holdings in various ways, some identifiable
and some not, what now, if anything, out to be done to rectify these injustices?
What obligations do the performers of injustice have toward those whose position
is worse than it would have been had the injustice not been done? Or, than it
would have been had compensation been paid promptly? How, if at all, do things
change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not the direct parties in
the act of injustice, but for example, their descendants?1044
The analysis of these projects through the current-time slice1045 and historical principles
of justice can provide another dimension of how Canada approached in its projects to the
issue of the distributive justice, especially in countries with still persisting issues of
historical injustices. In the meantime, the analysis can advise whether the types of law
reforms supported by CIDA created legal frameworks that regulated resources
distribution in recipient countries in accordance to the understanding of justice that CIDA
pursued through its programs and projects.
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